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## The Age of Arrogance: Stupidity in the Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century

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### **ABSTRACT**

From the sinking of the Titanic to the end of World War II, the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century conforms to and confirms the behavioral model of stupidity as the learned inability to learn: That is a normal, dysfunctional learning process which occurs when a schema formed by linguistic biases and social norms acts via the neurotic paradox to establish a positive feedback system which becomes first self-sustaining and then renders behavior irrelevant to the environment by carrying detached actions to maladaptive excesses.

**Keywords:** Titanic, World War I, Prohibition, New Deal, World War II

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

At the turn of the twentieth century, Victorian industrialists seemed invincibly in command of everything but themselves. Sad to say, in their smug little world of wealth and success, their self-satisfaction appeared to be justified by the triumphs of technology. It seemed that the adaptive genius of inventors and the application of reason to the material world by scientists and engineers had indeed brought the progress enlightened dreamers had foreseen. With the Industrial Revolution in full swing, there appeared to be no limit to what technology could accomplish. The telephone, electric light, airplane and the rich man's newest toy the horseless carriage all seemed triumphs over nature. The physical world was viewed primarily

as a source of gratification for anyone with the power and inclination to avail himself of its riches.

## 2. DISCUSSION

Unfortunately, the arrogance inherent in this "We can do anything" attitude came to characterize the general stupidity of the age and contributed to the monumental problems we created for ourselves. While blatant aggression and exploitation of human resources and the natural environment comprised the most obvious of these in the twentieth century, they were in turn based on our fundamental inability to control the technology we had come to worship and ourselves, in whom we smugly, persistently believe. Until we find places for both people and nature in the equation "Technology=progress"<sup>1</sup>, we will continue to pay the price for the arrogance which flaws the Western psyche and characterizes the official attitude of the establishment. In fact, early in the century, even the most reverent believer in the invincibility of industrial technology should have learned from the fate of the **Titanic** that all our mechanical skill could not guarantee human safety when coupled with a vainglorious, arrogant disrespect for nature.

Nothing serves better to symbolize our pompous belief in both our technology and ourselves than the voyage of that ill-starred ship of death. It was the biggest, fastest and most luxurious ship ever built, and best of all, it was unsinkable. Obviously, Captain E. J. Smith had nothing to fear from petty things like icebergs, of which he had been warned.<sup>2</sup> After all, if there were a collision, the iceberg would be more likely to sink than the **Titanic** or so everyone except God believed.

As it turned out, God was right: **Titanic** had actually been built to sink. Its otherwise watertight compartments had been left open at the top so when six starboard bow compartments filled up after the collision, the ship was pulled downward to such a degree that water spilled over into the seventh and then the eighth and so on.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, there were not enough lifeboats on board as they had been considered superfluous<sup>4</sup> on an unsinkable ship, so more than fifteen hundred souls perished that "Morning". This was a large number for a single, totally unnecessary tragedy but a small sacrifice to arrogance as measured by later standards in a century of unnecessary tragedies.

While people have occasionally paid for having too much faith in fallible hardware, most of our tragedies intense international wars and prolonged domestic injustices - have been due to our all too human software and particularly our inability to get along with one another (e.g., in the years 1914-1991, over 187 million people were killed,<sup>5</sup> although this represented only

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<sup>1</sup>a A proposition we do not want to end a civilization with. (Lindburgh.)

2. Lord, W. Maiden Voyage. American Heritage; VII, #1, p. 105. Dec. 1955. This does not include the foretelling of the disaster in *The Wreck of the Titan\**—a novel written in 1898 by Morgan Robertson about the maiden (and final) voyage of an "Unsinkable" luxury liner which hit an iceberg and sank one April, with most lives lost due to a lack of lifeboats. (John Newman. p. 58.) \*Not Titanic, but eerily close.

3. Ibid. (Lord. p. 105.)

4. Milton, G. When Hitler took Cocaine and Lenin Lost His Brain. Picador; New York. 2010. p. 27.

5. Hobshawm, E. The Age of Extremism: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. Michael Joseph; London. 1994. p. 12. Overall, the ten deadliest wars in history killed 300 million, (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth. p. 1.) but who's counting?

1.5% of the population<sup>6</sup>). Despite the inventions and technological progress of the Industrial Revolution, we seem to be in our own Dark Age of human relations. Nothing better demonstrated this point than World War I, certainly one of our finest, major tragedies.

It might not have occurred at all, had anyone read and heeded the message in **Modern Weapons and Modern War** (1900) by Polish banker Jan Bloch. He warned that in the next war, the spade would be as important as the rifle and predicted that it would be a stalemate between men entrenched behind machine guns. In a summary statement for the ages of military stupidity, he noted, “The steadfastness with which the military caste clings to the memory of a state of things which had already died is....costly and dangerous.”<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, civilization/science did offer technical advances: to wit, heavy artillery, fast firing rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, high explosives, flame-throwers and poison gas.<sup>8</sup>

While it was true armies had difficulty adjusting to innovative weapons systems, it was truer that the British navy was well prepared to fight a battle it just happened to be the battle of Trafalgar (1805). The fleet was well scrubbed and polished, but gunnery practice was frowned upon because it would soil the ships’ paint. Equally frowned upon was Captain Percy Scott, who invented modern gunnery and whose ship scored 80% hits in practice when the going rate was 30%. A reform-minded admiral, Jackie Fisher, rhetorically asked, in 1902, “How many of our admirals have minds?” Three years later, he made Scott’s gunnery methods compulsory throughout the fleet.<sup>9</sup>

He might have wondered about the Kaiser’s mind as well. Had Willie polished his monocle, he would have realized that Britain would respond to the build-up of the German fleet in the first decade of the new century by building up its own.<sup>10</sup>

In 1910, **The Cambridge Modern History** touted peace through strength as a leading achievement of the times. The arms race which began in the late 1880’s made for peace, and, in addition, national passions had lost their operative power.<sup>11</sup> In that same year, Norman Angell published **The Great Illusion**, which argued that a war among the great powers was an economic futility: it made no dollars or sense due to the interdependence of credit/finance. Ergo, the industrialized nations were losing the “Psychological impetus to war”.<sup>12</sup> So convincing was

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6. Harari, Y. *Sapiens*. Harper; New York. 2015. p. 60. From 1945 to 2000 there were some 300 international wars—almost one every two months—in which an average of 73,300 people were killed. The UN intervened in two—Korea and Kuwait. (Schweikart. 2010. p. 161.) In addition, from 1945 to 1995 there were more than 110 civil wars—more than one every six months—with untold deaths. (Ibid. p. 162. Armitage.) In sum, “We don’t want any more wars but a man is a damned fool to think there won’t be any more of them.” (Butler. Aug. 28, 1931.) And so is a woman—Rosida Schwimmer, a pacifist who believed war would disappear. (Urofsky. p. 159) To be fair to her, we can observe only that it has not disappeared yet or, to put it in another context, it has for those who are dead. (Santayana. 1924. p 102. Mis-attributed to Plato.) Maybe it will be for everyone sometime in the future when there are no more humans or genetically programmed ants, which both make war and take slaves. On the other hand, ants are capable of entangling themselves to form a living bridge when necessary for the survival of the colony. (Dawkins. 2017. p. 100.)

7. Evans, R. *The Pursuit of Power*. Viking; New York. 2016. p. 703.

8. Kershaw, I. *Hell and Back*. Penguin; New York. 2016. p. 45.

9. Evans. op. cit. p. 701.

10. Ibid. p. 703.

11. Ward, A., G. Prothero and S. Leathes. (eds.) *The Modern Age*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, England. 1910. pp. 7-8.

12. Angell, N. *The Great Illusion*.\* London. 1910. p. 31. It turned out Angell (and Bloch) underestimated the catastrophic impact a world war would have on financial markets, which went into tailspins even before the war broke out. (J. MacDonald. p. 60.) Financiers had taken Angell’s warning to heart but, like the Renaissance bankers in their day, they did not have enough political clout to affect policy. (Ibid. p. 61.) Twenty-five years later, a similar

he that the president of Stanford University opined that a great war in Europe was impossible: “The bankers won’t come up with the money needed for such a war, and industry will not support it, so the statesmen simply won’t be able to do it....”<sup>13</sup> Scholarly Woodrow Wilson agreed.<sup>14</sup>

The nationalism and greed which blinded the bankers, industrialists and statesmen might not have done so if they had heeded the explicit warning made by Hamburg teacher Wilhelm Lamszus, who, in 1912, published **The Slaughterhouse**. In it, he described “Fields saturated with the dead,” “Corpses after corpses”. Death was portrayed as a mechanic with troops ordered to their deaths by technicians. He likened the mass production of buttons and pins to the coming production of cripples and corpses.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, in the spring of 1914, an international commission reporting on the fizzled Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 averred that the great powers of Europe realized that the richest country had the most to lose by war and that all wished for peace. A British member of the commission, Henry Brailsford, asserted his belief that the epoch of conquest was over and that there would be no more wars among the great powers, if—a minor caveat—everyone behaved reasonably.

However, as usual, when rationality was needed most, there was a complete break-down of political sanity<sup>16</sup> with only a few eccentric doomsayers imagining the war’s catastrophic consequences.<sup>17</sup> Aside from the human suffering created by the war, it was, as predicted, a colossal economic disaster for Europe. There has never been so crushing a refutation of Marx's theory of economic determinism as WWI. It impoverished and destroyed people, rulers and states if not corporations. It cost \$330 billion<sup>18</sup>—thirty-three times all the gold money in the world at the time almost all of it devoted to the art, science and technology of reciprocal destruction. If Marx had been right and economics ruled, there would have been and would be no war,<sup>19</sup> but *human conduct is governed by schematic (mis)perceptions rather than reality*, and people quixotically perceived that the impending war would be to their advantage.

In July, 1914, on the eve of the war, Prime Minister Edward Gray sagely commented to the Austrian Ambassador to Britain that fighting would “Involve the expenditure of so vast a

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“It cannot happen” attitude made the next war all the more likely. The war to end all wars had been fought, treaties had been signed and disarmament effected so another world war was unthinkable and efforts to prevent one deemed unnecessary—so guess what. Likewise, as a warning to us today, there was a prevailing school of thought that weapons and tactics had developed to the point that reasonable people would not go to war—it was too ghastly to contemplate. We should bear this in mind when we think that nuclear weapons have forced the contemporary statesman to be reasonable and keep his finger off the button. \*His book was an expansion on his pamphlet *Europe’s Optical Illusion* (1909). He personified the futility of an intellectual who was right but powerless: All his logic and factual accuracy was wasted in the face of irrationality. Worse yet, an updated edition published in 1933 once again failed to prevent a war even worse than the previous one. (Butler-Bowdon. Chap. 5.)

13. Jordan, D. Statement after a lecture by Norman Angell in June, 1913. Quoted on page 129 of *Illies*.

14. Brands, H. *Traitor to His Class*. Doubleday; New York. 2008. p. 70.

15. Evans. op. cit. p. 703.

16. Pitkin, W. *A Short Introduction to the History of Western Stupidity*. Simon and Schuster; New York. 1932. p. 424. Churchill, W. Letter to his wife. Aug. 2, 1914. Quoted on p. 5 of Rankin, N. *A Genius for Deception*. Oxford; NY. 2008. My theory of stupidity inclusively combines confirmation bias with groupthink. JFW.☺

17. Aaronovitch, D. *Voodoo Histories*. Riverhead Books; New York. 2010. p. 18.

18. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 476.

19. Bogart, E. *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*. 1919. p. 299. By 1918, major combatants were committing 40% of their GNP to the war effort. (Tooze. 2014. p. 199.) Actually, the war refuted every Victorian optimistic value system—liberal, conservative, nationalistic, (Ibid. p. 29.) and democratic—with democracies appearing to triumph, but only by making mockeries of themselves in the process. The real winner was militarism, which was then rejected by victorious powers seeking peace through weakness—i.e., treaties/disarmament.

sum of money and such interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of ...credit and industry” meaning “Total exhaustion and impoverishment, industry and trade would be ruined, and the power of capital destroyed.”<sup>20</sup>

He was right; it was within a matter of months when ammunition stocks ran low and the financial markets seized up. However, the governments just blithely went along with the war anyway by responding in unprecedented ways. Exports and imports were fascistically regulated and food and raw materials were rationed. At the same time, central banks took charge of the money markets.<sup>21</sup>

Georg Brandes’s explicit warning in 1913 that “A great European war would be an overwhelming tragedy for all concerned” was roundly ignored, and he lamely conceded that “Statistics showing war’s absurdity are of little use. They convince only those who know how to think”,<sup>22</sup> which is to say, very few in general and no one in power or “Power x Wisdom=K”. On the other hand, Lenin anticipated a practical boon to the revolution in Western Europe if Austria and Russia went at it,<sup>23</sup>

Against this backdrop of misperceptions, economic suicide, regional politics, cravings for vengeance and paranoid ambitions, a general reluctance to face known facts, throttle patriotic zeal and search for peace led to outright blunders.<sup>24</sup> It tumbled everyone into war through misunderstandings, personal complexities of inferiority and grandeur, individual idiosyncrasies and, yes, stupidity.<sup>25</sup>

One might accuse Pope Benedict XV of stupidity in 1917 for trying to introduce cognitive consistency into the events of the day. Sounding like a Catholic Woodrow Wilson, he introduced a peace plan which was based on international arbitration, evacuation of occupied territories, renunciation of war indemnities and reductions in armaments. For trying to apply Christianity to history, he was denounced as a hypocrite. Get that? The pope is a hypocrite for asserting Christian values in a world gone mad with killing!?!☹ The French called him “The Boche pope”; the Germans called him “The French pope”. Both likewise enlisted God on their side: *Dieu est de no-tre cote* means *Gott ist mit uns*.<sup>26</sup> Perplexed, God pondered the situation, undoubtedly in Oxford English or at least American.☺

What He found was that just as, fifty years later, the war in Vietnam was about what the war was about, so too was WWI. Economically, it was the “Have” Britain wary of the challenging Germany,<sup>27</sup> but ideologically, the two were fighting past each other due to too many well learned lessons in history.<sup>28</sup> From the Western allies’ perspective, it was democracy, truth and freedom against Prussian militarism: From the German perspective, it was justice, freedom,

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20. Ferguson, N. *The Pity of War*. Basic Books. New York. 1998. p. 191.

21. Tooze, A. *The Deluge*. Penguin Books; New York. 2014. p. 199.

22. Brandes, G. *The World at War*. 1917. p. 34. For a view, albeit from fiction, of how people viewed the evitable conflict see: Ibanez, V. *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse*. Dutton; New York. 1918. p. 31

23. Lenin, V. Letter to M. Gorky. Mar. 1913. Cited on page 61 of *Illies*.

24. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 477.

25. Kennedy, R. *Thirteen Days*. Norton; New York. 1969. p. 62.

26. Kershaw. op. cit. pp. 431-432.

27. MacDonald, J. *When Globalization Fails*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux; New York. 2015. p. 245. Anticipating the present—Britain: Germany=America: China. Indeed, the Chinese economy surpassed that of America in 2014. (Luce, E. p. 28.) Unfortunately, President Trump’s response was to instigate a tariff war. While that may be politically red (neck), white (sheet) and blue (collar), it is not wise to get into a trade war with an economic power greater than your own.☺ Also see: Friedman, T. *Longitudes and Attitudes*. p. 3.

28. Thomson, G. *The Twelve Days*. Hutchinson; London. 1964. p. 23.

honor and morals against mammon.<sup>29</sup> From the historians' perspective, it was Athens against Sparta. For its part, Austria wanted a fight, but in getting more than what it wanted, it was carried along by an unhealthy dose of Germanic arrogance. Specifically, as a realization of Nietzsche's "Will to power" by Germany's fascistically conjoined political and business interests with racial overtones, France was to be eliminated and Britain neutralized. This all came to worse than naught due to Germany's misjudgement of the fighting abilities of both its immediate and potential enemies.<sup>30</sup>

Actually, the organization of the wartime economy and means of production favored the West-ern democracies which risked innovation (the tank and airplane) and out produced the central powers. By 1917, every major offense by the British was supported by hundreds of tanks against German handfuls, and the final push in 1918 was covered by 2,000 airplanes, which outnumbered the Luftwaffe by a factor of more than five. The ultimate in artillery warfare was achieved on Sept. 28, when the last attack on the German line was preceded by an allied barrage of 11 shells *per second* for twenty-four hours.<sup>31</sup>

Four years earlier, however, this was totally beyond German ken, because rooted in many dominant egos is the "Custer complex" the inability to appreciate the capabilities of one's enemies. Worse yet, in militarists this handicap is often accentuated by pride, and throughout the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II, who dismissed the British Expeditionary Force as a "contemptible little army",<sup>32</sup> and his chief Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg were particularly susceptible to this condition. They assumed the allies would be too stupid to discern the intent of German genius and completely underestimated America's ability to raise and dispatch an army of real value to Europe.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, if one constant can account for WWI, it was the miscalculations of Germans' prewar policy stemming from cultural blindness leading to overestimations of themselves and underestimations of their opponents. Specifically, if the Kaiser had polished his monocle, he would have foreseen that, as a response to the build-up of the his Navy, the British would build up theirs.<sup>34</sup> Moderating influence from the civilian sector might have saved Germany from intiga ting the war, whereas the policy of lightening land grabs on two fronts smacks of militarists talking to each other in an echo chamber.<sup>35</sup> The result was a peculiar combination of angst, arrogance and insecurity compounded by political ignorance about the non-German world.<sup>36</sup> In a word: Dummheit.

Actually, in their assumption about the allies misreading their intent, the Germans were right. The French ignored retired German General Friedrich von Bernhard's **Germany and the**

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29. Wilhelm II, Kaiser. Speech celebrating his thirty years in power. June 15, 1918.

30. Fischer, F. *Griff nach der Weltmacht*. ("Germany's Aims in the First World War"— although a better translation is "Grab for World Power". JFW) 1967. Original source: Berghahn, V. *Perspectives on History*. Sept. 10, 2007.

31. Terraine, J. *White Heat*. London. 1982. In this context, it is noteworthy that America's contribution was more financial than industrial—that is, we underwrote the war rather than producing the materiel to win it as in WWII. (Tooze. 2014. p. 201.) The rate of shelling pales in comparison to that of sixty shells per second for one hour by the British at the battle of the Somme in June of 1916, while the death rate for both sides on the Western front that year was 125 per hour. (Schweikart and Allen. p. 529.) That is put to shame by the 40 bottles of whisky per second bought by the Irish, but the amount of shelling exceeded all done by the Union in the Civil War. (Dwyer.) Counterbalancing the factor of quantity, in WWII, the Germans always were superior to the allies in the quality of their weapons systems. That may have been true in WWI as well.

32. Simms, B. *Europe*. Basic Books; New York. 2014. p. 295.

33. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 243.

34. Evans. op. cit. p. 701.

35. Ferejohn, J. and F. Rosenbluth. *Forged Through Fire*. Norton; New York. 2017. p. 248.

36. Stern, F. *Failure of Illiberalism*. p. 152.

**Next War**, which, in 1912, suggested before Germany was strangled, it should smash the encircling alliance of England, France and Russia by a preventive war. That, in fact, became reality beginning with *the aggressive annexation plans activated by the Kaiser* and his military advisors in December of that year.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the French were completely wrong as to where the heaviest German attack would come if there were a war despite clear, accruing evidence that they were indeed wrong and a warning of their strategic error from the ablest among them, General Victor Michel. In 1911, he had informed the Supreme War Council he was convinced that if Germany attacked, it would do so via the northern route through Belgium *because* of the impenetrable French defenses in Lorraine.<sup>38</sup> The British had come to the same conclusion as to the probable route of a German attack, but the French commanders had made up their collective minds. They were convinced the Germans would take the southern route through Alsace Lorraine because 1.) this was where the Prussians had attacked in 1870, 2.) this was where the French had decided they would launch their own attack if there were a war, and 3.) a northern drive would necessarily bring Britain, which had a treaty with Belgium, into the war.<sup>39</sup>

If one had to pinpoint one colossal blunder which all but induced the war, it would be the “Blank check” Germany offered to Austria in July, 1914. Superficially, Austria confronted Serbia for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand on June 28. A possible confrontation between Austria and Russia loomed in the background, but Germany committed itself to supporting whatever Austria did. That encouraged Austria to take a hard line toward Serbia which eventually led to the consuming conflagration. What could have been a limited spat of short duration in southeast Europe became a world war.<sup>40</sup>

During this period just before the war, groupthink played an especially prominent role in shaping French arrogance. Members of the Supreme War Council supported each other in their commitment to ignore not only General Michel's warning but the fact that obvious military preparations had been made by Germany, as called for by their Schlieffen Plan, along the Belgian frontier, not in Alsace Lorraine, where the French had massed their troops. Their reliance on simplistic slogans about French élan and illusions about France's invulnerability—presumably not based on the awkward fact that Germany had walked all over them the last

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37. Fischer, F. op. cit. Based on Berghahn. op. cit. The War Guilt Clause (Article 231) of the Treaty of Versailles thus seems entirely justified. Everyone believed otherwise— especially the Germans, whose Foreign Minister Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau denounced the confession of guilt as a lie, (Fawcett. 2012. p. 216.) but it was, in fact, true. (Berghahn. op. cit.) The Kaiser's belligerent policy probably stemmed from Germany's backing down when threatened by France and Britain in a confrontation in 1911 in the Moroccan port of Agadir. War was averted, but Germany was deeply humiliated. In 1914, the Kaiser was pushed to attack France on the army's timetable. (Craig. pp. 255-295.) Further, although the scaled down reparations even in depreciated Marks were never completely collected, Germans misperceived the treaty as an insulting outrage (Watson. 2001. p. 176.)—one of the greatest and saddest triumphs of misperception over fact in history, with dire consequences for everyone, especially the Germans. Characterized as too cruel and too kind, it promoted WWII much as the Congress of Vienna in 1815 did the Franco-Prussian war. (Tooze. 2014. p. 271-272.) An alternative take on it is that many of its provisions never were enforced, so it may have been that the treaty was not so bad; the problem was that it was not enforced. (Butler-Bowdon. p. 92.) Sadly, the treaty was all but matched in its tragic dimensions by the effect of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1905)—a forgery by the Tsar's secret police which allowed Hitler to falsify history to justify the Holocaust (Rosenbaum. p. 55.) and Hamas to rationalize Jew bashing. (Simms. p. 484.)

38. Tanenbaum, J. General Maurice Sarrail. University of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC. 1974. pp. 26-27.

39. Pitkin. op. cit. pp. 405-406. Bethmann Hollweg, T. von. Chancellor of Germany. Speech to the Reichstag. Aug. 4, 1914. (Quoted on page 240 of Walzer.)

40. Kershaw. op. cit. p. 32.

time–bolstered their decision to adopt an unrealistic military Plan XVII to launch a frontal assault against Germany's most heavily fortified western border.<sup>41</sup>

This plan was flawed not only in that it all but ignored the possibility of a German sweep through Belgium, but also because it was based on misleading intelligence. By counting only active German divisions and ignoring reserves, the French underestimated by half the defensive strength opposite the Lorraine gap and thus actually planned their attack with numbers equal to those of the well fortified enemy.<sup>42</sup> The key to this miscalculation was the fixed (i.e., stupid) belief that the Germans would not deploy their reserves to the front lines. Evidence to the contrary, which began seeping through to the French General Staff in 1913, was, of course, ignored.<sup>43</sup> Hence, when the war began and the Schlieffen plan was put into effect, the French were caught totally unprepared. They had to pull back and regroup, and when, with British assistance, they finally managed to stand off the Germans at the battle of the Marne (September 6-10, 1914), the war became a stalemate.<sup>44</sup>

The entire German army would have been annihilated had the battle begun just one day earlier, which it would have, had the British been as dedicated to timely action as they were to proper at-tire. Unfortunately for tens of millions of men, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, the military governor of Paris who conceived the plan for the battle, was a bespectacled, untidy, shaggy chap with black buttoned boots and yellow leggings. No British officer would be seen talking to such a "Damned comedian", and because of the resultant delay, the master stroke fell a day late, and the war dragged on for four years.<sup>45</sup>

It was a grand fiasco, with all sides bent on matching each other idiocy for fiasco for disaster a four year military train wreck in which sanity was lost in the midst of millions of madmen adoring their madness.<sup>46</sup> In 1916, a French officer wrote in his diary, "Humanity is mad! It must be mad to do what it is doing. What a massacre! What bloody scenes of horror! Hell cannot be so terrible. Men are mad!" The madness ended for him the next day when he was killed.<sup>47</sup> In that way alone, he incarnated the naive spirit of the early phase of the war: "Come and die. It will be great fun"<sup>48</sup> which was only an echo of Horace Vachell's **The Hill** (1905), an idealized fantasy about Harrow: "To die young, clean, ardent; to die swiftly, in perfect health...to die and carry with you into the fuller, ampler life beyond, untainted hopes and aspiration, un embittered memories, all the freshness and gladness of May—is that not a cause for joy rather than sorrow?" Likewise, in 1912, Viscount Esher enthralled Cambridge students with his observation that to underestimate the "Poetic and romantic aspects of the clash

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41. Janis, I. *Groupthink*. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. 2nd ed. 1982. p. 187. Too bad there was no Plan XVIII. (-;-)

42. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 405.

43. Tuchman, B. *The March of Folly*. Knopf; New York. 1984. p. 7.

44. Korda, M. *Hero*. Harper; New York. 2010. p. 250.

45. Pitkin. op. cit. pp. 357-358.

46. Céline, L. In *The American Heritage History of the 1920's and 1930's*. 1970. New York. p. 13. Rolland, R. Aug. 3, 1914. Quoted by S. Zweig on page 265 of *Romain Roll-and*. Thomas Seltzer; New York. 1921. A tragic example of such madness was the strategic thinking of the Germans in the Battle of Verdun: They hoped to "Bleed sense" into the allies. (Simms. p. 296.) Unfortunately, sense does not bleed well.

47. Joubaire, A. 1916. Cited on p. 223 of *Profiles in Audacity* by A. Axelrod. Sterling; New York. 2006. All but echoing this sentiment, on Memorial Day, thirty-five years later, Gen. Eisenhower, commenting in his diary upon the graves continually being added for future decoration noted, "Men are stupid." (E. Thomas. p. 11.) In the same vein, while serving in the Pacific during WWII, future President John Kennedy said, "War is stupid". (Talbot.)

48. Brooke, R. (Aug/Sept.?) 1914. A personal letter quoted by M. Crowley. *A Second Floweri*. New York. 1974. p. 6.

of arms” would be to “Display enfeebled spirit and an impoverished imagination”, or maybe first-hand knowledge of death in the trenches.

In a world in which pointing out the obvious could be considered an act of treason, for every whistle blower who noted that something was amiss and asserted that the war, when it came, was not working, there were millions who could not hear the whistles and assertions for all the cheering and shouting of jingoist propaganda at parades. Considering the preternatural idiocy balanced by all combative parties fairly reveling in their own madness if not stupidity, it is remarkable that anyone ever won.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, without overwhelming American strategic intervention, WWI might well be raging to this day.<sup>50</sup>

For sheer tactical idiocy, however, nothing could match that of the generals on both sides who clung to their "Attack" tactic long after it had been rendered clearly obsolete by modern weaponry. Indeed, repeatedly smashing uselessly up against the enemy's strongest point became a veritable British tradition:<sup>51</sup> Time after time, wave after wave of troops proved that direct frontal assault was a futile exercise in carnage, and everyone knew it but those in command. As one survivor described it, whole waves were scythed like hay by the traversing machine guns. “Down they went like wheat. I could see them dropping one after another as the guns swept along them.”<sup>52</sup>

It took a few years and millions of casualties for this fact to trickle upward in to those who found explanations for failure everywhere but in their own planning.<sup>53</sup> All that was needed for victory was more troops to carry out the faulty plan—or for the guy who planned the battle once to lead the attack. Never was the assumption on which the error was built challenged<sup>54</sup> so a new idea—like the need for tanks could be adopted. In fact, it probably never would have made it on its own but was carried along with surviving field officers as they gradually were promoted to staff rank and then could make their views known to some practical effect. Some of these were the undoubtedly the mercifully un-scathed minority of British troops who attacked at the Somme on July 1, 1916. One of the lessons they learned was that they should have used more than the 36 tanks which took part in the battle on Sept. 15th.<sup>55</sup> They were no doubt chagrined and dismayed to learn that the reason more had not been used was that the rawhide-bound cavalry preferred to use horses.<sup>56</sup> The battle behind the battle was thus tanks versus horses.

Another lesson the British commanders should have learned the first day of the battle was that it was not worth the cost—20,000 killed plus 40,000 wounded.<sup>57</sup> The failure to learn this lesson can properly be attributed in part to the desire to validate the cost paid by eventually

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49. Anderson, S. *Lawrence in Arabia*. Anchor Books; New York. 2013. p. 70.

50. While meant to be facetious, this remark reflects a common appraisal of the strategic situation by some of those who were there in 1916. (Kohler. and Donaldson.)

51. *Ibid.* p. 442.

52. Anonymous. July 1, 1916<. Quoted on page 102 of David.

53. Actually this lesson should have been learned sixty years earlier in the Crimean War when attack tactics developed in the days of the musket proved suicidal against defenders' rifles, but no one except the soldiers (i.e., the targets) seemed to notice. (Ghaemi. p. 219.) A change in technology; leads to a change in tactics.

54. Goodwin, R. *Remembering America*. Little Brown; Boston, MA. p. 543.

55. Jeffrey, K. 1916. *Blumsbury*; New York. 2015. p. 250.

56. Watson, P. *A Terrible Beauty: The People and Ideas That Shaped the Modern Mind –A History*. 2001. Phoenix; San Diego, CA. p. 146. As an exercise in carnage/futility, it topped Verdun. Following a week-long artillery bombardment, it lasted four months, cost-ing the Allies over one million casualties to push the line ten miles east. (Jeffery. Chap. 9.) As for the British cavalry giving up on their horses, twenty years later, they were still committed to their nags. (Holland. p. 43.)

57. Middlebrook, M. *The First Day of the Somme*. Penguin edn. London, England. 2001. p. 263.

achieving the desired and hoped for breakthrough. However, after two of three months of futility, that explanation faded into embarrassed absurdity.

In a war of such black ribbon blunders, however, few campaigns can match the disaster at Gallipoli, which was shaped largely by British commanding General Lord Kitchener's assumption that the Turks would run away.<sup>58</sup> Rarely, has there been such a spectacular gap between grandiose ambitions and disastrous execution. The initial landing, in fact, was so badly botched and the defending Turkish general so bewildered by its idiocy that he thought it must be a diversion.<sup>59</sup> Worse yet, as if rehearsing for the Battle of Verdun, both sides poured troops into the carnage trying to convince the other that 'We are too stupid to stop this madness, so you should'.<sup>60</sup>

However, none of the specific debacles there compares in stupidity to an advance made by the Allies at Anzac Bay on Aug. 6, 1915. A column moved to within a quarter of a mile of the ridge with only twenty Turks ahead of them. They could have easily taken the high ground and turned the entire campaign into a glorious triumph. A supply line to Russia would guarantee it would stay in the war.<sup>61</sup> Turkey would have then been knocked out of the war. Bulgaria would then not have joined the Axis powers. Austria would have been vulnerable, Germany isolated and the war over. So what did the troops in the column do? They stopped for breakfast!<sup>62</sup>

The only thing that could possibly have been any stupider would have been if they had stopped for tea. This was but one example of the general British inability to comprehend the importance of time in affairs of action.<sup>63</sup> Again and again, throughout the war, simple delays of minutes and hours spelled the difference between easy victory and disastrous defeat. The British presumably knew the war was not a gallant cricket match but, nevertheless, conducted their efforts with a casual indifference to time born of leisurely bowling when ready. More probably as a holdover of their indifference to timing in the Boer War,<sup>64</sup> they never could quite grasp the notion that at a given moment fifty men might accomplish what thousands could not do an hour later. As for the troops breakfasting at Gallipoli, when they finished, they were finished. The Turks had reinforced the ridge, so the well fed column traipsed back down the hill for an uneventful, terribly English lunch.

That said, this non-battle compares favorably with the results of a clash between the Turks and the 6<sup>th</sup> Gurkha Rifles that month for the nearby Sari Bair ridge. The Rifles took the high ground in bloody hand-to-hand combat, only to be driven off by friendly fire from the Royal Navy.<sup>65</sup>

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58. Rankin, N. *A Genius for Deception*. Oxford University Press; New York. 2008. p. 64. For a rambling account of the campaign, see Chapter I of Jeffery's 1916.

59. Anderson. *op. cit.* p. 120.

60. Kennedy, P. *Engineers of Victory*. Random House; New York. 2013. pp. 221-222.

61. *Ibid.* p. 221.

62. Taylor, A. 1963. *The First World War*. Putnam; New York. 95.

63. Churchill W. 1930. *My Early Life*. Scribners; New York. pp. 235 and 308. A mistake repeated in the next war by the French (Holland. p. 112.), who had learned too well the lessons of static defense in the first war (*Ibid.* p. 120.) to adapt to motorized mobility in the second. See also: Hitler, A. Speech to his generals 28 Dec., 1944. In Parker. pp. 218-219.

64. David, S. *Military Blunders*. Skyhorse Publishing; New York. 1997. p. 37.

65. Davies, H. *Allison of the 6<sup>th</sup>*. Worcester. 1990. p. 51. As bad as that snafu was, it compares favorably to the experience of some French troops at Verdun who were attacked from behind by other French troops who were trying to retake some ground they had previously lost. (Desagneaux. pp. 19-31.) On the other hand, "Friendly" fire sometimes was "Disciplinary"—directed at recalcitrant units which were underperforming or threatening to surrender. (Jeffery. pp. 86-87.)

Generally, the reigning mentality was structured and by decrepit military elites aristocratic, aging, palace sycophants whose battlefield incompetence and callous indifference toward those dying for them were evenly matched by their rivals. The British would muddle through; German arrogance would prevail; élan would carry the French to victory; peasants would serve as Russian cannon fodder.

Still, if British generals often gave away in stupidity what they had gained in ignorance,<sup>66</sup> the German Admiralty was there to save them. In September of 1915, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was ousted from control of the German Navy for protesting the restriction of submarine warfare. He had fallen under the sway of **Danger**, a fanciful novel by Sherlock Holmes's Sir Arthur Conan Doyle published in 1913, in which England is starved into submission by the submarines of a warring enemy state. Ignored by the British, the book led<sup>67</sup> Tirpitz to call for the sinking of every enemy ship afloat and every neutral vessel in the war zone. This was, of course, the policy adopted by the Germans early in 1917, so he was dismissed for calling for the right policy at the wrong time. His replacement, Admiral von Capelle, rejected, in 1916, a proposal that the shipyards increase submarine production by a factor of five. His rationale must rank as the stupidest remark ever made<sup>68</sup> "Nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats after the war"<sup>69</sup> and it sounds even worse in German. Further, the Kriegsmarine repeated the same mistake in the next war.<sup>70</sup>

In 1917, when it was clear to the German High Command that victory on land was impossible, unrestricted submarine attacks were resumed in the hope that England could be

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66. Lawrence, T. E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. (Oxford text. 1922.) Wilder Press; Blacks-berg, VA. 1991. p. 386.

67. O'Connell, R. *The Great War Torpedoed*. In *What If?* R. Cowley (Ed.). Putnam; New York. 2001. p. 599. See endnote 349 below for a WWII equivalent. Carrying on the theme of literature's influence on warfare, many of the novel weapons developed in WWII by the British were the fruits of techies reared on Jules Verne and H. G. Wells (Kennedy, P. p. 56.): e.g., Wells predicted atomic bombs in *The World Set Free*.

68 Apparently, the German military failed to learn anything from this error as the second stupidest remark might be that made by the Berlin Air Ministry in 1940, when postponement of work on all planes which would not be operational in two years was ordered because "Such types will not be wanted after the war".\* Likewise, and presumably for the same idiotic reason, in the spring of 1942, Hitler cancelled work on all new weapons systems—including the atom bomb—which would not be operational in six weeks. Third would be Abe Lincoln's comment in 1860 that "[The South] has too much common sense and good temper to break up [the Union]". Fourth—Ken Olson, president of Digital Equipment in 1977: "There is no reason for any individual to have a computer in their (sic) home". Fifth—my grandfather Frederick regarding the construction of the old Yan-kee Stadium: "No one will go all the way over there to see a baseball game". Sixth—Col. George Washington on Sept. 5, 1774: "No thinking man in all of North America desires independence." Seventh—Senator Morris Shepard in Sept., 1930: "There is as much chance of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment [prohibition] as there is for a humming bird to fly to the planet Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its tail". Eighth—Pres. Hubert Hoover in June 1928: "We in America to-day are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land." Ninth—Wilber Wright in Aug., 1901: "Not in 1,000 years would man ever fly!" Tenth—Albert Einstein's school headmaster's assessment of Al's future: ".....he'll never make a success of anything." (Like Einstein, Thomas Edison was an indifferent student. Smith. 1984. p. 117. Ditto Charles Darwin. McCalman. p. 19.) \* This presumably included the jet plane, which had been flown in 1939 reaching the speed of 481 mph. (Gilbert. p. 248.) Ca. 1942, a prop driven German JU-290—or JU-390—flew a recon mission to New York and back. (Schweikart and Allen. p. 629. Year and model are debated.) Hitler likewise set rocket development back 2.5 years when, at the start of the war, he decided they would not be needed so he put the program on hold (McDougall. pp. 42-43.). It is difficult to imagine how different the war would have been if the Nazis had had operational rockets at the start of 1942.

69. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 489. Worse yet, a compromise was available—an increase by a factor of four would work pretty well and might have been acceptable to opponents of five.

70. Donitz, Grand Adm. K. *Memoirs*. Naval Institute Press; Annapolis; MD. 2012. p. 333.

starved out of the war before America could intervene effectively. According to Hindenberg, things could not get worse,<sup>71</sup> and in a fit of characteristic optimism, the German admirals claimed that within five months, Britain would crumble<sup>72</sup> so the possibility of American involvement was not denied but was discounted: There simply would not be enough time for Yank forces to play a decisive role in the land war before England had to sue for peace.<sup>73</sup>

At best, this was a gamble; at worst, a colossal mistake. However, there was no other option available given the German insistence on victory, which became a rejection of reality with hide-bound Teutonic efficiency leading to disaster<sup>74</sup>—as it would do again a generation later—rather than open-minded, reasoned debate leading to a compromise peace. Woodrow Wilson's proposal of a negotiated peace without victory simply was not psychologically acceptable to a mentality schooled in winning objectives by force rather than via adjustment and accommodation. Nor could the Imperial Navy acknowledge its limitations by allowing even the possibility that England would still be in the war in 1918. The Chancellor's secretary admitted, "...all the old thoughts and methods fail",<sup>75</sup> meaning they had no schema to guide their policies. So, in the spirit of the finest Greek tragedy, Germany proved that character is indeed fate and, in a most fitting image, torpedoed itself.<sup>76</sup>

Military matters aside, once the United States entered the war, American intellectuals, in their idealist way, saw the war as their opportunity for a moral cleansing of Americana.<sup>77</sup> With the war quickly becoming a war on the American soul, **World** reporter Wilson Cobb presciently noted, "The spirit of ruthless brutality will enter the very fiber of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street. Conformity will be the only virtue. And every man who refuses to conform must pay the penalty." It would permit the implementation of desired political, economic and social programs<sup>78</sup> and provide a chance to rethink the basic, sacred American dogmas of democracy, equality and liberty.<sup>79</sup>

Liberty, especially, had to be rethink because in order to make democracy safe for the world, an economic dictatorship established rationing and price-fixing promoted by totalitarian propaganda in the form of the Committee for Public Information.<sup>80</sup> To make the world safe for democracy, the CPI's efforts in producing pro-war propaganda matched those suppressing dissent in the forms of the Espionage (1917) and Sedition (1918) Acts. While Lincoln had shut down hostile newspapers during the Civil War,<sup>81</sup> these laws made it a crime to criticize the government even in one's own home or use disloyal, pro-fane, scurrilous or abusive language

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71. Stevenson, D. 1917. Oxford University Press; New York. 2017. p. 30.

72. Kershaw. 2016. p. 54. Granier, G. (ed.) *Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg*. 2000. IV; p. 43–on the five month bit.

73. Tuchman. op. cit. p. 26.

74. Churchill, W. Comment made on May 10, 1917 to A. Scott. Quoted on p. 10 of W. Morrissey's *Churchill and de Gaulle*. Rowman & Littlefield; Lanham, England. 2015.

75. Patterson, A. (ed.) *The Jellico Papers*. 1968. II; p. 88. Quotation of K. Riezler.

76. *Ibid.* pp. 28-29. Ditto Hitler twenty-five years later re: negotiating. (Kershaw. 2000. p. 540.) On submarines, see Buchanan, P. *Where the Right Went Wrong*. Thomas Dunne; New York. 2005. p. 157.

77. Rothbard, M. Spring, 2002. Richard T. Ely: Paladin of the Welfare-Warfare State. *Independent Review*; 6, #4, p. 587.

78. [www.fff.org/freedom/fd0203c.asp](http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0203c.asp) Croly, H. Nov. 7, 1914. *The End of American Isolation*. *The New Republic*.

79. Steel, R. Nov. 20, 2003. *The Missionary*. *New York Review of Books*. McGerr, M. 2003. *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920*. Free Press; New York. pp. 59 and 66.

80. Goldberg, J. 2007. *Liberal Fascism*. Doubleday; New York. 111. On the CPI, see Sass, E. *The Mental Floss History of the United States*. Harper; New York. 2010. p. 193.

81. Strausbaugh, J. *City of Sedition*. Twelve; New York. 2016. p. 60.

about the flag, the armed forces or the country during the war<sup>82</sup> indeed, the Espionage Act made it a crime to criticize itself.<sup>83</sup> Under these laws, framed more to suppress dissent<sup>84</sup> than ferret out spies,<sup>85</sup> citizens were imprisoned for criticizing the Red Cross at their own dinner tables,<sup>86</sup> and stiff penalties were imposed on anyone who questioned official Liberty Bond propaganda.<sup>87</sup> Congressman Victor Berger was sentenced later overturned to twenty years in prison for criticizing the war in a news-paper editorial.<sup>88</sup>

The Acts also granted Postmaster General Albert Burleson the authority to deny mailing privileges to any publication which, in his opinion, exceeded “The limit”, which, to him, was when a publication “Begins to say that this government got in the war wrong, that it is in it for the wrong purposes, or anything that will impugn the motive of the government for going into the war....”<sup>89</sup> In a spin-off of the war effort, socialist publications were banned from the mails. However, the effectiveness of this program was hampered because, according to Socialist Norman Thomas, Mr. Burleson “.....didn’t know socialism from rheumatism”.<sup>90</sup>

Nor was there much to distinguish legally between those who practiced the oldest profession and any female exercising her civil right to walk alone near a military base. Thanks to the morally pure Chamberlain-Kahn Act of 1918, all were arrested, incarcerated and subjected to a gynecological examination.<sup>91</sup> If truth is the first casualty of war, tolerance is the second<sup>92</sup> and under-standing the third, but stupidity flourisheth unabated.

As proof thereof, presumed champion of civil rights Clarence Darrow stated, “Any man who would not back the President in this crisis is worse than a traitor”,<sup>93</sup> the idea being that, once the bullets fly, citizens lose the right to discuss much less debate the going-to-war issue publicly or privately. At that point, so his thinking went, “Acquiescence on the part of the citizen became a duty,”<sup>94</sup> and supporters of the war could not wait to jump on the military/nationalist, jingoistic bandwagon.<sup>95</sup> In the cause of perpetual peace, progressive clergymen “Transported the war out of the sordid but understandable realm of national ambition, rivalry, and interest—where policies and goals can be debated and defined—into the rarified world of ideals, abstractions, and politicized theology, where dissent and limitations are not only moral failures

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82. Katznelson, I. *Fear Itself*. Liveright; New York. 2013. 325.

83. Dwyer, J. (Ed.) *Strange Stories, Amazing Facts of America’s Past*. Reader’s Digest; Pleasantville, NY. 1989. p. 98.

84 As a personal note, an American flag was burned on my mother’s front lawn in Paterson, NJ, during the war as a protest to my grandfather’s opposition to it. He thought the munitions makers were behind the whole thing—a position later espoused by the US Senate’s Nye Committee in the 1930’s (Persico. p 25) and authors H. Barnes, C. Grattan, W. Millis and S. Butler. Btw, most people going to war do not consider the cost—just the potential profit.

85. Urofsky, M. *Dissent and the Supreme Court*. Pantheon Books; New York. 2015. p. 166.

86. Bryson, B. *One Summer*. Doubleday; New York. 2013. p. 276.

87. Tooze. op. cit. p. 215.

88. Bryson. op. cit. p. 399.

89. Brands, H. 2001. *The Strange Death of American Liberalism*. Yale University Press; New Haven, CT. p. 40. Wheeler, W. and Becker, D. *Discovering the American Past*. Two volumes. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. 1990.

90. Painter, N. *Standing at Armageddon*. Norton; New York. 1987. p. 335.

91. Hobson, B. *Uneasy Virtue*. University of Chicago Press; Chicago, IL. 1990. p. 169.

92. Aeschylus (Ca. 500 B.C.) on the first. Wilson, Pres. W. on the second. An undated quotation on p. 660 of McWilliams.

93. *The New York Times*. Sept. 16, 1917. *Charges Traitors in America Are Disrupting Russia*. p. 3.

94. Darrow, C. Ca. 1917-1918. Cited in *American Journal of Legal History*. Apr. 1979. Vol. 23, #2, p. 116.

95. Mother Jones. Cited on page 69 of *Populist Persuasion: An American History* by M. Kazin. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY. 1998.

but may be even ideological heresies.”<sup>96</sup> As one socialist grouched, “If you stopped to collect your thoughts, you could be arrested for illegal assembly<sup>97</sup> while the grossest abuse of legal assembly stemmed from the Selective Service Act of 1917. Consistent with the president’s penchant for self-delusion, Wilson claimed this was not conscription but selection from those who had volunteered in mass<sup>98</sup> al-though any actual volunteers enlisted.

Protest is most needed when the military, press and priests bid everyone to fall into silent lockstep and obey official commands,<sup>99</sup> but intolerance decreed that individualism was out and collectivism<sup>100</sup> in because individualism was barbaric and collectivism essential.<sup>101</sup> In the cause of negative liberty, the Injustice Department created its own band of civilian spies—the American Protective League, the members of which were given badges and the opportunity to read the mail and listen in on the phone conversations of their co-workers, neighbors and friends. They also cracked the heads of draft dodgers and cracked down on seditious street oratory<sup>102</sup> while in some communities it was a crime to play music by German composers.<sup>103</sup>

Woe also unto those in the halls of academia who criticized the war effort! The President of Columbia University fired three professors who did so because, due to the shifting standards of the times, “What had been wrongheadedness (i.e., stupidity) was now sedition; What had been folly was now treason”.<sup>104</sup> Faculty member and preeminent historian Charles Beard resigned in protest against the suppression of “Everything we don’t like to hear”—i.e., un-PC—in a country founded on a disrespect for and the denial of unjust authority.<sup>105</sup>

However, the ultimate price for dissenters was alluded to in a **Washington Post** editorial which noted the awakening of the country was a healthful and wholesome thing “In spite of excesses such as lynching....”<sup>106</sup> But what is a little lynching among righteous collectivists so long as you are not the lynchee like the German man in St. Louis who was believed to have spoken ill of America: He was set upon by a mob, tied up in an American flag and hanged, with the mob leaders acquitted because it had been a patriotic murder.<sup>107</sup>

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96. Gamble, R. *The War for Righteousness*. ISI Books; Wilmington, DE. 2003.

97. Anonymous. Ca. 1918. Quoted on p. 97 of Leuchtenburg.

98. Leuchtenburg, W. *The American President*. Oxford University Press; New York. 2015. p. 97.

99. Norton, C. An undated quotation on page 772 of McWilliams.

100. Perkins, G. Cited on p. 299 of M. McGerr. *A Fierce Dis content: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920*. Free Press; New York. 2003.

101. Abbot, L. Cited in McGerr. op. cit. 59. Fifteen years later in an entirely different context—the New Deal—Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Charles Evans Hughes voiced the same sentiment: “No one can go it alone”. Commencement address at the Deerfield Acade-my, Deerfield, MA. June, 1933. Cited by J. Shesol in *Supreme Power*. Norton; NY. 2010. p. 53.

102. Zinn, H. 2003. *The Twentieth Century: A People’s History*. HarperCollins; New York. 89-92. Knightley, P. *The Second Oldest Profession*. Norton; New York. 1986. p. 36.

103. Bryson. op. cit. p. 165.

104. Nore, E. 1983. *Charles Beard: An Intellectual Biography*. Southern Illinois University Press; Carbondale, IL. 80. Quoted on page 11 of Stone and Kuznick. See also: “Oust Traitors, Says Butler”. *The New York Times*. June 7, 1917.

105. Stone, O. and Kuznick, P. *The Untold History of the United States*. Gallery Books; New York. 2012. p. 11.

106. *Washington Post*. Apr. 12, 1918. *Stamping Out Treason*. Editorial.

107. Bryson. op. cit. p. 165. This was matched in Germany in 1919, when the offing of an unpopular politico failed to qualify as a real murder because the victim was doing so poorly at the polls. (Range. pp. 130-131.) Continuing the theme of misguided patriotism, on May 10, 1970, four days after four Vietnam war-protesting students were killed by the National Guard at Kent State University in Ohio, some students were attacked in New York City by rampaging construction workers armed with crowbars and other heavy tools wrapped in American flags. (Medsger. p. 26.) Unfortunately, only a few people understand that no one can shoot, bomb or kill an idea but, some nut cases nevertheless try.

Generally, the war ended the “Modern Era” 1700-1914, which was grounded in reason but subverted by subjective ambiguity, and replaced it with the post-Modern World—1914-1989—one of polarity,<sup>108</sup> with inveterate enemies righteously opposing each other. In the immediate post WWI era, however, Europe suffered as much from economic as mental exhaustion with a complete lack of capacity or will to believe or justification for believing in progress. That had been thrown into reverse, as had fashionable tastes in art,<sup>109</sup> which reverted from abstraction to conservative symbolism. Nor could belief in a despairing God encompass the carnage so recently created by good, righteous, educated and wise, scientific Christians.

This view was glossed over by cloche Christian Karl Barth, who opined that human nature does not change, there is no moral progress and the central fact of life is sin/evil. With the devastation of the war at hand as evidence, he made a compelling, Schopenhaueresque case. As a result of man’s sinful nature, we live in a perpetual moral crisis. Irrelevantly, bound to the dysfunctional past, he maintained salvation was obtainable by believing in the literal truth of the Bible<sup>110</sup>—this being the way to overcome yourself and be a saint.

Nor could anyone in the post-war era think of doing anything original in international economics but recreate 1913—which had led to 1914. Financial terminology was dominated by “Re’s”\*: Reconstruction, recovery, reparations, retrenchment, repayment of debts, revaluation of currency, restoration, re-etc.<sup>111</sup> In all countries, there was an excess of short-sightedness compounded by manic swings between vague idealism and concerted hard headedness.<sup>112</sup> In Germany in particular, there was psychological collapse as *people ceased to believe in the government’s ability to solve problems*, and the memory of the resultant fear and hysteria of the dispossessed middle class would provide a springboard for Hitler’s democratic ascension to power ten years later.<sup>113</sup> The political victories of such demagogues in the 20<sup>th</sup> century destroyed any remaining faith in Rousseau’s general will<sup>114</sup> and even called democracy into question.

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108. Fussell, P. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Oxford University Press; Oxford, England. p. 79.

109. Winter, J. *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, England. 1995. p. 78ff

110. Watson. *op. cit.* p. 576.

111. Thomson, D. 1962. *Europe Since Napoleon*. Longmans; London. p. 563. The “Re’s” reemerged after WWII as reconversion, readjustment, returning, relearning, reintegration, reconditioning, renaturalization and rehabilitation. (Re-Ibid.)

112. Ibid. p. 571.

113. Ibid. p. 569. Hitler’s rise to power (Hett. p. 3.) calls not only democracy into question but the idealistic principles of truth and objectivity as well. (Rosenbaum. p. 132.) Fans of democracy are stuck with the fact that Hitler rose to power legally. Any political system which permits that kind of thing is suspect and demands attention, but students of political science overlook this essential. Perhaps this is due to the fact that neither facts nor honesty prevailed against concerted, appealing Nazi propaganda which propagated perverse but ide-als appealing to humiliated Germans. Complicating matters severely was the fact that, in the 1920’s, millions of Germans’ beliefs were simply untrue. (Hett. p. 30.) Politics was—and is— not about facts and reality but about creating beliefs, be they valid or not. Also, the Weimar constitution contained a clause which bestowed on the executive emergency powers broad enough for Hitler to march through. (Ferejohn/Rosenbluth. p. 231.) In a lesser way, Americans elected Buchanan, Grant (twice yet), Harding and LBJ\* and Nixon^ back to back but somehow survived. In the late 1970’s, they lost faith in the liberal government’s ability to solve problems and turned conservative (Jeffries. p. 114.) until they tired of the problems conservatives created and turned Democratic until the Supreme court elected W—the worst of all—who forsook the War on Terror for oil in Iraq and led the country into the Great Re-cession. \*For a look at the crude, vulgar LBJ behind the scenes, see Kessler, Chap. 1.

^ Nixon was the consummate liar. (Kessler. p. 56.) It could be said, he was never caught telling the truth. ●

114. Luce, E. *The Retreat of Western Liberalism*. Atlantic Monthly Press; New York. 2017. p. 126.

Meanwhile, America found itself indulging in fits of emotional abandon while displaying some rather strange forms of its puritanical self-righteous character. At the very start of the Jazz Age, American fanaticism was at its peak in what just as well should be known as the Golden Age of Bigotry: Never before or since have so many Americans hated so many others with more passion and less reason.<sup>115</sup> The Ku Klux Klan made a resurgence and went public nationwide<sup>116</sup> representing the great mass of real Americans vs. the “Intellectually mongrelized liberals”.<sup>117</sup> In the holy spirit of a hooded Jesus, Santa Claus dressed in Klan regalia distributed yuletide presents to children in Detroit by the light of a burning cross.<sup>118</sup> Sad to say, there were towns in which the Klan set or represented the moral standards of the community<sup>119</sup> and sadder yet—probably there still are.

As bad as the Klan was, it was almost benign compared to the eugenicists who stalked the halls of academia and science. According to professors of comparative degeneracy, inferior people had first of all no right to be born, and having abused that right, certainly had less right to reproduce. As usual, the list of inferiors included Jews, Italians, Blacks, Irish, etc.—all condemned by their genes to drag everyone around them down to their less than culturally desirable level of idiocy which justified bigotry. The result was the use of eugenics to save America by enforced deportations, restrictions on where people could live, suspension of civil liberties and involuntary sterilization of tens of thousands of innocent people.<sup>120</sup> Humanitarian Adolf Hitler was particularly impressed with the leadership of America in this field,<sup>121</sup> so by 1934, the Germans were beating us at our own nefarious game.<sup>122</sup>

Much of this activity was the result of the efforts of Harry Laughlin America’s most embarrassing scientist. A tireless promoter of negative eugenics, he hyped sterilization of all defectives, including, oddly enough, epileptics, of whom he was one. After he cozied up to the Nazis in the mid - 1930's, the American Jewish Congress denounced him in the bitterest of terms. A review of his academic record showed he had falsified data, manipulated findings and perpetuated scientific fraud to support racist conclusions. Thoroughly discredited, he was forced to retire, but, largely due to his efforts, sterilization laws still remain on the books in twenty states.<sup>123</sup>

If the reality was bad, fantasy was worse. In 1908, English novelist D. H. Lawrence wrote of the building of a big “Leathal chamber” into which “All the sick, the halt, the maimed, would

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115. Bryson. op. cit. p. 359.

116. The American Heritage History of the 1920's and 1930's. New York. 1970. p. 31.

117. Hofstadter R. 1963. Anti-intellectualism in American Life. Knopf; New York. pp. 124-125. The noble organization was dedicated to chivalry, humanity, mercy and patriotism, and its object was to protect the weak, innocent and defenseless from indignities wrongs and outrages of the lawless, violent and brutal. (Trelease, A. White Terror. New York. 1971. p. 16. and Langguth. 2014. Chap. 12.) All without cognitive dissonance in true believers.

118. Bryson. op. cit. p. 360.

119. Gilmore, G. and Sugrue, T. These United States. Norton; New York. 2015. p. 136.

120. Ibid. pp. 36-363. Ironically, the Nazis in their extremes discredited the American eugenics movement. (Nourse, V. In Reckless Hands: Skinner V. Oklahoma and the Near Triumph of American Eugenics. Norton; New York. 2008.) After the Holocaust, no one could entertain the otherwise common sensical notion that we should put at least as much

fore thought into planning the next generation of children as we do breeding our horses, cat-tle, beans and melons.

121. Black, E. Nazi Nexus. Dialog Press; Washington, D.C. 2009. p. 116.

122. Kevles, D. In the Name of Eugenics. Knopf; New York. 1985. p. 116.

123. Bryson. op. cit. pp. 365-370. Lief, M. and Caldwell, H. 2004. And the Walls Came Tumbling Down. Scribner; New York. Chap. 8.

be gently led” with a band playing softly.<sup>124</sup> To his credit, he did not discriminate on the basis of race or religion but oddly selected victims for non-genetic conditions—those being maimed or ill. Still, the image is haunting and was foreboding.<sup>125</sup>

Meanwhile, in something less than the spirit of tolerance, young J. Edgar Hoover was made head of the General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice in charge of rooting out radicals meaning Communist immigrants.<sup>126</sup> There was a revival of principles institutionalized in the pre-Civil War south which circumscribed free speech by punishing advocacy of abolition and legitimized vigilance committees which “Ferreted out subversives and administered whip-pings...” thereto.<sup>127</sup>

This tradition of unconstitutional conduct by the government was continued in the post-war era with the infamous if popular Palmer Raids during which “Subversive” (read “Red”) groups were harassed and jailed with almost total disregard for basic procedural rights of the victims.<sup>128</sup> In April, 1920, the New York Legislature passed the Lusk bills, setting up a secret police whose job was to dig out by stealth and trickery citizens who questioned or privately rejected various tenets of the American political system.<sup>129</sup> In the same year, progressive Wisconsin enacted a “Pure history law” which required hearings on any schoolbook which allegedly “Falsifies the facts regarding the War of Independence or the War of 1812 or defames our nation's founders or misrepresents the ideals like freedom of speech—and causes—like resistance to government oppression for which they struggled”.<sup>130</sup> In that spirit, in the '20's, Oshkosh passed a pure choreography law which forbade dancers to look into each others eyes.<sup>131</sup>

Further muddying the waters was the arrest in Los Angeles of Upton Sinclair for reading the Bill of Rights out loud on May 15, 1923. Shortly after reading the seditious section about freedom of speech, he was charged with expressing ideas “Calculated to cause hatred and

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124. Kershaw. p. 12.

125. While being associated with racism was anathema to the good standing of intellectuals, being proeugenics was worse but nevertheless the lot of John M. Keynes, George B. Shaw and Aldous Huxley. (Kershaw. 2016. p. 206.)

126. Perrett, G. *America in the Twenties*. Simon and Schuster; NY. 1982. p. 59. Feldman, N. *Scorpions*. Twelve; NY. p. 14.

127. Fehrenbacher, D. *Slavery, Law, and Politics*. Oxford University Press; New York. 1981. p. 57.

128. Murphy, P. *The Constitution in Crisis* Times. 1972. p. 28. It had its antecedents in pre-Revolutionary America with the Continental Association, a system of surveillance and persecution by which Americans watched and judged the words and actions of their fellow citizens. (Hook. p. 28.) Men were legally punished for not breaking the law and tarred and feathered for drinking tea. The irony is that such coercive measures were employed in the cause of liberty—e.g., presumably in the cause of freedom of speech, in New York in 1775, mobs beat men who refused to curse the king. (Ibid. p. 37.) That is, people were compelled to be free through a system of suspicion, fear and terror comparable to that of the Spanish Inquisition. (Ibid. p. 33.) Loyalists who were driven out or escaped from America referred to it as the land of oppression and tyranny. (Ibid. p. 37.)

129. From 1940-1966, members of the American Legion spied on their neighbors and reported their findings to the FBI. (Theoharis.) Whether it is true, fun-ny or both, FBI agents would inquire whether a person of interest had ever dated a woman who had read Lenin or was interested in abstract art. (DeVoto.)

In an entirely different context, but continuing the theme of unconstitutional government, see Scahill's account (Chap. 56) of the Obama administration's murder-by-drone of American cleric Anwar Awlaki.

130. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 233.

131. Bryson. op. cit. p. 70. This being an excessive purification of proper strictures imposed in 1914 in New Orleans which required daylight between dancers and prohibited “Snake-wiggling” of the shoulders and hips. (Leathem.)

contempt” of and for the government.<sup>132</sup> While any good American finds this perplexing, devotees of the then unformulated theory of cognitive dissonance (cogdis) will now be driven to drink, which was not an option at the time.

The most artificially contrived social blunder of this otherwise libertine era was undoubtedly Prohibition—a "Noble experiment" which proved Americans to be ignoble failures. With the best of intentions, well-meaning reformers crusaded to save people from themselves by imposing their own puritanical, dry values on society<sup>133</sup> and erred tragically in legislating morality.<sup>134</sup> As re-formed<sup>135</sup> base stealer of the Chicago White Stockings, Billy Sunday, prophetically phrased it, “The reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will turn our prisons into factories and our jails into storehouses and corn cribs. Men will walk upright now, women will smile, and children will laugh. Hell will be forever for rent.”<sup>136</sup>

The goal of Rev. Sunday and his dry ilk was to create a new moral tone in the country, and in that, they succeeded. However, it was not the tone they had in mind—quite the opposite in fact. In all of history, it is difficult to find well-intended people who were so completely wrong (i.e., what Billy might have called “Off-base”) as to the actual effects their misguided ideals and ideas would and did have.<sup>137</sup> The “Saved” people responded with typical American ingenuity by coming up with every possible homemade device and ploy they could to avoid salvation by thwarting a law held in near universal disdain<sup>138</sup> and contempt and subjected to continuous derision.

The idea was that, since the *excessive* consumption of alcohol was bad, the manufacture, sale and transportation n.b., everything except buying and drinking<sup>139</sup> of alcoholic beverages would be made illegal.<sup>140</sup> The effect was not to cut consumption of booze because everyone kept on drinking thanks to an underworld built on crime. It was a classic overreaction to a problem, and the attempted solution of excessive control created new problems which were clearly worse than the one they were designed to solve.<sup>141</sup>

First and foremost, prohibition was dangerous. The national murder rate went up by almost one third after the program was introduced. In the first two and a half years, thirty

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132. Dwyer. op. cit. p. 55. For more on Sinclair, see Sann, P. Fads, Follies and Delusions. Bonanza Books; New York .1967. Chap. 14.

133. McWilliams. op. cit. pp. 61-81. Self-righteous efforts which paled in comparison to those of schizoid Saudi Arabia’s Orwellian “Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice” which led the fight to roll back liberal social movements circa 1970. Among its other achievements in the 1980’s, it banned pictures of women in newspapers and dog food from grocery store shelves because dogs are unclean. (R. Wright. p. 155.)

134. Archer, J. The Plot to Seize the White House. Skyhorse Publishing; New York. 2007. p. 93.

135. Abbot, K. Sin in the Second City. Random House; New York. 2007. p. 65.

136. Sunday, B.\* Quoted on p. 240 of Fawcett, 2010. Even without President Jesus C. Wilson’s moral politics, (Tooze. 2014. p. 307.) this was the golden age of idealistic idiocy. To wit, a congressman waxed that the passage of a constitutional act was “the dawn of a brighter day, with more of sunshine, more of the songs of the birds, more of the sweetest music, the laughter of children well fed, well clothed, well housed.....” (Eggerrt.) All to be brought to you by the newly authorized, loving, cheerful, friendly folks at the IRS. \*There is no indication Mr. Sunday returned any of the bases he stole.☺

137. But Thomas Jefferson’s embargo would run it a close second.

138. Urofsky. op. cit. p. 194. Consumption of alcohol actually increased during prohibition.

139. Dwyer. op. cit. p. 240.

140. As if most Americans cared about the legality of the law. In one case, the jury drank the evidence and freed a defen-dant. (McWilliams. p. 70.)

141. Nevertheless, the idea lives on. In June, 1990, 20% of 1,500 Americans polled by the Roper Organization favored reinstating prohibition. (The 20% idiots is a remarkable constant throughout history. JFW. Education just cannot penetrate the last vestige of deeply held beliefs.

prohibition agents were killed on the job, but their surviving colleagues got their revenge: In Chicago alone, they gunned down twenty-three innocent citizens in just over a decade.<sup>142</sup>

Next, prohibition was corrupting. Prohibition agents were paid less than garbage collectors and hence routinely sold confiscated liquor back to the owners. Nearly 1,000 prohibition agents were dismissed from federal service for bribery, extortion, embezzlement and robbery.<sup>143</sup> Bribery was routine and rife: About \$150 million was paid out annually in bribes in New York City<sup>144</sup> where, for every barrel of beer rolled into a night club, the owner paid the cop on the beat \$1,<sup>145</sup> while in Philadelphia, a royalty of \$2/ barrel of beer was earmarked for the Republican Campaign Committee.<sup>146</sup> On the other hand, the losses in legal tax revenue to government were calculated to be \$11 billion in lost taxes—as well as \$500,000 wasted enforcing the law.<sup>147</sup> In addition, in the summer of 1920, 134,000 gallons of confiscated evidence vanished from a storage warehouse. At the end of the program in 1933, of the 50 million gallons of confiscated whiskey held in government warehouses, two-thirds were missing<sup>148</sup>—probably due to the legal equivalent of federal evaporation.

Allied to corruption was hypocrisy as exemplified by the conduct of the prohibition administrator for northern California, who was suspended for having cocktail parties in his San Francisco offices. Not that the Attorney General cared: He had a side business selling bootleg booze but surprisingly was never caught.<sup>149</sup> Being in the business, he out did Congressmen, who merely had their own bootlegger who operated out of the House Office Building.<sup>150</sup> Doctors and druggists could legally prescribe whiskey for their patients and did so to the tune of \$40 million of cures a year. Further, religious groups could and did use alcoholic beverages for sacramental purposes. Finally, vineyard owners could send out packets of grape concentrate which could be converted into wine by the consumer. Obliging, warnings were provided that the contents would turn into wine in sixty days. Alternatively, they let the grapes become raisins, which they put into raisin cakes which they then sold along with directions on how not

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142. Bryson. op. cit. p. 167. To the agents' credit, that is good shooting: It is tough enough to find twenty-three innocent Chicagoans much less stop to shoot them dead.\* That is what makes being a law officer so easy in the Windy City. Anyone shot is usually guilty of something in a city known for unchecked, honest graft,^ (Tarr. pp. 73-73.) "Moronic buffoonery, barbaric crime, triumphant hoodlumism and dejected citizenship". (Bryson. p. 401.) In the first three weeks of March, 1919, there were eighteen murders, two major bank robberies, three payroll heists and scores of assaults and mugings. (Krist. p. 74.) A spate of re-ported abductions of young girls that summer was attributed to "Morons"—meaning mentally deficient deviants— leading to Chicago's "Moron problem". (Ibid. p. 139.) The solution was to arrest all the morons and half-wits in Chicago—a truly daunting if unconstitutional task—people having a right to be stupid. In the early '20's, the city's crime-ridden reputation was largely due to its generally acknowledged stupid mayor William Thompson, who was at least smart enough not to interfere with corruption (Bryson. p. 403.) or be picked up as a moron by his own police department probably because he was out of town at the time. (Ibid. p. 143.) Basically, it was an environment in which a scruple could be a fatal asset and an ethic was out of the question. \*One such case was when police chief George Shippey shot and killed a delivery man who was guilty of looking Jewish a capital offense in Chitown—and was mistakenly thought to be delivering a bomb. Needless to say, Chief Shippey was not charged. (Ibid. p. 404.)

^Also found in NYC. (Czitrom. p. 79. and Miller, Donald. 2014. p. 33.)

143. Miller, D. *Supreme City*. Simon & Schuster; New York. 2014. p. 91.

144. Bryson. op. cit. p. 167.

145. Anonymous. Ca.1927. Quoted on page 109 of D. Miller. 2014.

146. Archer. op. cit. p. 88.

147. Resnick, M. *America Votes Against Booze*. Page 185 of Fawcett. 2016.

148. Bryson. op. cit. p. 168.

149. Fawcett. op. cit. 2010. p. 232.

150. Remini, R. *A Short History of the United States*. Harper Perennial; New York. 2008. p. 208.

to let them “Mistakenly” ferment.<sup>151</sup> Consequently, in California, in the first five years of Prohibition, the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of grapes increased by a factor of seven.<sup>152</sup>

Worst of all was a government program designed to poison imbibers by denaturing alcohol created for legal purposes paint thinner, antifreeze, lotions, embalming fluid, etc. but which found its way into bootlegged drinks. In 1927, of the nearly 500,000 gallons of confiscated booze analyzed in New York City, 98% contained poisons.<sup>153</sup> That same year, perhaps as many as 10,000 Americans died from such government sponsored murder,<sup>154</sup> but according to Wayne Wheeler, crusader of the Anti-Saloon League, they got what they deserved.<sup>155</sup>

To put the conundrum of prohibition in small town, human terms, a sheriff would be charged with shutting down the local speakeasy, which was patronized by the mayor, the local doctor, the banker, principal of the school, the minister essentially every one of the town leaders as well as most voters. If he enforced the law, he would be voted out of office, so in terms of the theory of cognitive dissonance, he could do his job or keep it but not both. Usually, he would join a toast prohibition, while the voting pattern on the issue showed the cities to be wet and the rural areas to be dry and expected to remain so as long as the hung-over voters could stagger to the poles.<sup>156</sup>

Oddly enough, the worst problem that interwar America would have to face was building for lack of control: The economy of the 1920's was building to a crash for lack of an overall, guiding schema or regulatory mechanism. The basic, political/economic schema of America at this time was open-ended and based on the assumption that capitalism was good simply because individuals were free of governmental restraints in business affairs.<sup>157</sup> Since the job of the government was to get out of the way,<sup>158</sup> no one was looking out for society in general; good things were just supposed to happen for everyone automatically. The best people (i.e., the most efficient entrepreneurs) would emerge triumphant (with the most money), and the best ideas (most profitable policies) would naturally come out on top because whatever happened would be a matter of character and fate. The grand myth was that of the American businessman arrogantly assuming the mantle of material righteousness and pompously proclaiming he would bring happiness and progress to everyone if just left alone to compete freely with other vulture capitalists in the marketplace of life.<sup>159</sup>

A myth this was indeed, according to muckraker Lincoln Steffens, who saw the businessman as “...a self-righteous fraud ...busy with politics....defending grafters....originating corruption....sharing with bosses....deploring reform.....and beating good government with corruption funds”.<sup>160</sup> The business community certainly had a long tradition of requesting and

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151. Krist, G. *City of Scoundrels*. Broadway Books; New York. 2012. p. 107.

152. Bryson. *op. cit.* p. 169.

153. Asbury, H. *The Grand Illusion*. Doubleday, Doran; Garden City, NY. 1950. p. 280.

154. Bryson. *op. cit.* p. 161.

155. *Ibid.* p. 173.

156. Anonymous. Ca. 1928. Quoted on page 86 of Johnson and Johnson.

157. Arnold, T. *The Folklore of Capitalism*. Yale University Press; New Haven, CT. 1937. pp. 14-15. There is an alternative theory that the Federal Reserve Board—created in 1913 and run by and for big money interests—delayed the crash so it built up and was worse when it came. The suggested possibility is that there would have been a slump in 1928 without the depression of the '30's.

158. Kerrigan, M. *American Presidents*. Metro Books; New York. 2011. p. 147.

159. Arnold. *op. cit.* p. 35.

160. Steffens, L. *The Shame of the Cities*. 1904. Reprinted by Dover; New York. 2012. p. 3.

getting government support for and regulation of controlled—as opposed to “Destructive” competition. Like a good nineteenth century umpire, the government would see to it that everyone played by the rules,<sup>161</sup> which had been set up by business to favor commerce. Generally, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, every phrase in the Constitution designed to protect the submerged individual had become an instrument for the protection of the corporatocracy.<sup>162</sup> For example, the Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted to protect the newly freed slaves, was immediately turned to the advantage of the business community when the "Corporation" was granted the legal status of "Person"<sup>163</sup> but for some reason without the right to vote, the obligation to pay an income tax, serve on a jury or register for the draft or the ability to forgive or forget.<sup>164</sup> But it could sort of marry (i.e. merge) with another company and reproduce little spin-off companies which could then grow into megacorps.

As early as 1785, an investigation in Pennsylvania into the impact of commercial capitalism warned that the concentration of vast amounts of wealth in the hands of a few would lead financial institutions “To dictate to the legislature what laws to pass, and what to forebear”.<sup>165</sup> Some thirty years later, Thomas Jefferson expressed the hope “....we shall....crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations....”<sup>166</sup> With such warnings wasted, the growth of corporations became unmatched as a self-reinforced historical movement going to excesses making some businesses too big to fail.

By the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these gigantic businesses had prevailed upon the government to protect them from fair competition because true freedom would have led to the cut-throat destruction of the entire system via overproduction and low prices. The oil companies, insurance industry, lumbermen, meat packers, railroads, grocers and druggists all sought federal legislation to regulate their businesses so as to save them from the anarchy of laissez faire practices in their respective trades.<sup>167</sup> The fascistic, crony capitalism of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century produced creative corruption and awesome wealth for corporate moguls which in turn induced the progressive era of muckraking reforms but to no lasting effect. Little could the capitalist community know that the precedents established by governmental regulation of business for the sake of business would be used by FDR in the 1930's to save capitalism from itself by trimming its excesses<sup>168</sup> for the sake of the needy. Then, decades later, Republican presidents Reagan,<sup>169</sup> 43 and Trump would regulate the government for the sake of the greedy. Hence, while in 1892, the top 10% of the country owned 73% of its wealth, in 2013, the top 10% owned 76%,<sup>170</sup> and in 2014, the wealthiest 0.1% owned 22%.<sup>171</sup> So much for meaningful, lasting reform.

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161. Arnold. op. cit. p. 108.

162. Ibid. p. 33.

163. Lundberg, F. *Cracks in the Constitution*. Lyle Stuart; Secaucus, NJ. 1980. p. 236. In this regard, the court was following John Marshall's lead in the case of *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) which established a corporation as a private person. (Paul. p. 379.)

164. Goodwin. op. cit. p. 91.

165. Rappaport, G. *Stability and Change in Revolutionary Pennsylvania*. Pennsylvania University Press; University Park, PA. 1996. p. 183.

166. Jefferson, T. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series*. Vol 10; No. 1. May 1816 to Jan. 18, 1817.

167. Kolko, G. *The Triumph of Conservatism*. Free Press; NY. 1963. Chap. 4.

168. Goodwin, D. *No Ordinary Time*. Simon & Schuster; New York. 1994. pp. 53-54.

169. Leuchtenburg. op. cit. p. 600.

170. Axelrod, A. *The Gilded Age*. Sterling; New York. 2017. p. 2.

171. Bartels, L. *Unequal Democracy*. Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ. 2016. p.1.

In the 1920's, with the government largely restricting itself to enforcing laws that aided big business, the economy became, at best, a self-promoting entity which defined its own existence independent of any consideration other than its own short-term wellbeing. This created a decidedly imbalanced, one way relationship with society in general, since business shaped the lives and values of Americans but responded only to market forces (i.e., supply, demand, resources, labor, etc.) which directly affected it and only in ways that appeared to be to its own immediate advantage. Under such conditions (and as “Banksters” would do in 2007), businessmen became heedless of their responsibility to society at large and assumed that what was good for business was generally good for America. The average citizen had always suspected the morals of business men: In 1932, (s)he doubted their intelligence<sup>172</sup> as well.

In the halcyon days of 1924, Americans enjoyed the irony of a conscientious president (Coolidge) exuding rectitude while the economy spun out of control.<sup>173</sup> Solicitor general James Beck noted, “...the Constitution is in graver danger today than at any other time in the history of America”.<sup>174</sup> Exactly what the danger was is unclear, but it probably was the outrageous combination of lawlessness (engendered by the Constitutional amendment mandating Prohibition), jazz, modern art and Bolsheviks.<sup>175</sup> But Mr. Beck’s assertion is always true: Pick a year and a crisis. 1788: Need for a Bill of Rights. 1833: Nullification. 1863: Civil war. 1911: Trust busting. 1937: Court packing. 1952: McCarthyism. 1973: Watergate. 1998: Monicagate. 2012: Obamacare. Even federal judges, who played the role of high priests telling the people what the Holy Word really meant from year to year, were more divisive than decisive as they changed meanings to match their arbitrary, protean ideas of injustice.

One critic who blasted the Fed for lowering interest rates in July, 1927 predicted that such a rash action could precipitate a depression. He accused Benjamin Strong, the nominal, unofficial head of the Fed of “Crimes worse than murder” and futilely urged President Coolidge to reverse the action. His name was Herbert Hoover.<sup>176</sup> For his part, President Coolidge predicted a depression<sup>177</sup> but, incredibly, did nothing to prevent it because it was not his job to do so.

The first evidence was a drop of tire prices in 1926 due to a drop in car sales. This was logically followed by a fall in rubber prices in January of 1928, of wool and cotton that August and then copper the next April. In November, 1928, there had been an ominous 13% drop of the Dow with an immediate, ensuing correction. There was a 30% slump in March<sup>178</sup> and a crash predicted in May by Cordell Hull<sup>179</sup> a future Secretary of State under FDR and, in the midst of the ensuing Depression, the American myth about the evils of governmental regulation of the business community continued despite the obvious need for some kind of directing

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172. McCormick, A. Main Street Reappraises Wall Street. New York Times. Feb. 28, 1932.

173. Kerrigan. op. cit. p. 149. The only times Cal intervened in labor disputes was if and when the workers appeared to be winning.

174. Beck, J. The Constitution of the United States: Yesterday, Today—and Tomorrow? George H. Doran; New York. 1924. Chap. 22.

175. Beck, J. Presidential address before the American Bar Association. 1921.

176. Bryson. op. cit. p. 213.

177. Coolidge, Grace. July 1927. Quoted on p. 295 of Bryson. This is flat-out incredible. Here is the President of the United States sensing an impending depression and sitting in office for twenty months letting the impending disaster build to its disastrous climax. Generally, he had difficulty comprehending the effects of his policies when he had them and was so provincial he found the concept of “Overseas” perplexing. (Shales. p. 18.)

178. Kerrigan. op. cit. p. 153.

179. Hull, C. Congressional Record. May 12, 1929. p. 1208.

schema. Government regulation had not been evil so much as incompetent.<sup>180</sup> None of this caused the crash, but *the raising of interest rates by the Federal Reserve in June of 1929 did* because the Fed did not control human nature.<sup>181</sup> Low interest rates during the '20's, made them roar, while raising them not speculation in the Market ground the ride to a halt by undercutting production.<sup>182</sup>

Three weeks after the preliminary Crash of October 24, 1929, when the market had already lost 39% of its value, Hoover chided that “Any lack of confidence in ..... the basic strength of business in the United States is foolish”.<sup>183</sup> He set up sixty-two fact-finding groups to enlighten him on public issues and then refused to believe their conclusions. As one who had never experienced failure in his storied career as a world-famous engineer /financier,<sup>184</sup> he became flat out delusional—claiming in June of 1930 that the Depression had already ended that April.<sup>185</sup>

Then came the real crash. Proving that politicians had a different set of delusions from businessmen,<sup>186</sup> over the next two years, the Dow dropped another 85%—270 points to a rock bottom of 41.22.<sup>187</sup> It can be fairly said that politician Hoover took a business recession and turned it into a disaster.<sup>188</sup> As with the Reformation of the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, one had to wonder how and why leaders missed the warnings of impending doom, and the answer was the same in both cases: There always had been warnings of impending doom without the doom. This time, they got the doom—but not all leaders missed the warnings: Herbert Hoover liquidated his stock holdings before the roof caved in.<sup>189</sup>

However, Hoover was unable to save those who believed what he said about the market. *Because* he believed devoutly in improvement if not perfection<sup>190</sup> and was wedded to the principle that the free enterprise system would solve its own problems without government intervention,<sup>191</sup> he was ill-prepared to cope with the ensuing crisis.<sup>192</sup> In this matter, he followed the model of the Harding administration which ignored the brief recession of 1922, when the economy righted itself by the simple expedient of employers cutting the wages of remaining workers.<sup>193</sup> He was also self-consistent in that his ideas were conceived in advance of evidence and held stubbornly when the evidence went against them and him.<sup>194</sup>

Franklin Roosevelt, his chief opponent in the 1932 election, objectively characterized it as about “....economic paralysis, industrial chaos, poverty and suffering”<sup>195</sup> which he oddly

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180. Powell, J. FDR’S Folly. Crown Forum; New York. 2003. p. 34.

181. Brands. 2008. op. cit. p. 170.

182. Sass. op. cit. p. 231.

183. Hoover, Pres. H. News Conference. Nov. 15, 1929. (Gilmore and Sugrue. p. 155.)

184. Shales. op. cit. p. 31. (Quotation of Sherwood Anderson)

185. Leuchtenburg. op. cit.

186. Moggridge, D. Maynard Keynes. 1992. p. 607.

187. Sass. op. cit. p. 231.

188. Ibid. p. 233.

189. Brands. op. cit. p. 170.

190. Schweikart, L. and Allen, M. A Patriot’s History of the United States. Sentinel; New York. 2014. p. 569.

191. Fawcett. op. cit. p. 239. This was especially true for humans. Hoover approved an emergency measure to feed livestock but balked at a similar measure for people because humans need an incentive to work, and hunger is a great incentive. (Kerrigan. op. cit. p. 155.)

192. Boller, P. Presidential Anecdotes. Oxford; New York. 1996. p. 252.

193. Shales, A. The Forgotten Man. Harper Perennial; New York. 2007. p. 20.

194. Leuchtenburg. op. cit. p. 134.

195. Roosevelt, Gov. F. D. Speech in Baltimore in late October, 1932. Cited in Shesol. op. cit. p. 9.

misattributed to the First World War,<sup>196</sup> despite the ten year post-war era of peace, progress and profit.<sup>197</sup> Politicians were more interested in saving dollars than in dealing with the disaster at hand and more concerned with protecting freedom loving Americans from the woes of a bureaucratic dictatorship than in getting the unemployed back to work.<sup>198</sup>

During the campaign, FDR denounced President Hoover as a profligate spender who had run up intolerable deficits<sup>199</sup> and set a balanced budget as a goal for 1934.<sup>200</sup> Consistent with pre-election rhetoric, the first efforts of the New Deal<sup>201</sup> were timid, indecisive and ineffective as superstition and folklore hampered every effort to reorganize thought and develop an effective policy for national action. After first trying to save businesses by raising prices,<sup>202</sup> which ignored the basic problem that John Q. Citizen did not have enough money to buy anything, the Federal Government's planned capitalism featured reducing risk<sup>203</sup> by reducing federal spending.<sup>204</sup> Nevertheless, even this first stab at deficit spending were denounced by Supreme Court Justice Willis Van Devanter for fear that "...we are going to pile up an indebtedness which cannot be paid for [in] a century and that we are drifting toward things which are wholly impracticable." While skipping the essential fact that repaying a debt is like making a payment on a dead horse, we have parleyed the 1930's New Deal debt into a 21<sup>st</sup> century recession debt of \$21 trillion dollars<sup>205</sup> (i.e. or \$60,000/person) by making deficit spending a financial positive feedback system running to suicidal, addictive excess at the rate of \$1.4 trillion a year, with the deficit for 2016 alone equaling 76% of our GDP,<sup>206</sup> Now, we are broke: We just do not know it yet because Congress keeps our massive financial obligations off the books<sup>207</sup> by the expedient of declaring expenditures to be "Off budget". With Red China owning our debt, Justice Van Devanter now looks rather prescient.<sup>208</sup>

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196. Hoover, H. *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941*. Macmillan; New York. 1952. p. 80. Temin, P. *Lessons from the Great Depression*. MIT Press; Cambridge, MA. 1989. p. 1.

197. Keynes, J. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*. Vol. 16. p. 197. 1971-1989. (Probably ca. 1986.)

198. Arnold. op. cit. p. 47.

199. Leuchtenburg. op. cit. p. 178.

200. Herman, A. *Douglas MacArthur*. Random House; New York. 2016. p. 231. Goldfield, D. *The Gifted Generation*. Bloomsbury; New York. 2017. p. 4.

201 The liberal solution to the Depression was Socratic/Platonic honesty—the idea being that no one wittingly sins, so all ev-eryone had to do was tell the truth and everything would be jake. That is to say, as favored by Progressives, who would leave the market free to run ac-cording to its own internal dictates, there would be no direct regulation of the free market; only the information provided to customers would be regulated.

At the same time, Americans were anxious about the contradictory messages sent by the cognitive dissonant New Deal—save and spend. (Shales. p 332.)

202. Shales. op. cit. p. 150.

203. Katznelson. op. cit. p. 34.

204. Fawcett. op. cit. p. 235.

205. NBC News. Nov. 23, 2018. Humor being the only context for this absurdity—recently, one night, some terrorists backed up a truck to the U.S. Treasury Building and made off with \$1 trillion worth of debts. ☺ The theft went unnoticed for some time because it was so petty.

206. Reuters, T. U.S. CBO says budget deficit to reach \$590 billion for fiscal 2016. AOL. Aug. 24, 2016. 4 AM. Anything more than 50% is fatal, so we are cooked. ☺

207. Kotlikoff, L. Testimony to the Senate Budget Commit-tee. Feb. 25, 2015. pp. 3-4.

208. Van Devanter, Justice W. Personal comment to Dennis Flynn. Apr. 6, 1933. W. V. Devanter Papers, Box 17. Library of Congress; WDC. Cited in Shesol. op. cit. p. 60. In addition to the long-term/short-term trade off, there is another problem inherent in evaluating behavior: The immediate result is real and tangible; the long-term problem is theoretical and merely potential. Some people do not appreciate or are dismissive of such futuristic possibilities. This calls to mind a friend who, when referring to a mutual acquaintance who was not too bright, said, "Every time I mention something that is not in her immediate visual field, she says, 'What?'"

The basic problem was that the sequence of economic dislocation caused by World War I, the market crash and ensuing depression induced many to conclude competition just did not work. The New Deal's response was "Planned capitalism" with big government underwriting the lower classes while unions countered big business.<sup>209</sup> In fact, if anything symbolizes the New Deal, it would be a waffle—because it has two, pocked sides to it, and Roosevelt could not choose between them: Alternatively, he would choose and then reconsider and then revisit the reconsideration.<sup>210</sup> He called for a united effort to combat economic ills but counted on a profusion of individuals in government agencies to provide it.<sup>211</sup> Further, he disliked criticism and shifted policies as frequently as he, like President Trump eighty-five years later, changed his unsettled advisors.<sup>212</sup> The only apparent constant was that he, FDR, must be repeatedly re-elected, and he was a master at applying patronage where it was to do the most good for him.<sup>213</sup> In this regard, he was aided by his indifference to friends and family: He calculated independent of individual people. His unidimensional world was one of politics, and he was free to make the right political decisions without regard to apolitical/personal consequences.<sup>214</sup>

Cooperation based on political patronage became the domestic model until 1980, when a majority realized that the welfare state did not work any better than cut-throat competition. No one concluded that nothing works unless people do, but rather there was a re-version back to free market corporacapitalism.<sup>215</sup> As Arkansas Gov. B. Clinton observed re: 1990, "....anything that consistently defies arithmetic can't work for very long". Of course, in a democracy, a program needs to work only until the next election<sup>216</sup>. The pendulum of economic theory swung

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209. Darman, J. *Landslide*. Random House; New York. 2014. p. 74. Bearing in mind contemporary China's slide toward Communistic capitalism, I predict all political /economic systems will eventually be a combination of planned freedom, with each country, with its particular labels, taking its own path leading to the same end point. Meanwhile, bear in mind conservative Americans regard the word "Plan" as a Communist invention.☺ (Goodwin, D. p. 469.)

210. Brands. *op. cit.* p. 500.

211. Shales. *op. cit.* p. 208.

212. *Ibid.* 166. As an aside, the anti-Trump era includes a recent coinage oiko-phobia—fear of your own people, as opposed to the Greek xenophobia. (Luce, E. p. 111.) It is used by global elitists who look down on and fear provincial masses and their nationalism. The oikophobe views himself as defending enlightened universalism against the po' white trash who hype parochial chauvenism.☺ (*Ibid.* p. 112.) To find a presidential parallel to Trump—a paranoid unable to learn\* and always in need of adult supervision, (Woodward. 2018. pp. 166, 226 and 9.) one must look back to Andrew Jackson, whose displacement of the Cherokee nation might serve as a model for Trump's planned deportation of 11 million Mexican immigrants. (Luce, E. pp. 113-114.) \*His Secretary of State Tillerson referred to him as a "Fucking moron" (Wood ward. *op. cit.* p. 225.) to the shame and chagrin of our certified morons. Not to be outdone, Trump's chief of staff, John Kelly, referred to him as an idiot. (*Ibid.* p. 286.) For his part, Trump's national security advisor Lieut. General H. R. McMaster concluded that Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson had concluded that the president and the White House were crazy.# (Woodward. 2018. Caption to picture 11.) In fact, Trump did improvise in the manner of President Truman, but Harry had served ten years as a senator and learned how Washington worked before becoming president. Trump found out on his own in his own version of the lesson Romans had learned collectively—that they could not effectively administer an empire with the political set designed to run a city: In Trump's case, he could not run the federal government the way he ran a building corporation. #A good and fitting image: The place seemed to function like an insane asylum. As a fitting image, it serves to frame the comment denouncing a "Dishonorable and unmanly attack of our insane president" made by James Monroe when he was re-called from Paris in 1796 by president George Washington. (Kerrigan. p. 50.)

213. Schweikart, L & Allen, M. *A Patriot's History of the United States*. Sentinel; New York. 2014. p. 595.

214. Goodwin. *op. cit.* p. 306.

215. Watson. *op. cit.* p. 646.

216. Clinton, B. Undated interview with J. Meacham.

back and forth because intelligent thinking was doomed by people behaving in a pseudorational way, acting in their own short-term best interests based on easily available, self-confirming information, with individual decisions of-ten having disastrous collective consequences.<sup>217</sup>

Three of the disastrous consequences on the American family were the soaring rates of births of illegitimate children, divorces and aid to widows with children. In 1920, the traditional 3% of single American women gave birth. By 1952, the rate had doubled to 6%; by 1990 it had soared to 30%;<sup>218</sup> by 2007 to 40%.<sup>219</sup> Ditto the divorce rate, which stood at 0.8% ca. 1940. It was 1% in 1964, peaked in the late '70's and settled back to 50% in the 1990's.<sup>220</sup> And, in 1961, less than 2% of families were receiving aid from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children; by 1975, the federal government's war on the family crescendoed to nearly 6%<sup>221</sup> by rewarding single parents for staying single.<sup>222</sup> By 1980, it was clear welfare was not working,<sup>223</sup> and, thanks to the fact that some of the effects of public education can be overcome, part of the damage done by the Great Society has been undone.<sup>224</sup>

In the early 1930's, however, the impact of the Welfare State on the family was an unpredictable, theoretical issue. Cognitively, Americans of the time were not concerned with preserving family values but with bridging economic reality with American rhetoric. The jargon of Constitutional capitalism had to be retained even as the system was being totally revamped by pragmatic politicians acting like medieval priests hammering out piecemeal solutions to the consuming crisis in our political religion of democratic capitalism. As socialism i.e., government ownership of the means of production was too extreme for most, a fascistic program<sup>225</sup> of control and regulation of business by trained engineers evolved as predicted by economist "Thorn" Veblin.<sup>226</sup> This was accepted functionally, in terms of daily behavior, and fictionally, in terms of verbal expression, as it entered the realm of constitutional parlance via the normal expedient of re-interpretation—aka liberalism. The eventual result was regulation of the economy by a cacophony of nine federal agencies all ultimately beholden to business.<sup>227</sup>

The fascistic nature of the New Deal was personified in General Hugh Johnson, who, as head of the unconstitutional National Recovery Administration, raised his hand in a fascist salute while reviewing an NRA parade in New York in September, 1933. He gave cabinet member Francis Perkins a copy of the fascist tract **The Corporate State**, and celebrated the

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217. Krugman, P. *Peddling Prosperity*. W. W. Norton; New York. 1994. pp. 128 and 235.

218. Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. *The Bell Curve*. Free Press; New York. 1994. pp. 178-179.

219. *New York Times*, The. May 13, 2009.

220. Herrnstein and Murray. op. cit. pp. 172-173.

221. *Ibid.* pp. 192-193.

222. Schweikart and Allen. op. cit. p. 716.

223. Murray, C. *Losing Ground*. 1984.

224. Schweikart, L. *48 Liberals Lies About American History*. Sentinel; New York. 2009. p. 231.

225. Reagan, R. 1976. Cited on page 681 of Hayward, S. 2001. Hayek, F. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. University of Chicago Press; Chicago, IL. p. 184. Flynn, J. *As We Go Marching*. pp. 252-253. Western civilization in general was undergoing an economic reformation as the religions of capitalism, fascism and communism (Erickson. 2; p. 74.) battled it out. Capitalism won because it is based on Christianity's (myth of) individual free choice. (Wat-son. 2001. p. 754.) As science demolishes the myth of freedom, totalitarianism will make a resurgence. JFW☺

226. Heilbroner, R. *The Worldly Philosophers*. CliffsNotes; Lincoln, NB. 1965. p. 51.

The world of conspicuous consumption Veblin depicted during the Gilded Age was one in which the demand for a lady's dress increased with the price because it would show that her husband was rich. (Kishtainy. p. 100. Part of a good, short chapter on Veblen.)

227. Fukuyama, F. *Political Order and Political Decay*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux; New York. 2014. p. 497.

“Shining name” of Benito Mussolini in his farewell address, after his antics finally forced the president to remove him from office<sup>228</sup> so he could head the WPA.<sup>229</sup>

With all parties subjectively interpreting the Constitution to suit themselves, it ceased to have any definitive meaning if indeed it ever had and became less the Supreme Law of the land than a national symbol which all people could worship, praise, cherry pick and ignore as they pleased.<sup>230</sup> Among the worshipers were members of the American Liberty League, a group formed in 1934 to rescue the Constitution “From those who misunderstand it, misuse and mistreat it”<sup>231</sup> meaning FDR, who tended to ignore it as an impediment to progress<sup>232</sup>—one way to rescue it being planning a coup against the federal government.<sup>233</sup> The Minute Men of 1935 pledged to defend a Constitution which was, allowing for some journalistic hype, “Synonymous with privilege, poverty and insecurity, gag laws, concentration camps for strikers, and foreclosure”.<sup>234</sup> In a case of art imitating life, in 1935, Sinclair Lewis published *It Can't Happen Here*, a novel about America becoming a fascist state featuring thugish police called Minute Men.<sup>235</sup>

By 1936, the Constitution had become sort of a national ouija board which would solve all problems because it said all things to all people. Even the Ku Klux Klan supported it and, by using the Constitution to justify its policies of persecution, showed just how meaningless the document had become. Within a Constitutional context, America underwent an economic reformation with the adaptation of Keynesian economics. Economic conservative FDR had warned of the dangers of the permanent dole as “A narcotic and destroyer of the human spirit”.<sup>236</sup> Yet, like a patient in an emergency ward who becomes hooked on his medication, our economy became a positive feedback system requiring increasing deficits to sustain itself while well-meaning liberals provided an economic rationale for willing believers<sup>237</sup> i.e., the idea that a balanced budget “Has no support in economic theory”,<sup>238</sup> showing how idiotic

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228. Stone and Kuznick. op. cit. p. 50. As a case of the wag tailing the dog, the NRA generated about four times more paper regulations in its first year than the entire legislative output of the federal government since its inception (Shales. p. 202.)—i.e., 10,580 pages of laws vs. 2,735. As for its essential nature, a Senate investigatory committee characterized it in terms one would use for his brother-in-law: to wit, “Ghastly”, “Presumptuous”, “Savage”, “Monopolistic”, “Wolfish”, and “Invasive”. (Schweikart and Allen. p. 588.)

229. Shales. op. cit. p. 250.

230. Arnold. op. cit. p. 79. And the tradition continues down to the present day—see: Dean, J. *Conservatives Without Conscience*. Viking; New York. 2006. p. 167. Schlesinger, Jr. A. Cited on page 120 of McWilliams.

231. Stayton, Capt. W. *The Revolt of the Conservatives* by G. Wolfskill. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. pp. 111-112. Quoted in Shesol. op. cit. pp. 107-108.

232. Shales. op. cit. p. 6.

233. Stone and Kuznick. op. cit. p. 64. See J. Archer pp. 30-33 for details.

234. *New York Post*, The. Editorial. Sept. 18, 1935. (Presumably) Cited in Shesol. op. cit. p. 168.

235. Shales. op. cit. p. 260.

236. Hayward. op. cit. pp. 123 and 452. Murray, C. *Losing Ground*. 1984. The deterioration of American character and general loss of a sense of individual responsibility manifested itself specifically in the breakdown of morale among POW's during the Korean War, when 70% of them collaborated with the enemy. (Stone and Kuznick. op. cit. p. 252.)

237 This was most poignantly displayed when FDR asked some advisors if he had the legal right to devalue the dollar. When informed he had an equal right to assault someone in the street and take his clothes from him but he could do it anyway, he roared with laughter. (Shesol. p. 42.) As an aside, one of the problems in dealing with FDR was his capacity to believe so many things in so short a period of time, (Moley.) which he often was compelled to do when his programs engendered fits of logical conflict which required “Cognitive flexibility” on his part. (Perkins.)

238. Myrdal, G. “The War on Poverty”. *The New Republic*. Feb. 8, 1964. p. 16.

economic theory is. As an emergency, short-term measure, deficit spending was necessary, but as a way of life, it is long-term corrupting and suicidal.

As Cicero put it a few years before, in 63 B.C., “The budget should be balanced, the treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled....lest Rome (i.e., WDC) become bankrupt”.<sup>239</sup> Of all those moralistic “Shoulds”, the most difficult to achieve has been the tempering and controlling of the arrogance of officialdom in a democracy in which the chance of winning the next election is enhanced by spending more on the people than they are taxed. Faustian federal legislators simply sold their economic souls for the short-term, political reward of incumbency, and as incumbents, they had all learned lessons from the early '30's<sup>240</sup> which in turn shaped their desired policies. The problem was, their lessons and resultant policies varied as they did: some wanted a balanced budget; some wanted it less than balanced. Worse yet, the President was typically uncertain as to what he wanted.<sup>241</sup> Nevertheless, every time we compromise our morals, we lose,<sup>242</sup> or, as President John Kennedy noted, “The right thing to do is also the right thing politically”.<sup>243</sup>

Until the mid-1930's, the idea that deficit spending was a good thing in and of itself was regarded as insane and repelled men of sound judgment. However, it was precisely those men—including Dutch householder FDR<sup>244</sup> who made the case for John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) when their insistence on balancing the budget brought a modest recovery to a halt in 1937 as he had predicted. When the causal bill to increase taxes was being considered in 1935, Walter Lippmann opined it reflected “the absence of any plan and the lack of intellectual effort, the work of tired brains, relying on their wishes and their prejudices and throwing out casual suggestions which they are too hot and bothered to think about.”<sup>245</sup> Result? It was passed.

Finally, with the ensuing slump in the Depression,<sup>246</sup> the proponents of deficit spending had their day, but still their spending program failed to pull the country out of the economic doldrums until taken to the excessive extremes required and justified by World War II.<sup>247</sup> In mid-1938, one New Dealer confessed, “We Democrats have to admit we are floundering .... We are a confused, bewildered group of people.”<sup>248</sup> Well they should have been—with the rate of unemployment higher in 1940 than it had been in 1931.<sup>249</sup> In fact, *were it not for WWII*,

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239. McWilliams. op. cit. p. 84. For a concise presentation of the eternal pitfall of the “Ins” indulging in inflationary economics starting with Nero, see Chap. 16 of Fawcett. op. cit.

240. Shales. op. cit. p. 340. (Based on M. Eccles. Nov. 1937.)

241. Ibid. p. 342.

242. Harriman, A. Quoted by Arthur Schlesinger Oct. 2, 1963 in his unpublished diary. New York Public Library. Quoted on p. 188 of T. Clarke.

243. O'Donnell, K. and Powers, D. Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. Little, Brown; Boston, MA. 1970. p. 75.

244. Shales. op. cit. p. 325—and “Householder” p. 340.

245. Best, G. Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt Versus Recovery, 1933-1938. Praeger; NY. 1991. pp. 63-64.

246. Shales. op. cit. p. 3. Fear of another double-dip recession echoed 70 years later when J. Lazzaro warned about repeating the error of balancing the budget too soon. AOL. Will the US Repeat the Great Mistake of 1937? Dec. 19, 2009.

247. Galbraith, J. The Age of Uncertainty. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. 1977. pp. 218-221. In 1940, 15 million (23% of the workforce) were unemployed—down from a high of 25%.

248. Bresiger. Revolution of 1935. Essays in Political Economy. Ludwig von Mises Institute; Auburn, AL. 2002. p. 93.

249. Schweikart and Allen. op. cit. p. 591.

*Americans would have realized what a colossal failure the New Deal had been.*<sup>250</sup> Put another way, WWII bailed us out of the New Deal but not for lack of a belated statement of our national goals. There had even been a ghost of the slump in 1939 after the president not a quick learner in matters economic made noises about balancing the budget. The stock market took a dive and the malaise spread to the general economy until he backed off from the notion of sound economic policy in favor of reassuring business<sup>251</sup> that profit was sacred. Being more inclusive, in FDR's State of the Union speech in January, 1941, he committed the country to "Jobs for those who can work. Security for those who need it. The ending of special privilege for the few. The preservation of civil liberties for all". In functional terms, the non-system of 19<sup>th</sup> century capitalism simply did not work in the complex 20<sup>th</sup>. The unrecognized problem was that the New Deal was patched together to improve the economy in the political context of getting FDR re-elected.

During the war, the inflation that deficit spending invited loomed as a threat, but Keynes had an answer ready. According to the Messiah, "All" that had to be done was to put everything into reverse after the war: **Taxes would have to be raised** to keep pace with spending (or even more to pay off the debt), **and labor would have to forego wage increases**. This was a nice solution for dreamers (i.e., reform-minded economists), but it proved to be a politically inexpedient remedy virtually impossible to effect in a democracy at any time. On the other hand, the president had already undercut the Messiah in December, 1940, when he revealed his basic, maturing economic policy re: Lend-Lease that he would like to get rid of the "Silly, foolish old dollar sign".<sup>252</sup> After all, why bother with such a petty, symbolic hex! Just turn the printing press and crank out more "Greenies" whenever you want them.

By 1942, the long-term, slow acting suicidal complex of deficit democracy was established, and, with the government a major debtor, inflation became a positive feedback system running away with itself:<sup>253</sup> The war made the implementation of the suggested control mechanism totally unthinkable<sup>254</sup> so it never was even tried. During the war, fascistic control measures of price fixing and rationing were needed, albetthem to the detriment of quality, and after they were removed at the war's end, inflation became an unalterable fact of modern American economic life. In a way no economist could have anticipated, the debtor federal government, struggling to plan freedom,<sup>255</sup> became trapped by the garnering the short-term,

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250. Skousen, C. 5000 Year Leap. 1981. National Center for Constitutional Studies; Malta, ID. p. 300. Social Security is one of the sickest of the New Deal programs. As of 2018, it is already taking in less than it doles out and will be bankrupt by 2040. (Baker, P. p. 381.)

251 Brands. op. cit. p. 366. We are now committed to deficit spending which is tantamount to slow economic suicide, but who is in a rush? ● The lesson for China—or whoever comes after us—is that when business gets greedy and takes money out of the system, the government has to put in money it does not have to keep the economy going. It can do so only by committing to inflation until the dollar becomes worthless and the whole absurd non-system collapses. When will this happen? My guess is 2050, but I am an econopessimist. My recommendation? Buy and hoard gold.

252. Leuchtenburg. op. cit. p. 197. That tops my idea of limiting the number of zeros to be used in the budget. JFW (:-)

253. Skousen. op. cit. pp. 222-223.

254A culture is doomed when it raises expectations that it cannot satisfy. That occurred in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century Church and late 18<sup>th</sup> century France. Now America is dis-covering it cannot afford a government that has to fund the welfare state everyone expects. (See P. Howard's The Death of Common Sense.) Current deficits are about a nifty 30%/year.

255. Merriam, C. The National Resources Planning Board. American Political Science Review. 38, p. 1086. 1944.

immediate rewards of spending dollars which at first did not exist and which ever since have become progressively inflated to be worth less and less.

In 1981, budget director David Stockman conceded that no one really understood what was going on with all the numbers and that the people involved in the budgetary process did not know what they were doing.<sup>256</sup> Well, one of the numbers in 1983, as the country began the recovery phase from a then extent recession, was a \$200 billion federal deficit. Twenty-seven years later, in the same phase of recovery from an even better recession, the number was \$1.56 trillion. This might be euphemistically labeled “Negative progress”. If we cannot solve this problem, and we evince no inclination much less ability to do so, the federal deficit for the recession of 2040 will be on the order of \$1 quadrillion–\$1,000,000,000,000,000, meaning the dollar will be worthless.

One of the reasons we cannot afford to solve our political/economic/social problems is that more than 40% of personal income taxes go to pay interest on the debt: That is, previous generations mortgaged off the future, and we are now paying their bill. There was a time when parents lived *for* their children: Now, we live *off* our children, and years from now they will live off their grandchildren leaving Americans to figure out which is worse –the conservative corporate state or the liberal give-away state?<sup>257</sup> Sad to say, the prospects are that we are falling behind on the economic treadmill and will pass along an inflated bill to our descendants until they cannot pay the interest on the debt, at which time the dollar will be dead,<sup>258</sup> or until our chief supporter, that bastion of capitalism, China, stops buying our debt at which time we will be bankrupt. Having China control our insolvency i.e., Chimerica<sup>259</sup> is a bit chop-sticky, but if we go under, the Chinese would lose all they have invested in our debt so there is some balance in this ballet of potential worldwide financial disaster by military/political/economic rivals.

As in matters alcoholic and economic, in labor relations, what was regarded as a cure to one problem ran to excess and became a problem itself. Before the 1930's, the courts had been the major bulwark against the organization of workers. Property had been granted the right to organize up to a point: Corporations were legal but trusts were not. Still, this favoritism was enough to produce the "Corporate state" which, with the blessings of the federal government, assumed responsibility for the economic well-being of practically everyone<sup>260</sup>—especially those responsible for running the corporate state. The very nature of the American Republic changed as corporations took over and the characteristic of “Virtue” so essential to a functional republic disappeared:<sup>261</sup> i.e., there is no such thing as a “Virtuous corporation” any more than there is “Corporate virtue” or a virtuous CEO, as Machivelli would have noted.

After the corporate-state debacle leading to the Depression, the New Deal encouraged unionization of workers and made big labor a counterpoise to big business, but all within the system: most emphatically, the typical America non worker was not a Marxist revolutionary dedicated to overthrowing the establishment.<sup>262</sup> Although this seemed sensible in so far as the

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256. Greider, W. “The Education of David Stockman”. *Atlantic Monthly*. Nov. 10, 1981.

257. Scruton, R. *Fools, Frauds and Firebrands*. Bloomsbury; New York. 2015. p. 221.

258. Levin, M. *Plunder and Deceit*. Threshold Editions; New York. 2015. The year 2040 looms as a doomsday—the approximate time we will run out of both oil money to buy it.

259. Ferguson, N. What “Chimerica” hath wrought. *The American Interest*. Jan-Feb. 2009. A really scary scenario would be for us to go to war with China so that we could dis-solve the debt.

260. Lundberg. op. cit. pp. 239f. But at a price. The development of corporations meant a loss of the Protestant ethic in that the corporate personality was more that of a team player than a go-getter. (Whyte. p. 14.)

261. Levin, M. op. cit. p. 4.

262. Shales. op. cit. p. 331.

National Labor Relations Act (1935) safeguarded the workers' right to collective bargaining, the labor movement proceeded to go to excess with absurdly high demands of more pay for less work.<sup>263</sup> This became a classic case of a positive feedback system with increasingly inordinate union exactions rewarded,<sup>264</sup> although they fueled national inflation.<sup>265</sup> This then reduced business and eventually led first to unemployment,<sup>266</sup> then, in some cases, to the wholesale hiring of illegal aliens and eventually the inevitable loss of jobs with businesses moving abroad in the guise of Free Trade.

The reality of the post-war world economy was that American steel workers getting \$26 per hour simply could not compete against cheap foreign labor and thus drove business overseas. In the 1960's, laborers struck, paraded and demonstrated for their right *not* to work; in the '70's, they were equally emphatic about marching and demonstrating for their right *to* work.<sup>267</sup> Of course, this idea of a right to work was a fiction embraced by workers trying to cope with the fact that they had priced themselves out of the inter-national labor market. Only in the 1980's did union executive back off in their self-defeating demands and resumed their proper role of helping rather than harming the American worker.<sup>268</sup>

While America was just beginning to undergo these secular reformations in constitutional law, economics and labor relations in the '30's, the world was contending with the results of political revolutions in Russia and Germany. The Russian Revolution had its origins in the hearts of the peasants and factory workers but could not take form until intellectuals expressed the dream in dull, cumbersome books. Most of these were elaborations on Karl Marx and placed the revolt on a respectable academic basis of exhaustive research if dubious psychology. Of course, all scholarship and erudition quickly gave way to the dictatorships of the practical politicians<sup>269</sup> and popes of the new religion—Len-in and Stalin.<sup>270</sup>

If one of the common marvels of the human mind is its effectiveness in inhibiting the recognition of facts which fail to conform to conventional ideology, a counterpoise is the liberal tradition permits all ideas to flourish so that the one that best fits the facts may finally prevail. However, any ideal can be misapplied, and this one certainly was when the support of liberals eased the way of the Communists to power in Russia in 1917 to the long-term detriment of liberalism everywhere.<sup>271</sup> Under the Tsars, the liberals convinced everyone including themselves that living conditions were so terrible that they could not possibly get any worse,

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263. Flew, A. Intended conduct and unintended consequences. In Duncan, R. and Weston-Smith, M. (eds.) *The Encyclopedia of Delusions*. Wallaby; New York. 1979. p. 27. (Mr. Flew discusses the British labor movement, but his remarks seem quite applicable to American unions.)

264 With benefits, reaching \$70/hr in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2010, a wage earner in American manufacturing got \$30/hr; in China, 80 cents. So, if you were a shrewd capitalist, where would you set up shop?

265. Hargraves, R. *Superpower: A Portrait of America in the 1970's*. St. Martin's Press; New York. 1970. p. 163.

266. Walker, P. Charity begins at home. In Duncan and Weston-Smith. op. cit. p. 222. (Mr. Walker is discussing conditions in England, but his remarks seem totally applicable to urban America as well.) After WWII, the expanded British government anticipated problems with want, disease, squalor, idle-ness and ignorance (Kishtainy. p. 123)—but not stupidity.☺

267. Wilson, C. The right to work. In Duncan and Weston-Smith. op. cit. p. 8.

268. Wall Street Journal. "Economic Gloom Cuts Labor Union Demands for Big 1982". Sept. 1981.

269. Arnold. op. cit. pp. 92-93.

270. Freedman, L. *Strategy*. Oxford University Press; New York. 2013. pp. 297 and 333.

271. Welch, C. 1979. Broken eggs, but no omelette: Russia before the revolution In *The Encyclopedia of Delusions* edit ed by R. Duncan and M. Weston-Smith. Wallaby; New York. p. 59.

but the Communists set out to prove them wrong.<sup>272</sup> At first, liberals blamed Revolutionary excesses on the civil war and post-War allied blockade.<sup>273</sup> Too late, they learned that one of the Communists' favorite excesses is the forceful suppression of liberalism.

This stupidity of Russian liberalism was epitomized and personified in Alexander Kerensky. In all of history, it is impossible to find a more consistent record of well-intended blunders than his.<sup>274</sup> His naive attempt to lead a democratic Russian state ranks him along with Woodrow Wilson as one of the great misplaced idealists in an age of misplaced idealism<sup>275</sup>—the ideals including defense of the homeland, national honor, prestige, freedom, civilization, patriotic duty, national liberation and a better future.<sup>276</sup>

By way of contrast, it is difficult to find in all of history a more thorough repudiation of liberalism than was personified by Lenin, who swept the feeble Kerensky off the political stage<sup>277</sup> after Kerensky stupidly let him enter the country in 1917. Lenin considered ruthlessness the greatest virtue, never admitted an error and once settled on his course of action—i.e., Marxism—he despised debate. This made sense to him because in his simple world, there were but two forces—bourgeois and socialist—so there was not much to debate anyway.<sup>278</sup> As a single-minded genius, he went to extremes and was doctrinaire to the extent that not a single “Essential part” of Marxism could be eliminated without deviating from “Objective truth”.<sup>279</sup> One such

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272 Fifteen years later, having learned nothing from events in Russia, liberals in Germany helped ease Hitler into power. (Hayward. 2001. p. 217.) Likewise, having learned nothing from the disastrous results of collectivization in Russian in the 1920's, East Germany trod the same path in 1959-1960 with the same outcome. (Simms. p. 429.) In one sense, the intellectual history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be judged by how long it took various people to realize how terrible Russian Communism was.

273. Wolfe, B. Feb. 1960. The Harvard Man in the Kremlin Wall. *American Heritage*; XI, #2, 102.

274. Pitkin. op. cit. 239. Ironically, the record of well-intentioned liberals in Czechoslovakia in 1948 come pretty close. Talk about not learning from the mistakes of others! Cronkite, W. *A Reporter's Life*. Knopf; New York. 1996. p. 303.

275. Reinsch, P. 1905. The Negro race and European civilization. *American J. Sociology*, 11, 148. This is really a negative reference because the author's point was that the nineteenth century error of imposing institutions where they did not belong had not been committed in the twentieth century— which was four years old at the time. However, that is exactly what was done after World War I, when the victorious powers insisted the former monarchal Germany become an economically devastated republic and what the Bush II administration tried to do in Iraq in the twenty-first century despite what it claimed. (See Ferguson, N. 2004. *Colossus*. Penguin; New York. p. 26.) As for Wilson's idealism, in Mar. 1919, Dr. Sigmund Freud opined [Wilson] “Was rapidly nearing that psychic land from which few travelers return, the land in which facts are the products of wishes ...and in which an asylum chair may be the throne of God.” (Freud and Bullitt. p. 240.) He portrayed the President as trapped in an imaginary world of language woven by his domineering, Presbyterian father. (Freud and Bullitt.) This was restrained compared to the comment made three years earlier that “[Wilson] had not the soul of a louse nor the mind of a worm or the backbone of a jellyfish.” by ever-diplomatic Lieutenant George S. Patton. (Quoted on page 202 of Boot. 2014.) Re: naive Russians, see Wilson's declaration of war. (Apr. 2, 1917.)

276. Kershaw. 2016. op. cit. p. 92.

277. Van Doren, C. 1991. *A History of Knowledge*. Ballantine; New York. 261. Feifer, G. No Finland Station. In *What If?* R. Cowley (Ed.). Putnam; New York. 2001. p. 610. One of the best/worst examples was Wilson's euphoric rhapsody for the spokesmen of the Russian people in “The true spirit of modern democracy” giving Russia's “Conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable....with frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy....” (Jan., 8, 1918.) Whose virtues were he extolling? Humanitarian Communists Lenin and Trotsky. (Tooze. 2014. p. 121.) Wilson's career in academia suited him poorly for the not so diplomatic world of international relations. Echoing Plato, ideas did not rest on facts, but facts rested on abstract ideals: Railroad cars were transportation and people were not human beings but humanity. (Weyl. Quoted on p. 86 of Leuchtenburg.)

278. Freedman. op. cit. p. 291.

279. Lenin, V. *What Is to Be Done*. 1902.

truth was that the workers could not be left to help themselves: They needed an elite to guide their revolution, meaning a focused, hard core, organizational monomaniac like himself<sup>280</sup> not dreamy intellectuals.<sup>281</sup> Another truth was that a closed-minded fanatic like Lenin may not necessarily be stupid<sup>282</sup> if an emergency crisis calls for firm, decisive action.<sup>283</sup> By way of contrast, Herbert Hoover characterized the Communist debacle as a “Shift from intelligence to ignorance”.<sup>284</sup>

An artistic crisis was induced in when Vladimir Tatlin was commissioned to design a monument to the socialist movement in Russia. Unveiled in 1920, it was to be proletarian/socialist art. With slanting towers 1,300 feet high dwarfing the piddily Eiffel Tower by 300 feet, it was to be a defining tribute to constructivism. As an example of engineering in art, it constituted a dynamically useful image heavily loaded with symbol-ism. It was to be built of commonplace glass and steel except for one minor detail—there was no glass or steel to use for its construction, so it never got beyond the stage of a model. In this sense, it remains a great work of art in that as an unbuildable, unworkable, dysfunctional metaphor, it epitomizes impracticality<sup>285</sup> if not stupidity. It thus symbolizes and captures the essence of Communism,<sup>286</sup> which can be characterized as monumental in conception, scope and idiotic errors of judgment.<sup>287</sup> In the search for the selfless, patriotic New Soviet Man, 100 million Russians were killed: the appropriate monument to them would have been an anthill.

If there is a single, simple lesson to be learned from the career of politician Vladimir Lenin, it is that the clever use of slogans is paramount, as slogans (i.e., words/labels) shape the perceptions people have of experiences<sup>288</sup> and thus shape comprehension. "All the land to the people" was the Bolshevik cry before the revolution, although by 1916, 89% of the total cultivated land and 94% of the livestock was owned by the peasants.

"All land from the people" would have been an appropriate slogan when, Stalin inaugurated his first Five-Year Plan (1928-1933) which was necessary because, after ten years, Sovietism was failing.<sup>289</sup> As pre-President Hoover noted upon his visit to the land of hammers and cycles at this time (i.e., 1927), “Inherent in Communist destruction” was a “Shift from intelligence to ignorance”.<sup>290</sup> Accordingly, the state stole the land back from the peasants—whom Marx had completely ignored—and restored them to serfdom.<sup>291</sup> Alternatively, the government left the land to the peasants and simply confiscated the produce, which resulted in

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280. Fukuyama. op. cit. p. 409.

281. Freedman. op. cit.

282. Pitkin. op. cit. p. 240.

283 The stupidity of fanatics—like our contemporary terrorists—is that they so routinely foment crises to justify going to excesses thus perpetuating if not expanding and extending their fanaticism.

284. Shales, A. *The Forgotten Man*. Harper; New York. 2007. p. 52.

285. Hughes, R. *The Shock of the New*. (2<sup>nd</sup> edition. 1990.) p. 92.

286. Gutzman, K. *James Madison and the Making of America*. St. Martin's Griffin; New York. 2013. p. 177.

287. Radice, L. *Beatrice and Sidney Webb: Fabian Socialists*. Macmillain; London. 1984. p. 303. The Webbs visited the USSR in the early 1930's, were willingly conned by the Soviet government and never could bring themselves to admit it. (Watson. 2001. p. 294. Kershaw. 2016. p. 450.)

288 As with his intellectual kinsman President Ronald Reagan, who, while talking a fiscally conservative line, tripled the national debt. (Maclean. p. 177.)

289. Shales. op. cit. p. 50.

290. Hoover, H. 1927. Quoted on p. 52 of Shales. Ever paranoid, secretive, brutal and insecure, (McDougall. p. 86.) Stalin insisted on living down to the rhetoric of Communism. Seventy-five years later, the Chinese Communists kept the jargon of Communism while allowing the development of capitalism. Cognitive dissonance anyone?

291. Welch. op. cit. p. 53.

the peasants sowing and producing less. Not only was this an outrage, but it was incredibly stupid because collectivization is simply not an efficient way to organize agriculture. However, that was what the industrialization of the USSR called for,<sup>292</sup> and, as it also passed with control-freak Stalin's belief in terror,<sup>293</sup> penchant for power and ruthless repression,<sup>294</sup> that is what was done. Policy no longer mattered; nor did the law; nor did Marx, who had predicted communism would emerge in industrialized nations when, in fact, its biggest triumphs were in backward Russia and China. It turned out, Communism was a great way to industrialize albeit at the price of installing a permanent, repressive, totalitarian state government whose basic approach to a problem was to eliminate the dissidents who called attention to it.<sup>295</sup>

All that really mattered was control and power.<sup>296</sup> The change was labeled a revolution from above and was a triumph according to often fabricated figures. It was basically forced collectivization of the peasantry and was massively unpopular. There were food shortages, a lack of housing and rising prices.<sup>297</sup> In this reenslaving program with the judicial system a cover for state crimes,<sup>298</sup> replaced the Tsar's program with one that was much worse.<sup>299</sup> Peasants could now cooperate, be shot<sup>300</sup> or deported to forced labor camps in Siberia, while livestock in the country was reduced by half and farm production slumped.<sup>301</sup> In the Ukraine, in 1932-1933, 2,000 people were punished for cannibalism.<sup>302</sup> Reluctantly, the government came to the realization it could not coerce productivity,<sup>303</sup> but it never gave up trying. Sadly but not surprisingly, every policy which punished the framing peasants further reduced productivity.<sup>304</sup>

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292. Applebaum, A. *Red Famine*. Doubleday; New York. 2017. p. 90.

293. *Ibid.* p. 91.

294. McMahon, D. 2013. *Divine Fury*. Basic Books; New York. p. 207.

295. Applebaum. *op. cit.* p. 110.

296. Butler-Bowdon, T. *50 Politics Classics*. Nicholas Brealey; Boston, MA. 2105. p. 51.

297. McMahon. *op. cit.* p. 266.

298. Butler-Bowdon. *op. cit.* p. 268. Some of the trumped by charges which automatically condemned hapless souls to prison without trials or appeals were, "Praise of American technology", "Praise of American democracy", and "Toadyism toward the West". *Ibid.* The crime of stealing a hand full of potatoes or a spool of thread could net one ten years. After a speech by Stalin, the audience leapt to its feet and applauded for ten minutes before one man sat down. He was arrested the next day and sentenced to ten years on a trumped up charge. *op. cit.* p. 269. Seventy years later, Saddam Hussain's audiences had the same problem: It took some negotiating to establish when it was safe to sit down.

299. *Ibid.* p. 270. The numbers on executions are horrendous. Under the Tsars, seventeen people were executed per year; Under the Communists, the numbers ran well into six figures. *Ibid.* The tsars may have been bad in a passive way. The Communists were evil. And for what? Ten years after the revolution, the standard of living was still lower than it had been under the tsars. (Applebaum. *op. cit.* pp. 82-83.)

300. Hellie, R., *The Structure of Russian Imperial History*. *History and Theory*. 44, 4, pp. 88-112. 2005. (pp. 102-103.)

301. Thomson. *op. cit.* p. 621-622.

302. Kershaw. *op. cit.* p. 165. See also, Applebaum. *op. cit.*

303. *Ibid.* pp. 111-112. The American farmer to the rescue. In the Soviet Union's middle years (1963-1980), the USA sold between 150 million and 440 million bushels of wheat to the USSR. (K. Blake. p. 210.) We kept them on life-support during the Cold War.

304. Applebaum. *op. cit.* Chap. 10.

More generally, Stalin<sup>305</sup> took over the government which controlled the economy whereas, incongruously, Marx had framed it the other way around.<sup>306</sup> By usurping for the state decisions in matters of morals and ethics, which are properly the province of the individual,<sup>307</sup> Stalin made evil in the cause of Communism a duty and good,<sup>308</sup> the Devil being capitalism and hatred thereof justification for all breaches of morality, which was obviously a bourgeois invention<sup>309</sup> anyway.

Another bourgeois invention which Stalin felt obliged to honor in the breach was a constitution. Not only did he provide one in 1936, but it guaranteed universal suffrage, civil rights, employment and freedom of thought, press, religion, organization and assembly. Uncle Joe's fans will be shocked to learn that it was a just a scam perpetrated by a ruthless dictator who ruled by fear,<sup>310</sup> intimidation and brutality.

Had Stalin been committed to constitutional consonance, the constitution would read, "A citizens has the right to be deported to Siberia or executed. He/she has the right to vote for the candidate of the Communist party. He/she has the right to a lousy job at minimal pay. He/she is free to think proper thoughts, publish agreeable facts, worship me as a god and assembly and/or organize him/herself at any time I see fit."

The abuse of unconstitutional power reached its zenith with the Great Terror 1934-1937. Among thousands of others, eighty-three biologists and twenty-two physicists were executed.<sup>311</sup> Of the biologists, nine were geneticists who presumably did not adhere to the line of Trofim Lysenkoas, who espoused Marxist genetics—meaning he told the Politburo what *should* happen if crops obeyed Soviet policy. As it turned out, the crops were not, genetically speaking, very good Marxists,<sup>312</sup>.

One of the lesser results of this policy was the failure in 1937 of the population of the USSR to reach the level of 170 million predicted in the 1920's. The census showed only 156 million so Uncle Joe had the census takers avuncularly shot. To everyone's relief but no one's surprise, a follow-up census two year later showed the population miraculously grew 10% to the predicted 170 million.<sup>313</sup>

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305 Shortly before Lenin's timely death in 1924, he recommended that Stalin be removed from his post as General Secretary of the Communist Party for inappropriate and arbitrary conduct. Unfortunately for millions, this recommendation was ignored. (McWilliams. p. 643.)

306. Roberts, J. *The New History of the World*. Oxford University Press; New York. 2003. p. 908. Perhaps the fairest take would be that the relationship is reciprocal, but, when Stalin wanted to have control, he took over not only the banks—he got his start as a bank robber (Applebaum. p. 23.) and financial institutions but the police and army as well. For some reason, this calls to mind the saw, "In capitalism, man exploits man: In Communism, it is the other way around."

307. Blauvelt, J. 1936. *Forward to G. Record's How to Abolish Slavery*. The George L. Record Memorial Association; Jersey City, NJ. p. 25.

308. Lukács, G. *Record of a Life*. Edited by I. Eörsi. Translated by R. Livingstone. London. 1983. p. 76. In this context, it should be noted Stalin was conveniently schizoid—indulging in complete dissociations between what he said and did when convenient. (Gilbert. p. 65.)

309. Scruton. op. cit. p. 120. Scruton's basic pitch is that neo-Marxist philosophers were not scrutinized too closely because most critics agreed with their idiotically abstruse conclusions. An equivalent neo-fascist would have been blasted. This was at the start of the PC era—i.e., the 1960's and '70's.

310. Kershaw. 2016. op. cit. p. 265.

311. Josephson, P. *Physics and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*. University of California Press; Berkeley, CA. 1991. p. 308.

312. Watson. op. cit. p. 475.

313. Dolan, R. *UFOs and the National Security State*. Hampton Roads; Charlottesville, VA. 2002. p. xxi. A similar game was played in Red China after a disastrous attempt to improve agriculture. Rice production seemed to

To put the West of the 1930's into an intellectual nutshell, liberal, capitalistic democracy had discredited itself and was down and out. The choice for the future was between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. In the mid-'30's, neither had shown its true colors but there were hints from both as to extremes they might reach. Although there was not much to choose from between the two, retrospective analysis indicates the Nazis were seldom evaluated objectively but invariably in the context of the known and presumably worse threat of Communism, being viewed as nationalists who would save Western Europe from the real, imposing Red menace.<sup>314</sup> Nevertheless, in objective terms, the Nazis had been denounced by a hostile press, hostile radio, hostile movies, a hostile church, and a hostile government which harped on Nazi lies, inconsistencies, false promises and the danger and folly of their plans and programs conceived with a contempt for truth.<sup>315</sup> The Nazis never would have gotten anywhere had Germans been in their right minds, but they hated: they hated the Versailles Treaty, foreigners, liberals, democrats, capitalists and Communists. The functional irrelevance of the Nazi policies can be reduced to the price of bread: It did not matter if bread cost more, less or the same. What mattered was that the Nazis set the price.<sup>316</sup> What matters now is whether the Germans failed democracy or democracy failed the Germans.<sup>317</sup> In good and even trying times, people who believe in respectable leaders with a trustworthy system can make democracy work. Sadly, the rules of democracy must be cast with weak if not bad people in dire circumstances in mind. In the case of inter-war Germany had there been no Red threat internally or in the east, the Nazis would have had neither appeal nor future, so we owe Hitler to Stalin. Thanks a bunch, Uncle Joe. ☺

As for the actual nature of the Red Treat, the subtleties of theoretical Marxism were lost on pragmatists who embraced the theoretical potential of Communism. The captivating ideal was that the individual would be subordinated to the state.<sup>318</sup> It is a testament to the power of stupidity that so many bright minds were enslaved by the ideals of socialism that the crimes against humanity were lost in the propagandistic fog of hope. German Bertolt Brecht simply closed his eyes to the reality of the inhumanity of the Communist dictatorship. Enthralled by the dream, he could not abandon his faith in his essentially religious belief—even in the face of irrefutable evidence—that Stalin's night-mare-for-the-future was making a mockery of the dream, faith and belief.<sup>319</sup>

Likewise, Manes Sperbert, a Polish-Jewish writer in Paris at the time had doubts about Soviet Communism as early as 1931 but “Shrank from knowledge that would cause [him] both political and emotional difficulties”—meaning he would not challenge his schema. Given that the only apparent alternative was Hitler's Germany, maybe we should cut him some intellectual slack, but he finally came to his senses when the absurdities of Stalin's show trials in 1937

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increase when paddies were filled with rice harvested from other areas to the satisfaction of party leaders whose belief in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist science was confirmed. (Grayling. p. 242.) Generally, Mao adapted Marx to an agrarian society, to the consternation and befuddlement of pure Marxists. (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth. p. 260.)

314. Janis. op. cit. pp. 190-191. Judt. op. cit. p. 64. CBS News correspondent Walter Shirer privately noted the Nazis' fanaticism, sadism, persecution,\* regimentation, terror, brutality, suppression and militarism (Shirer. Sept. 1937.)—but no one is perfect. JFW.☺ \*Persecution was directed primarily at foreigners, Jews, homosexuals and Communists. Those not obviously otherwise mentally handicapped were left pretty much alone. (Holland. p. 91.)

315. Hett, B. *The Death of Democracy*. Henry Holt & Co. New York. 2018. pp. 197-198.

316. Drucker, P. *The End of Economic Man*. John Day; New York. 1939. pp. 13-14.

317. Hett. op. cit. p. 198.

318. Kovaly, H. *Under a Cruel Star*. London. 1986/2012.

319. Kershaw. 2016. op. cit. p. 450.

forced him, however reluctantly, to acknowledge what was going on right before his eyes<sup>320</sup> whether he liked it or not.

During WWII, the mentality of the Soviet secret police was revealed in a statement made by one of the agents of a round-up for deportation of some villagers:

“I knew they were enemies of the state and had to be “recycled”.... Stalin was much like a god for everybody. And all of his words were the last word on any subject. You couldn’t even think that it wasn’t right.... Every decision that was made was correct..... That wasn’t only my opinion. We were all thinking like that. We were building communism. We were obeying orders. We believed.”<sup>321</sup>

Any questions? Hardly as they were neither allowed nor necessary.

Thanks to such dedication, until well after World War II, Russia was much worse off, by any standard, under Communism than it had been under the Tsars. Nevertheless, the myth persists that everything improved directly after the revolution. This attests to the power of propaganda in the formation of perceptions and the structuring of comprehension. Of course, the Communists in Russia achieved a kind of brutal success via cruelty and tyranny that would have shamed the Tsars. Further, a party-induced famine caused 6 million Ukrainians to starve to death in the 1930's.<sup>322</sup> As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. noted, the USSR, in the 1930's, “...was a land where industrialization was underwritten by mass starvation, where delusions of political infallibility led to brutal extermination of dissent, and where the execution of heroes of the revolution testified to some deep inner contradiction in the system”<sup>323</sup> i.e., a case of profound psychic dissonance.<sup>324</sup>

Russians nevertheless came to enjoy a higher material standard of living than ever before,<sup>325</sup> although three generations of such success was all the Russians could endure under a system continually in conflict with or at best indifferent to a basic human bent toward self-interest in economic affairs.<sup>326</sup> Most emphatically and in direct contradiction to the prophecies of Marx and Engels, throughout the Communist era, two classes remained in Russia—the elite (who drove their fancy cars to their dachas) and the poor (who had nothing to spend and less to spend it on). Further, their prediction that the immaterialistic state would wither away could not have been more wrong. Repressive totalitarianism thrived and grew as never before while

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320. Ibid. p. 451.

321. Ibid. p. 362.

322. Conquest, R. 1986. *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. Oxford U. Press; New York. p. 303. Sad to say, the reporter, Malcom Muggeridge, who wrote up the famine was ostracized by the press for telling a truth at odds with the prevailing schema of the day. The 1930's were so embarrassing for the Red world that East German censors changed any reference to the decade to “The first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”. (Darnton. p. 161.) On the other hand, for Germany, the same decade was referred to as “The Good Years”. (Kershaw. 2016. p. 289.)

323. Schlesinger, Jr, A. *The Vital Center*. 1949. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. xviii.

324 The Tsars did not execute as many political prisoners in 92 years as did the Soviets in a single year. (Flynn. p. 178.)

325. Tuchman. op. cit. p. 6.

326. Djilas, M. May-June, 1988. *Aspects of Communism*.

power predictably corrupted the all too human leaders who were indifferent the truth and false, fact and fiction.<sup>327</sup> Totalitarians are not there for the country but for the illusion of it.<sup>328</sup>

A specific example of this was the experience of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who served the Motherland admirably in a number of major battles during WWII only to be arrested in January of 1945 for writing, in a personal letter, his belief that Stalin had betrayed Leninism and was responsible for some of Russia's early defeats in the war and a weak theoretician who used primitive language. For these crimes, he was sentenced to eight years in prison.<sup>329</sup>

Just as Luther had charged the popes with heresy and Jefferson accused his King of unenglishness, righteous critics in the 1950's, charged that the leader of the ruling elite, totalitarian Joseph Stalin—being human enough to be corrupted by power—was a heretic, deviant and traitor to the sacred cause of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Shock rippled through eastern Europe, where a loyal Polish Communist realized, "...we have been turned into idiots and dummies. It turns out that everything that happened before was wrong and false. I am no longer believe in anything". As Polish intellectual Jan Kott put it, "Whenever the facts stood in the way, the facts were changed. If genuine heroes were obstacles, they evaporated".<sup>330</sup>

To complete the intellectual charade, Stalinist Russia was presented by deluded historians as the rational culmination of the Enlightenment. Unnoticed by them was how easily reason degenerated into dogma via top-down control of human affairs accompanied by a callous indifference to human suffering.<sup>331</sup> As if he had read this book, in an essay which appeared in 1950, Arthur Koestler agonized over his failure to speak up and out at the time for friends and colleague who were victims of Soviet purges. "To one who for himself for seven years found excuses for every *stupidity* and crime committed under the Marxist banner, the spectacle of these dialectical tightrope acts of *self-deception* performed by men of good will and intelligence is more disheartening than the barbarities committed by the simple in spirit."<sup>332</sup> (Italics added.)

One who was too simple in thought was Politburo member Nikolai Voznesensky, who confused virtue with vice in 1950. He tried to bring workers in factories into the planning and management processes as well as into discussions about the aims and enterprises in which they worked— all this in a dictatorship of the proletariat. Facing the terror of cogcon, Stalin had Nicky arrested, tried, convicted and killed for doing what everyone talked about doing.<sup>333</sup>

As a Hungarian echo, a steel worker in Budapest denounced, the prevailing intellectually insulting climate: "I have been obliged to accept the opinion of others.....As that opinion changes it's demanded that mine change equally....I'm a man...I too have a head which I use to think". He yearned to be treated as an "Adult who lives and knows how to think".<sup>334</sup> In essence, the Party wins and everyone else loses when intelligent people realize silence is prudence.<sup>335</sup>

Slav dissident Milovan Djilas was sentenced to three years of "Conditional imprisonment" for criticizing Stalin and netted another seven for providing a foreign publisher with his truthful indictment of the actual order **The New Class**.<sup>336</sup> Not limited to mere criticism,

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327. Butler-Bowdon. op. cit. p. 48.

328. Ibid. p. 52.

329. Weerakoon, R. Solzhenitsyn. International Publishers; Colombo, Cylon. 1972.

330. Hall, S. 1956. Pegasus; New York. 2015. p. 96.

331. Mishra. op. cit. p. 101.

332. Koestler, A. The God that Failed. 1950. (Quoted on p. 860 of Gilbert.)

333. Gilbert. op. cit. p. 863.

334. Mishra. op. cit. p. 183.

335. Ibid. p. 184.

336. Ergang. R. Europe Since Waterloo. Heath; Lexington, MA. 3rd ed. 1967. p. 792.

Red Army commander Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko tried in the mid-1960's to revive true Leninism in the U.S.S.R. His campaign against lavish salaries and privileges granted to senior Communist party officials netted him six years in mental hospitals.<sup>337</sup> While party leaders wallowed in comparative luxury, the party betrayed itself and became one of the all time greatest oppressors of workers and peasants.<sup>338</sup>

If the first part of Khrushchev's vain boast in 1956, "... history is on our side. We will bury you."<sup>339</sup> ever was true, history switched sides sometime later. Fast-forwarding to the demise of the Soviet Union, reformer Mikhail Gorbachev began his reign as a good Bolshevik who sought to reform abuses in what he regarded as a basically sound system.<sup>340</sup> In 1986, he outlawed private income only to find that, when productive private gardens shut down, output of fresh produce fell to the point that the edict was dropped probably because people work harder for themselves than for the state. In a land in which sixty years of Communism had produced a working class of shift-less alcoholics,<sup>341</sup> his war on alcohol was even less successful than that of our dries, with thousands killing themselves drinking aircraft fuel, perfume and deodorant. Although there was no appreciable effect on drunkenness,<sup>342</sup> body odor or halitosis, tax revenues on alcohol dropped significantly. The net effect was that his economic reforms failed totally to increase productivity.<sup>343</sup>

Gorby's attempts at political reform were likewise doomed because tinkering with the system was useless when the system characterized by self-serving central planning, corruption and incompetence<sup>344</sup> was the problem.<sup>345</sup> Worse yet, *there was no mechanism within the system for reforming it*, so the need was not for a tinkering reformer but for a truly committed revolutionary. Instead, Gorby wanted to democratize the Communist Party if not Russia, and, like all would-be great reformers, aspired to take the party back to its roots—the good old party of 1917<sup>346</sup> which had become corrupted while wrecking the Soviet Union which struggled vainly to support it.

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337. When. F. *Strange Days Indeed*. Public Affairs; New York. 2009. p. 160. Just to keep things balanced, a few years earlier, in 1958, Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University Mississippi, was admitted instead to an insane asylum. The judge ruled that any black who thought he could attend Ol' Miss must be out of his mind. (Harari. p. 143.) It seems this ploy is commonly embraced when an establishment is challenged beyond schematic rea-son in the cause of cognitive consonance. (See en 461.)

338. Fukuyama. op. cit. p. 409. In 1956, during the May Day parade in Lodz, Poland, students tried to break into the radio station to play jazz. (S. Hall. p. 98.)

339. Khrushchev, N. Speech at the Polish Embassy in Moscow. Nov. 16, 1956. Oddly, these words did not appear in either Pravda or The New York Times both of which published the text of the entire speech the next day. They were added later by someone for some reason. Also, the proper translation of the last sentence is downright disrespectful: "We will walk on your graves." (McWilliams. p. 657.) Nitika's problem was that he was a true believer: he was a throw-back to Lenin and reveled in dumping on Stalin. (McDougall. p. 234.) While that was all well and good, he had trouble adjusting to the new realities of post-war economic and technological developments.

340. Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G. J, The international sources of Soviet change. *International Security*. 16, 3, 105-106. 1991-1992.

341. Hellie. op. cit. p. 107.

342. But it led to one worthy attempt at humor. A Russian boss ordered his secretary to strip in his office. She replied, "If we're going to have sex, we should close the door". "No", he responded. "Then they would think we are drinking." (Oldsfield.)

343. Simms. op. cit. p. 482.

344. Kotkin, S. *Armageddon Averted*. Oxford. 2001.

345. Hayward, S, *The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution*. 2009. Crown; New York. p. 423-424.

346. Sakwa, R. The new democratic revolution. In *Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990*. NY. 1990. pp. 192 - 193.

By 1989, the U.S.S.R. was a culture-bound failure with Marxism in total disrepute<sup>347</sup> and the military dominating all other systems to the point of collapse: It was not just falling behind the West; it was falling apart.<sup>348</sup> Although the signs were obvious and rampant, perhaps to maintain/justify Western rhodophobia and rationalize the power structure purportedly necessary to protect America, neither our intelligence agencies nor academic experts had a clue as to what was really going on in the inner workings of the overrated not so jolly red giant.<sup>349</sup> The planning apparatus was extolled,<sup>350</sup> military might exaggerated, public health overrated,<sup>351</sup> and the size and soundness of the economy overestimated by all the western intelligence agencies and experts. This was especially true of the CIA's Team B a collection of ultraextremists who, under President Carter, shared an "Apoplectic animosity toward the Soviet Union"<sup>352</sup> and hyped its threat to us so as to rationalize their rampant but unjustified fear of it.

In fact, the plan making apparatus was a shambles; spending on the military was underestimated by a factor of two it was an unsustainable 25% of its GDP;<sup>353</sup> health facilities were a sick joke; abortions, infant mortality, alcohol consumption were up and life expectancy down;<sup>354</sup> rat meat was being sold in Russian markets;<sup>355</sup> and the computer gap was such that at American high school students had better units than the Soviet military, whose scientists often had to abandon them to help in the fall harvest.<sup>356</sup> A song "Battle with Fools" by a Soviet rock band proclaimed that if one killed all the fools in the Soviet Union, no one would be left.<sup>357</sup> Workers were striking in their own alleged paradise, and isolated state leadership<sup>358</sup> reflected the long-term workings of Stalin's murderous purges of the 1930's, which have been theologically characterized as "Distortions to their souls".<sup>359</sup>

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347. Boot, M. *Invisible Armies*. Norton; New York. 2013. p. 476.

348. Morris, I. *Why the West Rules—For Now*. Farrer, Straus and Giroux; New York. 2010. p. 549.

349As one critic noted, if you want to make someone a Communist send him to the United States. If you want to make him a capitalist send him to Moscow. (S. Toure.) Former Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver agreed. After eight years of self-imposed exile in Communist countries, he expressed his willingness to return to America and accept any legal punishment pending. As he put it, "I would rather be in jail in America than free in any other country." (Bartlett.) Maybe he should have tried a liberal, non-Communist, Black Muslim-hyped country like Iraq or Iran.

350. Berliner, J. "Planning and Mangement" in *The Soviet Economy* edited by Bergson and Levine. p. 360.

351. Rositzky, H. Cited in *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* by A. Codevilla. Free Press; New York. 1992. p. 217.

352. Cahn, A. *Killing Detante*. Pennsylvania State University Press; University Park, PA. 1998. p. 138.

353. Boot, M. 2002/2014. *The Savage Wars of Peace*. Basic Books; New York. p. 368.

354. Eberstadt, N. *Tyranny of Numbers: Mismeasurement and Misrule*. AEI Press; Washington, DC. 1995. p. 130.

355. Farrell, J. *Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century*. Little, Brown. Boston, MA. 2001. p. 607.

356. Dobrynin, A. In *Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents*. Times Books; New York. 1995. pp. 522-526.

357. Schweikart, L. *7 Events That Made America America*. Sentinel; New York. 2010. p. 142.

358. Almarik, A. *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* 1970. Tellingly for fans of stupidity, Mr. Almarik makes the point that the longer the state of affairs perpetuates the status quo, the more rapid and decisive the collapse will be when the inevitable confrontation with reality comes. (Hayward. 2009. Endnote 40. p. 655.) As with the French Revolution, failure to make short-term accommodations make the long-term demise that much more certain and dramatic when it happens.

359. Hayward. op. cit. p. 113. Ever the paranoid, Stalin executed any army officer who showed initiative, appeared to be able to think for himself, was popular with his men or simply seemed competent. (Fawcett. 2012. pp. 254 and 272.) Early in the war, when he realized the purge had gone to the dysfunctional point of freezing surviving commanders into fearful imbecility, he had his chief executioner—the head of his secret police—executed. (Ibid. p. 273.) Hall, S Chap. 3.

By 1990, the reality really was that Gorbachev's revolution had run away with itself to the extent that he tried unsuccessfully to rein it in. He allied himself with conservative Communist leaders which induced an abortive revolution against him and his. I proved abortive because the *apparatchiks* bureaucrats conducting the would be coup could not function without rules: That is, they were trying to stage an oxymoronic "Legal revolution". Recognizing the resultant indecision, Boris Yeltsin promoted himself captain of the sinking ship of state and rose to the pinnacle of power in the disintegrating Soviet Union.<sup>360</sup> It disintegrated because, by its very nature, it could not release the ingenuity and energy of the people to save the government/state from itself.<sup>361</sup>

The practical essence of the Cold War was the arms race, with the Soviet Union stupidly trying to match the West bomb for bomb and missile for missile, when all they really needed was enough to destroy us. Gorbachev conceded that the insane militarization of the Communist states "...crippled our economy, distorted our thinking and undermined our morals...",<sup>362</sup> although just what their morals were remains an undermined mystery inside an enigma.

Whatever Communist morals are, they are reflected ethics of an underlying explicitly nontheistic, secular, ritualistic religion and rationalizing ideology which, through stupefaction, promote cohesion and inhibits criticism. The ideology includes strong elements which provide detailed guides to correct action which boil down to a mutual con: The people pretend to work; the state pretends to pay them,<sup>363</sup> probably because Karlo's model was 19<sup>th</sup> century Western Europe where people were not "Bourgeoise" or "Proletariat" but in fact producers or idlers.<sup>364</sup>

Basically, the people lived a daily cogdis contradiction between their real lives and self-promoting propaganda<sup>365</sup> warranting the observation: "Nothing reported could be further from the myth". For example, there was no censorship in Communist East Germany because the constitution guaranteed freedom of expression. Rather, those in control granted "Printing authorizations".<sup>366</sup> The literature that did appear in 1989 conformed to the principles of social realism (i.e., state sponsored fantasy) and promoted the "Historical mission of the working class in the struggle for social progress".<sup>367</sup> This meant no stories about the people lining up to flee the country the first chance they got and very few about factory workers and tractor drivers but many about officials who had their shoulders to the bureaucratic wheel, pushing literature if not the state to new heights as it—symbolized by the Berlin Wall: aka "The anti-fascist protection wall" came crashing down in front of them<sup>368</sup> having been undermined by Bruce Springsteen, Madonna and Kiss.<sup>369</sup>

In a broader context, belief in the edifying effect of a pilgrimage to Lenin's tomb reinforced veneration for him as sing-song incantations of maxims from Mao's **Little Red Book**

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360. Axelrod. op. cit. pp. 251-252.

361. Suskind, R. 2008. *The Way of the World*. Harper; New York. p. 135.

362. Gorbachev, M. Quoted on p. 257 of Gaddis.

363. Judt, T. *Thinking the Twentieth Century*. Penguin; New York. 2012. p. 222. One might say something similar about the early dating game: The guy pretends not to be interested in sex, and the girl pretends to believe him. JFW.

364. Jones, G. *Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion*. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA. 2016. p. 497. Originally: Marx, K. *Civil War in France*. (A pamphlet.) p. 337 of Vol. 22 of Marx and Engels Collected Works. New York.

365. Caryl, C. *Strange Rebels*. Basic Books; New York. 2014. p. 14.

366. Darnton, R. *Censors at Work*. Norton; New York. 2014. pp. 148 and 222.

367. Hager K. Message 36828 to E. Honecker. Sept. 27, 1985. Quoted on p. 154 of Darnton.

368. Darnton. op. cit. pp. 156 and 178.

369. Schweikart and Allen. op. cit. p. 801.

once served to honor him. All such systems use slogans and symbols to reinforce belief, build social cohesion by providing the devout with an exalted sense of righteousness<sup>370</sup> and inhibit comprehension and criticism of what is really happening. In the guise of explanations, ideologies serve not only to codify behavior but also to unify spirits and both motivate and restrict people. In China, ideology consigned phone books, street maps and the locations of gas stations to the realm of state secrets,<sup>371</sup> and in the field of mental health, discussions of Freud were taboo, with a mental illness commonly being attributed to “Class oppression”.<sup>372</sup>

While history shows that civilizations fail from the top down, Mao showed that revolutions can be led<sup>373</sup> and to some degree fail the same way. One such case was due to the motivational restriction on Mao’s Great Leap Backward. Designed to improve agricultural production, from 1958-1961, it plunged the peasantry into mass starvation, killing more than 40 million people courtesy of party activists who descended upon them from the cities with the farmers’ best interests at heart<sup>374</sup> and made Mao perhaps the greatest mass killer in history.<sup>375</sup> Another was the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the mid/late-1960’s during which weddings, hand-holding and kite flying were banned but only a mere 400,000 people were killed.<sup>376</sup> On the other, non-held hand, suicide was up to the point that strollers in Shanghai would not walk near high-rises for fear of being struck by falling bodies.<sup>377</sup> Lysenkan genetics made a resurgence,<sup>378</sup> militant ignorance was celebrated by the Red Guards,<sup>379</sup> a man was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for scratching his back with Mao’s **Little Red Book**<sup>380</sup> and thought was given to changing the colors on traffic lights so red would no longer mean stop.<sup>381</sup> As usual, books were burned<sup>382</sup> in the anti-intellectual cause of revolutionary orthodoxy, and the four “Olds” were slammed: Old habits, old ideas, old customs and old culture.<sup>383</sup>

Such totalitarian methods are never completely able to control information, however, so some knowledge of the outer world eventually seeped in and undercut institutional fear of change, improvement and technological if not political progress. If there is something positive to be gained from Mao’s reign, it was that his successor, Deng Xiaoping, instituted reforms to insure that no one would again have the power that Mao had to wreck China. Since Mao’s death in 1976, there have been new constitutions or major revisions thereof in 1978, 1982, 1988, 1993 and 2004, but the party remains above the law.<sup>384</sup> Politically, Chinese leaders hang on to the

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370. Hammond. op. cit. pp. 334-335. Mao’s Little Red Book is the all-time best selling book on insurgency primarily because as the ruler of the most populous nation in the world, the author could and did threaten potential customers with torture and death if they did not buy it. (Boot. 2013. p. 342.)

371. Caryl. op. cit. pp. 246 and 255.

372. Schell, O. Watch Out for the Foreign Guest. Pantheon Books; New York. 1980. pp. 22-23.

373. Skocpol, T. Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. World Politics. 40, #2, p. 154.

374. Caryl. op. cit. pp. 18, 174 and 176. Mao’s great break with Marx was his focusing on the peasants, whom Marx had ignored for the industrial proletariat. (Mao.) While he cared about the peasants as a class, he cared not a twit for human life. (Boot. 2013. p. 334.) People were a means to his end.

375. Hodgkinson and Bergh. op. cit. p. 240. His rival for the number one spot was Genghis-Khan.

376. Watson. 2001. op. cit. p. 540.

377. Hodgkinson and Bergh. op. cit. p. 240.

378. Johnson, P. A History of the American People. p. 557.

379. Caryl. op. cit. p. 124.

380. Garside, R. Coming Alive: China after Mao. Andrea Deutsch; London. 1981. p. 212.

381. Yu Xiaoming. “Go on red! Stop on Green! In Schoenhales, M. (ed.) China’s Cultural Revolution 1966-1969. M. E. Sharp. New York. 1996. p. 331.

382. Johnson. op. cit.

383. Caryl. op. cit. p. 243.

384. Fukuyama. op. cit. p. 363.

totalitarian format of Communism because it keeps them in power, but economically, they have, without admitting it, converted to state capitalism.

If the magnitude of state-induced stupidity is any measure of motivation, fear must be, unfortunately, a more powerful motivator than capitalistic profit. Like so many emotions, fear is not so much a blinder as a fixator in that the paranoid fixes attention on one feature of a situation while dissociating from and ignoring the relevance of other factors. The French policy toward Germany after World War I was a classic example of fear cum stupidity.<sup>385</sup> The French fear of Germany contributed to the creation of a "Frankenstein" monster via the Versailles Treaty which was based on an excess of uncoordinated expert advice and undigested information.<sup>386</sup> Looking backward and concluded, fittingly, in a hall of mirrors<sup>387</sup> it not only failed to bury German militarism but, *au contraire*, provided a basis for propagandistic rants and rationalizations which moral cretin, manic depressive and pathological liar Adolf Hitler<sup>388</sup> parleyed into his rise to the pinnacle of demonic power.<sup>389</sup> Put another way, as the victors looked out over devastated Europe, they set themselves the task of destroying what was left and succeeded.<sup>390</sup>

One simple PR item which paved Hitler's way to power was that the German people did not know they had lost the war. Based on their newspapers and propaganda, they thought they were winning, and when the armistice went into effect, there were no foreign troops on German soil. The returning soldiers were greeted as victorious heroes, so when the terms of the treaty were announced, the German people were shocked to the point of outrage.<sup>391</sup>

In 1925, the Locarno Treaties, designed to end the 1,000 year strife between the French and Germans, were signed and followed break out the champagne by three years of peace. Yet, even as the ink was drying on them, the Germans were devising ways of subverting them by rearming: e.g., money provided by loans from America to build factories for peaceful purposes were quickly converted into arms production. Hitler did not create but capitalized on the German craving for revenge.<sup>392</sup>

Not only did the treaty and the world-wide economic depression of the early 1930's play into Hitler's hands, but he was able to exploit given conditions because he knew well and ignored the limitations of ethics, objectivity and veracity. He took kindly to intelligence that was favorable and flattering, and his advisors knew good news enhanced the standing of those who delivered it<sup>393</sup> and informed him accordingly. A reverse/negative genius he had to build before he could destroy he knew that Sorel was right: truth was irrelevant to if not useless for

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385. Hammond. op. cit. 293.

386. Thomson. op. cit. 579.

387. Watson. op. cit. p. 174.

388. Bullock, A. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Harper & Row; New York. 1962/ 1964. Ghaemi, N. A First-Rate Madness. Penguin; New York. 2012. p. 170.

389. Ibid. 571. Kennedy, D. Freedom from Fear. Oxford University Press; New York. 1999. p. 7. During Hitler's distinguished service in WWI, never rose above the rank of Gefreiter (private first class/corporal) because his officers judged him to lack the leadership qualities of a sergeant. One constant in Adolf's political life was that he was underestimated by everyone. Politicians, businessmen, industrialists, labor leaders—all thought they could control him: No gentleman, he was going to be the PR front man to harangue the mobs de-spite of or because of his occasional grammatical errors. (Hett. p. 4.) Everyone assumed being in power would moderate his extreme views. (Ibid. p. 5.) For the lying bit—p. 38.)

390. Butler-Bowdon. op. cit. p. 92.

391. Kershaw. op. cit. pp. 118-119.

392. Butler-Bowdon. op. cit. p. 92.

393. Holland, J. The Battle of Britain. St. Martin's Griffin; New York. 2010. p. 396.

capturing crowds of credulous simpletons,<sup>394</sup> so he was not particularly interested in it and indeed detached himself from reality.<sup>395</sup> He lied first to the public, then to his friends and then to himself and was so convincing, that he fooled everyone. He particularly favored the big lie one so humongous that everyone figured it must be true, because no one would dare utter it otherwise. Paradoxically, he would lie while telling the truth,<sup>396</sup> as he did with his Labensraum pitch that Germany was going to take the Ukraine from the undeserving, Slavic untermenchen: At least it fit with his ideas about race. The triumph of his will was over physical reality, which he refused to acknowledge<sup>397</sup> to the delight of students of stupidity.

Indifferent if not contemptuous of truth and reality, Hitler really was interested in power,<sup>398</sup> and he knew that to get it, he had to tell the Germans what they wanted to hear, which was what he happened to believe anyway. He provided them with something fascism in which and someone himself in whom they could believe. That the basis for his personal schema was self-loathing<sup>399</sup> and nonsense made it none the less indeed all the more appealing to a people who felt betrayed and humiliated. A self-made, self-destructive, overachieving political artist if not architect, he provided Germany with a way out of the miserable aftermath of World War I. Too late did it become clear that the way out was a way down to cultural carnage that would have shamed the Devil himself.

Most emphatically, Hitler did not impose himself on a “..... nation of intelligent sensible, essentially kindly people....”<sup>400</sup> Rather, he made himself the rallying point for their Germanic madness as induced by loss of the war and the humiliating and incorrectly but widely presumed to be unjustified terms of the peace treaty. If he permitting one thing, it was for Germans to project on to him whatever “Vote worthy” values they wanted. On the other hand, he did not intend to defeat opposition parties but to destroy them through violence if necessary. Making a virtue of intolerance, he made a commitment to the German Volk to rebuilding a new state on the ruins of the old.<sup>401</sup> He called for a spiritual renewal to overcome the degeneracy of nihilism and offered a utopia that blended mythical elevation of past cultural values with a vision of a

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394. Hitler, A. *Mein Kampf*. Ralph Mannheim, Translator. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. (1999.) 240–242. In a similar vein, MIT economics professor Jonathan Gruber, in 2014, attributed the passage of Obamacare in part to the stupidity of the American voter. (Diamond, J. CNN. Nov. 18, 2014. 2:13 PM EST.) This in turn calls to mind the strategist who drafted Social Security—a program which is growing as it fails: (Levin. 2015. Chap. 3.) Thomas Eliot deliberately made it confusing to throw off the judges who would rule on the program’s constitutionality (Bresiger. p. 58.) and deceive the people, who the government would keep ignorant of the workings of the program. (Ellis. 58-59.) At about the same time, fascist plotters figured the American public would be dumb enough to believe the President’s health was failing and that he therefore needed some help running the country. (Arch-er. p. 155.)

395. Hett. op. cit. p. 13.

396. Ibid. p. 38.

397. Ibid. p. 45.

398. Szasz, T. 1979. The lying truths of psychiatry. In Duncan and Weston-Smith. op. cit. 140.

399. Waite, R. 1971. Adolf Hitler's guilt feelings: a problem in history and psychology. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*; 1, #2, 229-249. In a similar case, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (b. 1889) was a bit self-hating. He was 3/4 Jewish, and three of his brothers committed suicide. (Hecht. 454-456.) Hitler knew he was possibly 1/4 Jewish, and, bearing in mind he considered Jewishness akin to a sexually transmitted disease, (Rosenbaum. p. 140.) his concerted effort to prove himself worthy brought destruction upon himself and those who believed in him, who/ whatever he was. Btw, the Nuremberg Laws passed in Sept., 1935, defined a Jew as having three Jewish grand parents (Gilmore and Sugrue. p. 199.), thus incidentally but legally denying Hitler the honor of being Jewish.

400. Anonymous. Letter to the San Francisco Chronicle. Nov. 1938. (Cited on page 10 of Manning.)

401. Kershaw. 2016. op. cit. pp. 210-211. For an extensive consideration of the history of “Volk” see pp. 173f of Mishra.

future homogeneous and united nation which incorporated those cherished, past, tribal values into snappy, new uniforms.<sup>402</sup>

His "Revolution" in the 1930's was accomplished within the existing, republican/democratic political framework but was non-Marxian, in that it was not directed toward a re-ordering of classes.<sup>403</sup> Rather, directed toward creating a "New man", through a romantic revolution of mentality, values and will,<sup>404</sup> it turned society upside down and culture in-side out. The dregs of the streets became the establishment by perverting every liberal value and ideal of inclusive humanity into a horror of metaphysical obscenities<sup>405</sup> and moral insanity based on racial exclusion and Aryan fitness.<sup>406</sup> Despite ample evidence presented by the **Munich Post** that Hitler was much worse than everything he claimed to be,<sup>407</sup> almost no one perceived him as an existential threat. An exception: in his political wilderness, the disenfranchised, bipolar<sup>408</sup> Winston Churchill, voiced his wasted warnings of the impending debacle<sup>409</sup> in an era he characterized as one of "Unwisdom".<sup>410</sup>

Linking fear with hope, Hitler vindicated Churchill by appealing to a sense of tribal pride with his explanation of how Germany had lost the war. Teutons had been schooled to think of themselves as invincible and superior in every way to everyone else<sup>411</sup> so were at a loss to understand how they could possibly have been defeated. Hitler's thesis was that the German people had been stabbed in the back<sup>412</sup> by Jewish bankers. This idea not only gave an embittered Hitler the motivation to dedicate his life to avenging this alleged betrayal—making Hitler a challenger in comparative evil<sup>413</sup> in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to Stalin and Mao but it had immense popular appeal, as it saved the Aryan myth and directed against the financial community the unfocused hostility which had been created among the people by the inflationary collapse of the German economy after the war. This, in turn, had been induced by the presumably crushing reparations imposed in the Versailles Treaty, the demand for payments of which John Keynes

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402. Ibid. p. 452.

403. The allure of fascism captivated poet Ezra Pound, who was righteously disgusted with the abject failure of capitalistic democracy. In Italy, he fell under the spell of Mussolini and never did admit to comprehending the horrors of fascistic Nazism. (Kershaw. 2016. pp. 452-453.)

404. Ibid. p. 229.

405. Biddle, F. Nuremberg: The Fall of the Supermen. American Heritage; XIII, #5, p. 66. Aug. 1962. Meacham, J. Franklin and Winston. Random House; New York. 2003. p. 355.

406. Kershaw. 2016. op. cit. pp. 229-230.

407. Rosenbaum, R. 1998. Explaining Hitler. Harper Perennial; New York. p. 48. (Indeed, all of chapter 3.)

408. Ghaemi, N. A First-Rate Madness. Penguin; New York. 2012. Chap. 4.

409. Manchester, W. Alone: 1932-1940. Little, Brown; Boston, MA. 1988. Churchill, W. While England Slept. 1936. Hayward. 2009. p. 100. Throw in also "Germany Report" of the Sopade, (Voice of the exiled Social Democrats. Cited in Kershaw. 2000. p. xxxiii.) April, 1936 and pp. 10-11 of A History of the Twentieth Century by M. Gilbert. In addition, on May 5, 1935, in a speech in the House of Commons, he made a summary analysis of stupidity when referring to "That long, dismal catalogue of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind". (Ibid. p. 63.) On the other hand, some lessons are easy to teach and willingly learned. JFW ●

410. Churchill, W. 2005. The Second World War. Vol. I. The Gathering Storm: Un- wisdom etc. Penguin; London.

411. Stone and Kuznick. op. cit. p. 37.

412. Arnn, L. Churchill's Trial. Nelson Books; Nashville; TN. 2015. p. xxiii. Hindenburg, Gen. P. v. Closing line of his statement to the national assembly committee formed to investigate Germany's defeat in WWI. (Hett. p. 32.) He emphasized the absence of the will to conquer, showing Schopenhauer lived on. Nov. 1919.

413. Rosenbaum. op. cit. pp. 54 and 91. Stalin was tops in quantity—murdering or causing the deaths of about 40 million people (O'Reilly and Dugard. 2016. p. 140fn.) to Mao's 20 and Hitler's 12, but Hitler was worst in quality of deaths, relying extensively on agonizing poison gas to do the job.

presciently denounced as an act of “political unwisdom”, i.e., financial stupidity, (see in 35)<sup>414</sup> while presciently predicting another European war.<sup>415</sup>

If the Germans wondered how they had lost the war, that was about the only question they asked of Hitler. Generally, the German intellectual tradition is not the property of the people but of a few philosophers: It is quite narrow and usually absurdly deep. Even among thinkers, the tradition is not to ask probing questions but to provide arcane answers or—as do academically inclined psychologists—enunciate grandiose, idealistic, smug, logical statements about how the world theoretically should work. Both of these factors favored Hitler as he transformed ideological appeal into political power in a Hobbesian cultural war of all-against-all which he fostered and in which he thrived<sup>416</sup> right up to the disastrous,<sup>417</sup> self-destructive end.<sup>418</sup> Like so many twentieth century atoms banging into each other, European states and peoples clashed Poles against Czechs, Serbs against Bulgarians, Rumanians against Hungarians, and, until they were submerged, Austrians against their ever more vengeful and aggressive German cousins.<sup>419</sup>

In 1928, well meaning intellectuals supported the Kellogg-Briand Pact as an international instrument encouraging disarmament and renouncing war, which we declared illegal. Those opposing it i.e., the contemporary advocates of peace through strength—were roundly

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414. Keynes, J. Quoted on page 215 of Fawcett. 2012. The debt was finally paid off in 2010. (Ibid.) As for the treaty in general, French Field Marshal Foch was only slightly wrong when saying, in June of 1919: “This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years.” (op. cit. p. 216.) He was off by three months. For an excellent review of the treaty see J. Mac-Donald. Chap. 3.

415. Keynes, J. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. Harcourt, Brace and Howe; New York. 1920. p. 268. Not all his predictions were so accurate. At the start of the Depression, he predicted it would not affect Britain, and he regarded the look to the future as “Encouraging”. (Kersahw. 2016. 216)

416. Rosenbaum. op. cit. p. 46. Part of Hitler’s—and FDR’s— management style was divide and confuse: Competing administrators were given the same jobs. H. G. Wells (1933) characterized the Nazis’ book burnings as an assault on sanity, and there is something timeless about it. In 1817, Heinrich Heine, a Jew, noted Teutons’ “...love was no different than hatred for the foreigner and whose faith lay only in stupidity...” He went on to denounce German philosophers and historians who “Torture their brains in order to defend any [German] despotism, no matter how silly or clumsy it may be, as sensible and authentic”. (Mishra. p. 206.) 110 years beforehand, he predicted “A play will be performed in Germany which will make the French Revolution look like an innocent idyll.” (Heine.) He was in turn denounced by ultra-culturalist Heinrich von Treitschke, who noted that Heine had never composed a German drinking song. Anti-Semitism found early expression in Germany when, in 1807, Johann Fichte called for the deportation of all unassimilated Jews, and von Treitschke made it respectable during Bismarck’s reign. (Mishra. p. 207.)

417 In this context, note the remark of Secretary of State Cordell Hull in April of 1933— three months after Hitler took power—that “Mistreatment of Jews in Germany may be considered virtually eliminated”. (McWilliams. p. 652.) Perhaps he anticipated successes to be achieved by the German League of Human Rights in Berlin, (Hecht. p. 447.) an organization with a real future. Compounding the irony, in 1914, the world Zionist movement was headquartered in Berlin. (Tooze. 2014. p. 195.)

Hull’s optimism comports well with that of editors of the *Village Voice*, who, in May, 1959 opined there was “...no longer any real belief in the notion that segregation is in the nature...of things” only to be undercut by statements precisely to that effect on the floor of the U.S. Senate four months later by miscegenists James Eastland of Mississippi and Strom Thurmon of South Carolina. (Kaplan. pp. 134-135.)

418 The tradition of German intellectuals being obtuse started in the 18<sup>th</sup> century in response to censorship under Frederick the Great. Writers would deliberately construct elaborate sentences with gigantic words of which there are many in German just to confound the censors. They, in turn, would allow anything they could not understand, figuring if they could not understand something, neither could the people.

419. Zweig, S. *The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography*. Viking; New York. 1943. 401. One of the League’s problems was that it did not oppose war as such but only those that would alter the status quo. (Somerset, F. aka Lord Raglan. 1933. Quoted by Baker. 1989. p. 212.)

denounced by John Dewey as exhibiting “The stupidity of habit-bound minds” suffering from mental inertia.<sup>420</sup> Showing two types of stupidity and how quickly some hard won lessons are forgotten—the British opted for peace through weakness (i.e., diplomacy) while the French committed themselves to strengthening their static Maginot Line.<sup>421</sup>

Echoing analysts who predicted the impossibility of WWI, Thomas Watson, the head of IBM, dutifully relayed Hitler’s message to the International Chamber of Commerce in 1937: “There would be no war. No country wants war, no country can afford it.”<sup>422</sup> In the same prescient vein was the trenchant comment, “I am as convinced that he [Hitler] doesn’t want to fight as anyone else is....” by U.S. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy<sup>423</sup>—the anti-Communist father of a future president, who saw Hitler as a break against Russia.<sup>424</sup>

Maybe Hitler did not want to fight: He just wanted to invade neighboring countries peacefully.<sup>425</sup> In any case, he persisted in his bellicosity in the face of counsel from his minister of finance Lutz von Krosigk in 1938 that *the German economy was in a shambles and that Germany could not win a prolonged war against England and France, especially if they were backed by the United States*. When General of the Army Walther von Brauchitsch passed along a memo to that effect to Hitler, he received a severe tongue -lashing for his efforts. No one could talk facts or sense to Hitler, who alone knew what to do,<sup>426</sup> and at the top of the list was a new war—there **HAD** to be one.<sup>427</sup>

Others who did not included an anti-war group which contributed unintentionally to the out-break of war by basing policies on wishful thinking<sup>428</sup> to wit, the British attempt to appease Hitler was both a sad and classic example of groupthink gone awry if not amok. In 1938, the Chamberlain government had absolutely no interest in information that challenged their naive assumptions about Hitler's presumably, oft repeated peaceful intentions. In acts unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy, German generals sent *three* messages to the British urging a firm stand against Hitler,<sup>429</sup> but the British ambassador to Germany, Neville Henderson, played "Mindguard" and advised ignoring them. Basically, His Majesty's Government insisted on misperceiving Hitler as a nationalist who would combat Communism,<sup>430</sup> which may explain

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420. Dewey, J. May 16, 1928. Outlawing Peace by Discussing War. New Republic. p. 370.

421. Holland. op. cit. p. 45.

422. Maney, K. *The Maverick and His Machine*. Wiley & Sons; New York. 2003. p. 206. Unfortunately, cost is not a factor when statesmen plan wars. See: World War I.

423. Stone, R. with M. Colapietro. *The Man Who Killed Kennedy*. Skyhorse Publishing; New York. 2013. p. 61. Nor did the ambassador apparently learn anything during his time in Britain, sticking to the same mantra driven by self-interest and excessive stubbornness. He had a speculator’s smartness but was insensitive to the forces playing out around him. (R. Lee. Quoted on page 585 of Holland.)

424. Hersh, S. 1997. *The Dark Side of Camelot*. Little, Brown; New York. p. 70.

425 Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the outdated “Nation” was under assault by separatism, immigration and intervention (Barzun. pp. 774-775.) not to mention borderless cyberdom in the 21<sup>st</sup>. (Haseltine.)

426. MacDonogh, G. 1938. Basic Books; New York. 2009. p. 124. Tooze, A. *The Wages of Destruction*. Penguin Books; New York. 2006. pp. 155-156.

427. Heuss, T. *Hitler’s Weg*. (Hitler’s Way.) Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft (Union of German Publishers Association); Stuttgart. 1932. pp. 100 or 160-163. (See p. 240 of Hett.)

428. Zweig, S. *Beware of Pity*. Viking; NY. 1939. p. 9.

429. Shirer, W. 1959. *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. Simon and Schuster; New York. 380-381. Hersh, S. 1997. *The Dark Side of Camelot*. Little, Brown; New York. p. 69. Knightley is loaded with instances of the German generals trying to undermine Hitler to the point of losing the war.

430. Janis, I. 1982. *Groupthink*. Houghton Mifflin; Boston, MA. pp. 190-191.

why leaders of Die Schwarze Capella which proposed a coup against Hitler—were rebuffed by the British.<sup>431</sup>

In order to avoid a repeat of the lead in to WWI, the Prime Minister was urged on Aug. 7, to make a clear statement as to British policy: Otherwise, Europe would plunge into war.<sup>432</sup> The only problem was the British government had no clear policy, so the urging came to naught. Official views of events were so totally askew that the Czechs were castigated for threatening peace because they did not want to give half their country away to Hitler at the infamous Munich Peace Conference in Sept., 1938. To the credit of the Foreign Office, there were a number of critics of Chamberlain's murky policy, but they were resolutely ignored in the cabinet's inflexible pursuit of folly.<sup>433</sup>

Just four days before Germany invaded Poland in 1939, anti-Semite Henry Ford assured the **Boston Globe** that Hitler was just bluffing. According to him, the Germans “Don’t dare to have a war, and they know it.”<sup>434</sup> Not one to give up easily on his illusions, he mentioned a week later—three days into the war—to a friend that not a shot had been fired, and the whole story was manufactured by Jewish bankers.<sup>435</sup> During the next six years, Ford’s company was, as was GM, an arsenal for both democracy and fascism.<sup>436</sup>

Along with starting the war, Hitler—an inveterate gambler,<sup>437</sup> made several risky strategic decisions which proved disastrous. His first was in allowing Göring to talk him into letting the Luftwaffe polish off the British army at Dunkirk in May/June of 1940.<sup>438</sup> Göring was jealous of the army generals and convinced Hitler that too much success would go to their heads. Hitler should have countered by stressing the team approach to annihilation and could have pumped up Göring a bit with promises of glory for the air force in the coming Battle of Britain. However, he listened too much to a biased advisor, and with bombs exploding harmlessly in the sandy beaches—they hurt no one unless they hit him directly on the head in descent—bad weather gave the British time to pull off their miracle evacuation.

As bad as this was, Hitler's next mistake was even worse. As German air supremacy was essential before England could be invaded, he gave the Luftwaffe the task of destroying the Royal Air Force. This it was doing<sup>439</sup> and undoubtedly would have done had not Hitler gone completely berserk after the RAF staged some bombing raids on Berlin. Retaliatory raids on London were appropriate and should have been enough to assuage German rage, but Hitler insisted on switching the entire brunt of his air attacks to the strategically unimportant capital.

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431. Fawcett. 2010. Chap. 69. The opposition within Germany to Hitler was very real and very organized. All it needed was for the British to stand up for themselves. Unfortunately, they did not. (MacDonogh. Chaps. 6 and 7.) Another incipient coup was dropped in late 1939 for lack of support among the German generals who thought Hitler insane. (Holland. p. 31.)

432. MacDonogh. op. cit. p. 162.

433. Janis. op. cit. 187-188. Based in part on a misreading by Chamberlain of Hitler, whom the Prime Minister naively believed would keep his word. (Chamberlain. 1938.) Shamefully, he waxed, “What we did was to save her [Czechoslovakia] from annihilation and give her a chance of a new life as a new State ....” (Parliamentary Debates. Session 1937-1938.)

434. The New York Times. Ford Says It’s All a Bluff. Aug. 29, 1939.

435. Wallace, M. The American Axis. St. Martin’s Press; New York. 2003. p. 219.

436. Snell, B. American Ground Transport. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Feb. 26, 1974.

437. Holland. op. cit. p. 113.

438. Ibid. pp. 200-201. Durschmied, E. How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed History. Arcade; New York. 2016. pp. 248-249. Rating Hitler’s mistakes is difficult: Honorable mention must be made of his decision to declare war on America on Dec. 11, 1941. (Gilbert thought it his worst. p. 408.)

439. Mortimer, G. The Longest Night. Berkeley Caliber; New York. 2005. p 5. Holland. op. cit. p. 527.

While German bombers pounded the city in September, 1940, British moral unexpectedly soared<sup>440</sup> and the RAF recouped its strength and retained air supremacy over England, so the invasion had to be postponed indefinitely i.e., cancelled.<sup>441</sup>

Having learned nothing from the fates of Charles XII of Sweden<sup>442</sup> (1709) and Napoleon<sup>443</sup> (1812), Hitler committed his third and greatest mistake invading Russia, thus giving Germany the two-front war it could not possibly win. As stupid as the attack was, it was even stupider of Stalin to know<sup>444</sup> but *refuse to believe*<sup>445</sup> it was coming.<sup>446</sup> For the first few days after it began (June 22, 1941), Stalin froze like a Russian in electric lights, unable to comprehend what was happening<sup>447</sup> while Soviet commanders compounded their tactical predicaments by repeatedly allowing units to be encircled by panzer pincer movements.<sup>448</sup>

As dumb as this was, the Russians found themselves outclassed when it came to stupidity. When the Germans first marched into the Ukraine, they were welcomed by the people as liberators from Stalinist oppression. The residents thought nothing could be worse than life under Communism, but the Nazis set out to prove them wrong and succeeded. Ruthless and arrogant to the Teutonic core, the invaders found no particular satisfaction in victory itself, and soon their mindless idiocy in the form of needless brutality turned the population solidly against them.<sup>449</sup> Hitler could have had half of Russia with him against Stalin but instead turned

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440. Gladwell, M. *David and Goliath*. Little, Brown; New York. 2013. p. 149.

441. Toland, J. *Adolf Hitler*. Doubleday; Garden City, NY. 1976. pp. 628-629. In addition to his major errors, Hitler made minor mistakes which deserve dishonourable mention. He failed to learn from the British the importance of calibrated defense. Always offensive in his thinking, he failed to emphasize the production of fighter planes as the war progressed and, worse yet, insisted the first operational jet fighter, the Me-262, be used as a tactical bomber—although carrying bombs reduced its speed, which was its prime asset. (P. Kennedy. p. 140.)

442. Hattan, R. *Charles XII of Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration*. We bright and Talley; New York. 1969.

443. Fawcett. op cit. 45 and 46. The author notes it is easy to invade Russia but very difficult to do so successfully. The Vi kings from the north (Haywood. Chap. 7) and Mongols from the east succeeded, but no one from the west ever has.

444. Burns, J. *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; New York. 1970. p. 95. Hughes-Wilson, Col. J. *Military Intelligence Blunders*. Car roll & Graf; New York. 1999. p. 41. Bullock, A. *Hitler and Stalin*. London. 1991. pp. 791-793.

445. Stalin knew a war with Germany was inevitable but had learned too well the lesson from Tsar Nicholas II's mobilization leading to WWI that such an act could be perceived as a threat by an edgy Germany and provoke an attack.

446. Bethell, N. *Russia Besieged*. Time-Life Books; Alexandria, VA. 1977. pp. 26-27. The Russian high command was slow to learn the lessons being taught to them on the battlefields, but they eventually caught on. (P. Kennedy. p. 206.)

447. Freedman. op. cit. p. 213.

448. Glantz D. (ed.). *Initial Period of the War on the East-ern Front*. London. 1993. p. 31. Nor did the Germans ever learn how to get along with conquered populations. They applied the same self-defeating brutality in Crete, Greece, Yugoslavia, Brittany, Belarus, Norway and Rhodes (P. Kennedy. p. 198.) as did the Japanese at the same time in China. (Hartford and Goldstein. p. 108.) In the cause of inequality, the Nazis had a sliding scale of Aryanness in retaliation for the death of a German soldier: e.g., five Danes or 100 Poles. (Bennett. p. 101.) However, having missed on one of Rome's successful policies, the Germans alienated everyone equally as the doctrine of racial superiority offered no hope to any of the subjugated peoples of becoming members of the Reich. (Mazower. p. 7.)

449. *Ibid*. p. 83. Further, Hitler's plan for the area was totally irrelevant to extant conditions, having been formed before WWI and shaped by his distorted view of the Ukraine. In this, he was at least consistent: In most\* matters, his views were pre-WWI in origin, and he made no effort to update them. Specifically, regarding colonial domination, his ideas were strictly 19<sup>th</sup> century. Only in the matters of the strategy of Blitzkrieg and weapons production, in which his ideological prejudices played no role, was he innovative—at least up to the point that his

everyone against himself and his cause with a self-defining/self-defeating policy of alienation which marked the beginning of the end for him and his Reich.<sup>450</sup>

Further, after the failure of the invasion in 1941, Hitler affixed blame everywhere except where it belonged and stupidly concluded only his Schopenhauerian will power had pre-vented a complete disaster and then doubled down on his futile effort to win.<sup>451</sup> Finally, his refusal to allow the German Army to withdraw from Stalingrad while it still could was his ultimate act of idiocy.<sup>452</sup> It all but doomed the Reich and was due largely to the positive feedback mechanism by which Hitler's early victories led him via megalomania to overestimate his evaluations of military affairs and undervalue those of his General Staff, who proved to be righter and righter as the war wore on. Put another way, his vaunted will-power became a fatal virtue when it became a delusional stumbling block to learning and adapting to deteriorating and finally fatally disastrous circumstances.<sup>453</sup>

On the other hand, when war came to the Pacific, some of the revelations it brought with it were shocking to the point of embarrassing enlightenment. For example, Singapore was found to be a pregnable fortress, the fall of which was made all the more probable by the belief that it was invulnerable. It might indeed have been *impregnable* had the Japanese attacked from the sea as expected. However, being at war and thus not disposed to be accommodating, the Imperial Army invaded overland instead and thus were immune to fire from guns which could not be spun around and brought to bear on them.

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lack of scientific training inhibited his appreciation for novel technologies like rocketry and atomic weapons. He was also limited by his land-locked mentality—having grown up in Austria, he failed to appreciate the navy and what it could and could not accomplish. Likewise, he drastically underestimated the resolve of the peripheral powers—Russia, Britain and America—allied against him. Fatal in all matters was his inability to change his mind once he had made it up. (Schramm. P. Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader. Academy Chicago Publishers; Chicago, IL 1999. pp. 77-78 and 102-106.) He was largely self-educated, read mostly to confirm his usually original views, which he could do only by severely distorting facts, but never had a teacher to challenge his intellectual values (Maser. p. 154.) or the validity of his ideas. Authors he favored were Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Goethe, Schiller, Dante, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Marx, Bismarck and Kant. (Range. R. 1924. Little, Brown and Company; New York. 2016. p. 170.) \*A notable exception was his vehement antisemitism, which came to the fore right after WWI, when Jews bought out the prostrated German nobility. The seeds were probably sown by his father (Maser. p. 165.) and in prewar Vienna, a sump of antisemitism where he was exposed to, among other things, Ostara, (Range. p. 14.) a racist periodical which often had a swastika stamped on its cover. However his racism did not flower until after the war—that is, he apparently got his answer before anyone posed the question: Why did Germany lose the war? Even before it ended, the Kaiser indulged in anti-Semitic rants and linked Jews to Bolshevism, (Tooze. p. 135.) and General Ludendorff indulged in tearful tirades denouncing Jews, i.a., for prematurely embracing peace. (K. Epstein. pp 218 and 232.) Oddly, Hitler was totally off in one of his basic beliefs—that Jews were a race: They are not. Jews are a religious group. Anyone of any race can be a Jew. Jews were originally racially Semites—who could be Jewish, Muslim, Christian or atheistic. However, Hitler had a thing about racial purity and hated the Jews, so, for him, Jews had to be and were a race to be hated. The Nazi plan was to exterminate Jews much as anyone else might get rid of so many rodents. Nazis also described Jews in bacteriological terminology. (Kershaw. 2016. p. 19.) At the same time, Hitler referred to the “German race” (Butler-Bowdon. p. 93.), which was equally nonsensical. He was transfixed by “Race” and misapplied it all over. 450. Rosenbaum. op. cit. p. 90.

451. Kershaw. I. 2000. Hitler: Nemesis: 1936-1945. W. W. Norton & Co.; New York. p. 499.

452 Throw in declaring war on the United States. (Ambrose. 1992.) Re: Stalingrad Hitler flew into a rage and with clenched fists and foaming\* at the mouth all but attacked a staffer who was reading the numbers of Russian troops available for action. By late 1942, his “Decisions ceased to have anything in common with the principles of strategy.... They were the product of a violent nature which acknowledged no bounds to possibility and which made the wish the father of the deed.” (Halder.) \*Another report of Hitler foaming at the mouth followed the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on him. (Gilbert. p. 586.)

453. Schramm. op. cit. pp. 109-117.

Their landings on the Malayan peninsula were facilitated by the sinking, by the Japanese air force, of the British ships of the line *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, which steamed into battle according to the long-held view of the Admiralty that air planes could not sink capital ships.<sup>454</sup> Worst of all, the commanding general, A. E. Percival, refused to make defensive preparations for one of the stupidest reason ever to do so would be bad for morale.<sup>455</sup> Singapore thus found itself added to the list of violable defenses which, like the Maginot Line, were invulnerable to everything but imagination, maneuver and attack.<sup>456</sup>

Those three elements mixed with fatal overdoses of wishful thinking and complacent preconceptions on the part of those responsible for defense provide an explanation for the debacle at Pearl Harbor,<sup>457</sup> which has been characterized as an ordinary blunder of the type in which the government specializes<sup>458</sup> and excels. In 1932, the navy conducted war games in Hawaiian waters which demonstrated Pearl Harbor's vulnerability to a surprise, predawn aerial attack launched from aircraft carriers.<sup>459</sup> Further, groupthink played a crucial role in the realization of the unthinkable,<sup>460</sup> with warnings—including Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox's on Jan. 24, 1941, to Secretary of War Henry Stimson "...the hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or navel base at Pearl Harbor ...."<sup>461</sup>—being repeatedly ignored if they contradicted the prevailing belief in Hawaii that "It couldn't happen here".<sup>462</sup> Thus, in March, 1941, when two aviation officers presented a paper concluding that an attack at dawn on Pearl Harbor launched from Japanese aircraft carriers could achieve a complete surprise, it was dismissed because the commanders at Pearl stupidly believed the Japanese simply would not take that chance.<sup>463</sup> Be-sides, intelligence experts believed the physically inferior Japanese pilots could not fly modern fighter-bombers hundreds of miles from their strange-looking aircraft carriers.<sup>464</sup>

The chance of success was also enhanced by the fact that American attention was focused on a known Japanese convoys moving toward Thailand. The whereabouts of a second convoy

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454. David. op. cit. p. 65.

455. Ibid. p. 68.

456. Wohlstetter, R. 1962. *Warning and Decision*. Stanford University Press; Stanford, CA. pp. 397-398.

457. O'Toole, G. 1991. *Honorable Treachery*. Atlantic Month-ly Press; NY. 382.

458. Schelling, T. 1962. Foreword of Wohlstetter. op. cit.

459. Dwyer. op. cit. p. 398.

460. Janis. op. cit. pp. 72-73.

461. Knox, F. Secretary of the Navy. Jan. 24, 1941. Communique to Secretary of War H. Stimson. Three days later, Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo informed the State Department that a staff member had heard "that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces in case of 'trouble'." (Cited in Ergang, 1967. p. 611.) Nor would the attack have been a surprise to anyone who had read *The Great Pacific War*, a novel written by Hector By-water and published in 1925. In it, the Japanese conduct a surprise attack on the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor with simultaneous attacks on Guam and the Philippines. At the time of its publication, I. Yamamoto, the architect of the actual attack, was a naval attache in Washington and may have seen a re-view of the book on the front page of *The New York Times Book Review* (Sept., 13; Sec. III; p. 1: col. 1.) under the headline, 'If War Comes to the Pacific.' (Toland. 1970. p. 190f.)

462. Earle, J. 1946. Hearing before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 79th Congress. U. S. Gov. Printing Office; Washington, D.C. Part 26, p. 412.

463. Ibid.

464. Bolger, D. *Why We Lost*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; New York. 2015. p. xxviii. In 1925, Gen./Col. Billy Mitchell predicted a dawn Japanese air attack on a Sunday December morning in the early '40's on Pearl Harbor in his book *Winged Defense* (Herman. 2016. p. 188.), although he did not anticipate the attack would come from carrier-based aircraft.

of aircraft carriers was a concern to some in the intelligence community in Hawaii,<sup>465</sup> but no one seemed to have considered the possibility that the two Japanese fleets might strike in two places at once.<sup>466</sup>

Washington did not help clarify matters as all of their warnings were at best ambiguous and received amidst background "Noise" of many competing, irrelevant signals. Worst of all, in acts of petty, anal retention *and in defiance of explicit agreements*, officers in Navel Intelligence in Washington failed to forward messages<sup>467</sup> directly relating to Pearl Harbor to the commanders there,<sup>468</sup> thus contributing to reigning uncertainty. Still, it is a commander's job to protect his base so in the event of ambiguity, prudence would demand caution. The basic mistake base commander Admiral Husband Kimmel made was in assuming an attack would not occur at Pearl Harbor. The failure to heed the warnings, such as they were, was due to the tendencies of people to note and give credence to data and messages that support their expectations and of analysts to select interpretations of data or messages which confirm their beliefs.<sup>469</sup> In this case, both perceptions and interpretations were shaped by the self-confirming schema that the Japanese would attack somewhere else—probably thousands of miles west of Hawaii<sup>470</sup>—which they in fact did in Southeast Asia within hours of the dastardly attack on Hawaii.

However, at Pearl Harbor, the military commanders knew of the possibility of a Japanese attack in "Any direction"<sup>471</sup> and received warnings of possible danger from the War Council in Washington. None of them, unfortunately, was sufficiently explicit about the danger to Hawaii to alter the local officers' assumptions about their safety, since none of them directly contradicted the prevailing notion in Hawaii that Pearl Harbor was an un-likely target.<sup>472</sup> Thus, the commanders there indulged in the luxury of wishful thinking:<sup>473</sup> instead of finding out whether they were being threatened or taking other precautionary measures<sup>474</sup> like recon, they let their guileless assumption that the attack would occur elsewhere skew their judgment to their great regret.

Basically, the failure of the American commanders at Pearl Harbor to appreciate the probability of an attack there can be traced to a question they did not ask and an answer they could not have given. The question was: If the Japanese were to start a war, what would be the most important target for them to hit first? Had they asked this question, they probably would have come up with the wrong answer since they did not see their fleet from the Japanese perspective but rather persisted in smugly perceiving it as a deter-ent rather than an inviting target. Considering the value of their base, they should have considered an attack all the more likely. However, Admiral Kimmel thought less in terms of gain than risk to the Japanese and

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465. O'Toole. op. cit. p. 376.

466. Janis. op. cit. p. 94.

467 The most authoritative account of this fubar indicates Navel Intelligence in Washington withheld two messages which would have shown the commanders at Pearl Harbor Japanese interest in tactical specifics there—they wanted to know when the ships were in port and their locations pinpointed on a grid system. (Layton, et al. pp. 90-91.)

468. Layton, Adm. E, Peneau, Cpt. R. and Costello, J. 1985. *And I Was There*. William Morrow; New York.

469. Wohlstetter. op. cit. pp. 392-393. See also Bacevich. p. 117.

470. Janis. op. cit. p. 81. Stinnett, R. 2000. *Day of Deceit*. Free Press; New York.

471. Janis. op. cit. p. 82.

472. Ibid. p. 92.

473. Wohlstetter. op. cit. pp. 397-398.

474. Morison, S. *The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-1942*.

Vol. 3 of *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Little, Brown; Boston, MA. 1950. p. 138.

thought they were not stupid enough to chance losing their carriers and aircraft by sending them thousands of miles over the ocean to attack Hawaii.<sup>475</sup> Indeed, he thought the Japanese were not going to attack the United States at all,<sup>476</sup> the common assumption being that "...the Japanese would not be so stupid as to start a war they would be certain to lose within a few weeks".<sup>477</sup> Thus, since the raid was unexpected, it was in fact safe<sup>478</sup> and proved to be tactically, at least, very successful.<sup>479</sup>

Actually, low frequency radio transmissions of a Russian trawler near the strike force headed for Hawaii had been detected by SS **Lurline** on December 1 and reported to Naval Intelligence in Hawaii on December 3, 1941,<sup>480</sup> but, in one of the great bungled "Might have been" of the war, no one dispatched reconnaissance aircraft to determine their source and which could have discovered the threatening armada. Hence, in his sublime ignorance, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox reassuringly if falsely prophesied on Dec. 4, that no matter what happened, the Navy was not going to be caught napping.<sup>481</sup>

On December 7th, in the complacent state of groupthink-induced presumed invulnerability,<sup>482</sup> two more warnings were missed. The incoming planes were detected on radar and reported to army headquarters where they were assumed to be an expected flight of B-17's from the mainland due in at about that time.<sup>483</sup> Once again, data were interpreted according to prevailing expectations: No one attempted to confirm that the planes spotted were indeed the expected bombers—they were just assumed to be, and that was that. Also, officers on a destroyer sighted and *attacked* a midget submarine trying to sneak into the harbor.<sup>484</sup> This was reported to naval headquarters where the sub was dismissed as a false sighting,<sup>485</sup> of which there had been a number shortly before.

The general contribution of groupthink to the disaster at Pearl Harbor was that it inhibited anyone from breaking ranks and asserting that the base was vulnerable. That would have been contrary to group norms and probably would have been a wasted effort any-way. Usually, people do not contemplate scenarios that contradict group assumptions. The resultant communal mindset may boost morale, but the false sense of security provided is produced by distorting perception and trading off misunderstanding for the sake of the pleasing image.<sup>486</sup>

As for the Japanese, they accepted the risk of attack out of necessity. The Empire had to expand or die, as the leaders had become prisoners of their own ambitions. Thus, in a war of miscalculations, the attack on Pearl Harbor ranks as one of the worst, stupidest mistakes of the

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475. Janis. op. cit. pp. 84-85.

476. Kaiser, D. No End Save Victory. Basic Books; New York. 2014. p. 330.

477. Astor, G. Crisis in the Pacific. Donald I Fine Books; New York. 1996. pp. 25-26.

478. Franklin, B. Letter to Lafayette. Oct. 1, 1779. (Quoted on p. 386 of Isaacson. 2003.) An eternal rule: Safety in surprise.

479. Toland, J. The Rising Sun. Random House; New York. 1970. Chap. 8.

480. Farago, L. The Broken Seal. Bantam; New York. 1967. pp. 379-389. See also Stinnet, R. Day of Deceit: The Truth about Pearl Harbor. The Free Press; NY. 2000. pp. 196-198.

481. Knox, F. Dec. 4, 1941. Quoted on page 647 of McWilliams. op. cit.

482. Morison. op. cit.

483. Wohlstetter. op. cit. 68. Brands. 2008. op. cit. p. 4. One cannot help wondering how different things would have been if there had been no incoming flight expected at that time.

484. Prange, G. 1981. At Dawn We Slept. Penguin; New York. pp. 495-496.

485. Wohlstetter. op. cit. 16-17.

486. Janis. op. cit. pp. 88-89.

war.<sup>487</sup> It undoubtedly had its roots in the belief, firmly entrenched in most Nipponese minds that as a unified, superior people who lived, worked and fought as one, Japan—the modern Sparta<sup>488</sup> was invincible.<sup>489</sup> Further, when the Japanese militarists saw films of American troops training with wooden guns—as their fathers had done in 1917,<sup>490</sup> they were convinced they could win a war against the United States. Had they seen a mop handle propped up on a sawhorse doubling as an anti-aircraft gun, a truck bearing a sign saying, “Tank” and logs as placeholders for artillery pieces,<sup>491</sup> they would have *known* they could win. All they had to do was seize Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, Java and Singapore, thus neutralizing American, British and Dutch military influence by taking or destroying their military bases. Further, they had to accomplish all this with only 25% of their army, as the bulk was committed to the main war, which was with and in mainland China.<sup>492</sup>

Trying to pick up more than they could with one chopstick, the Japanese really did not expect a war to ensue once they had destroyed the American Pacific fleet—they expected we would simply concede the Western Pacific to Japan and accept a dishonourable peace. It was one of the few things that could have galvanized Americans into a united war of fort, but this point probably was wasted on the militaristic Japanese, who had modernized, industrialized but not liberalized their society.<sup>493</sup> Misjudging America by their own imperial standards and assuming that Emperor Franklin Roosevelt could lead the country into war whenever he wanted to, they did not realize they were doing the one thing that would bring a war expanded to excess upon themselves.<sup>494</sup> In this sense, the Japanese leaders were self-interested, self-deluded men making decisions without regard for the consequences<sup>495</sup> much like standard politicians anywhere.<sup>496</sup> A logistics expert presented the numbers of American vs. Japanese productivity in military essentials—to wit, aircraft 5:1, steel 20:1, oil 100:1 only to find what he said fell on deaf ears. As a specific example of the positive feedback model in action, the army, which was in control, often murdered dissenters. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto proved to be an exception in this regard: When he raised his concerns regarding the vast industrial gulf between the two

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487. Tansill, C. From an interview with J. Garraty. *American Heritage*; XXI, #2, p. 62. Feb. 1970. Alexander, B. *How America Got It Right*. Crown Forum; New York. 2005. p. 119. *New York Review of Books*. May 17, 2001.

488. Butler-Bowdon. *op. cit.* p. 179.

489. *Cardinal Principles of National Polity*. A Japanese school book cited on page 221 of J. Dower’s *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. Pantheon; New York. 1986.

490. Tooze. 2014. *op. cit.* p. 202.

491. Berger, M. *American Soldier—One Year After*. *New York Times*. Nov. 23, 1941.

492. Kennedy, P. *op. cit.* pp. 287 and 293-294.

493. *Ibid.* p. 284.

494. Tuchman. 1984. *op. cit.* p. 31. According to Toland, (1970. p. 187.) the war in the Pacific was fought due to mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, mistranslations, Japanese opportunism, irrationality, honor, pride and fear as well as American racial prejudice, distrust, ignorance, rigidity, self-righteousness, national pride and fear—everything but stupidity. A summary statement on war in general was made by a noted General: “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, and its stupidity.” (Dwight D. Eisenhower. Jan. 10, 1946. K. Davis. 2015. p. 194.) As for the re-action of the American public to the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, from coast to coast, in every city and village, all rose in unison and with one outraged voice called out, “Where is that?” (Meacham. 2015, p. 38.) More germane to this work was the comment by an anonymous sailor as the Japanese were bombing all around him, “I didn’t even know they were mad at us”.

495. Emperor Hirohito remained an unindicted war criminal after the war because the Al-lies needed him for political stability. This was a blatant case of sacrificing justice and the truth for political expediency (Herman. 2016. p. 700). Had he just said, “No”, Japan would not have fought the war.

496. Herman. *op. cit.* p. 701.

countries, he was dispatched to sea duty.<sup>497</sup> As the war developed, the military leaders were slow to accept the hopelessness of their plight, preferring to believe a mind-over-matter mantra,<sup>498</sup> which was the Oriental equivalent of Hitler's belief in Nietzsche's will power. Essentially, Japan was doomed by a world view that enslaved them and made surrender all but impossible.<sup>499</sup>

It did not take long for stupidity to manifest itself elsewhere in America once fear of attack took root. On December 9<sup>th</sup>, Lt. Col. John DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army of the Western Defense Command announced that Japanese warplanes had flown over San Francisco the previous night. He admitted he did not know why bombs were not dropped, but it probably was because there were no planes at all flying over the city. Nevertheless, he was furious with San Franciscans who did not take blackout orders seriously, denouncing the people as "Inane, idiotic and foolish".<sup>500</sup>

Col. Dewitt might have saved his labels for Commander in chief of the American fleet, Admiral Ernest King, who opposed convoying merchant ships in the north Atlantic, preferring to let unchallenged U-boats pick them off one at a time. He persisted in this misguided strategy for more than half a year as statistics piled up proving him wrong.<sup>501</sup> Gen. Eisenhower confided in his diary we would win the war faster if someone would shoot Admiral King,<sup>502</sup> and when the press asked why the sinkings of our ships could not be stopped or at least reduced, the Navy responded with secrecy and lies<sup>503</sup> rather than citing the success rates of the convoy strategy from WWI.

First, the Navy began by withholding: in this case, the names of ships sunk.<sup>504</sup> Next came misinformation: Secretary of the Navy Knox claimed we had probably damaged or sunk fourteen submarines when we had done neither to any.<sup>505</sup> He based his erroneous claim on over-optimistic reports of naval warships and army planes, which mistakenly bombed and strafed whales as unwitting stand-ins for U-boats.<sup>506</sup> Then lying: about protection of merchant ships.<sup>507</sup> Admiral Manley Simons then set the standard for lying when he claimed the Axis "Has paid a terrible price" for the sinkings of allied shipping in the Atlantic when they had in fact paid no price at all<sup>508</sup> other than the cost of building, fueling and sending the subs to the killing fields off the American Atlantic coast.

Meanwhile, the army was proving Pearl Harbor was only the most striking example of the Allied propensity to ignore warnings during World War II. Before the battle for the "Bridge too far" at Arnhem in September, 1944, the British were warned by the Dutch underground that the paratroopers would be dropping right onto German tanks.<sup>509</sup> Unfortunately, British General Bernard Montgomery had a plan, and since the panzers were not in it, a compromise had to be

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497. Schweikart and Allen. op. cit. p. 614.

498. Morck, R. and M. Nakamura. Frog in a Well in R. Morck (ed.) A History of Corporate Governance Around the World. Chicago University Press; Chicago, IL. 2005. p. 421.

499. Schweikart and Allen. op. cit. p. 655.

500. Los Angeles Times. Bay City Warned Raid Peril Real. Dec. 10, 1941.

501. Geroux, W. The Mathews Men. Viking; New York. 2016. p. 73.

502. Eisenhower, Gen. D. Undated diary entry—probably circa 1943. Cited on page 72 of Geroux.

503. Geroux. op. cit. p. 75.

504. Ibid.

505. Ibid. p. 76.

506. Ibid. p. 73.

507. Hudgins, G. Letter to his wife Salome. Early July, 1942. Quoted on page 180 of Geroux.

508. Geroux. op. cit. p. 77.

509. Ryan, C. 1974. A Bridge Too Far. Simon and Schuster; New York.

and was reached: The tanks were blithely assumed to be out of gas, and the debacle went off on shed-u-ul.<sup>510</sup>

Similar warnings were given the Allies before the Battle of the Bulge<sup>511</sup> a few months later when refugees told of masses of German troops concentrated just out of sight of our armies. However, these reports were dismissed rather than checked out. Other reports of a coming offensive filled intelligence files but were likewise given scant attention<sup>512</sup> because of (according to British historian F. H. Hinsley) a “Besetting tendency in intelligence to become too wedded to one view of enemy intentions”<sup>513</sup> that is, a stupid propensity to let a prevailing belief shape misperceptions. Fortunately, dogfaced GI's had learned something from their recent experience at Arnhem and in their way made an explicit point of winning the battle before Monty could come up with a plan to save them.

One should not conclude that an officer's training is just an extended, antisentinal course on "Warnings: How to Ignore Them". Major General John Lucas proved this in a backhanded way as commander of the American landing at Anzio in January, 1944. This was an unfortunate example of a general not being informed as to what was going on. The Allies had cracked the German code, so Lucas's superiors knew the German army was in a weak position but could not tell Gen. Lucas how they knew and how sure they were for fear of revealing the code breaking coup. Consequently, Gen. Lucas ignored the urgings of his superiors, giving the Germans time to trap his troops on the beach<sup>514</sup> and recreate the makings of the disaster at Gallipoli.<sup>515</sup> Rome's liberation, which should have taken one day, took four months instead.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

The history of stupidity from the sinking of the titanic to the end of World War II confirms the behavioral model that stupidity results from the application of inoperative belief systems. Observations from various fields of endeavour military, diplomatic, political demonstrate the universal validity of this analysis of human behavior.

#### **BIO: James F. Welles**

If I had grown up, it would have been in a suburb of New York, but I never did get the hang of reality. My misspent youth led to ivy league colleges, a stint in the Peace Corps and a doctorate in biology. After teaching for a few years in Germany and mastering German, I played the piano for a few years in piano bars before coming to the realization that people go to bars to drink. Thereafter, I settled on being a writer, cranking out books and articles on the topic I know best—stupidity.

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510. David. op. cit. pp. 117-134. Bennett, R. Ultra and Some Command Decisions. In W. Laqueur (ed.) *The Second World War*. Sage; London. 1982. p. 232.

511. Parker, D. ed. *Hitler's Final Push*. Skyhorse; New York. 2016. A detailed account of German battle plans.

512. Payne, R. 1973. *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler*. Praeger; NY. p. 524.

513. Hinsley, F. and C. Skimkins. *British Intelligence in the Second World War*. Vol 3; p. 430.

514. Knightley, P. *The Second Oldest Profession*. Norton; New York. 1986. op. cit. p. 161. Wallace, R. 1981. *The Italian Campaign*. Time-Life Books; Alexandria, VA. pp. 130-132. Truly an historians nightmare: Two totally different explanations of the same event.

515. Gilbert. op. cit. p. 540.

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