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2017 | 85 | 13-19
Article title

Price war on the polish petrol market

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EN
Abstracts
EN
Petrol market is very peculiar sector of economy. In Poland the biggest refineries are under control of government. This paper is first stage of analysis polish petrol market. By petrol market in this case we understand retail sale of fuel. The main purpose of this research is to analyze if cooperation between two biggest companies on market is possible and what type of cooperation should they choose. The direction of this analysis is to build a model that will explain which strategies are the best for the market and for those refineries. In this paper is showed only introduction and assumes to procedure of building this model.
Year
Volume
85
Pages
13-19
Physical description
Contributors
  • Department of Management, The Cardinal Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Poland
References
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Document Type
article
Publication order reference
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.psjd-f3af0f34-1633-4ea1-a54f-570825e6578d
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