PL EN


Preferences help
enabled [disable] Abstract
Number of results
2018 | 112 | 1-13
Article title

The theory of Kuhna Paradigm and the legal sciences. An outline of the problem

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This publication defines and characterises the theory of Kuhn's paradigm and tries to show its place and role in the legal sciences. The Kuhn's scientific achievements are based mainly on the history of the exact and the natural sciences. In view of the fact that the dynamics of the legal development is accelerating more and more, the "legislative fecundity" is even dizzying, as the mantra returns the question, can his theory be used in the legal sciences?
Year
Volume
112
Pages
1-13
Physical description
Contributors
  • Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Cracow, Poland
References
  • [1] Bird A. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its Significance: An Essay Review of the Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 63, Issue 4, p. 859–883.
  • [2] Latour B., Woolgar S. (1986). Laboratory Life. The Contruction of Scientific Facts. Princeton, New Jersey.
  • [3] Prior, J.W. (1983). The Concept of Paradeigma in Plato's Theory of Forms, A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science Vol. 17, pp. 33-42.
  • [4] Blackburn S. (1997). Oxford philosophical dictionary, Oxford University Press, p. 285.
  • [5] Kuchn T. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions, University of Chicago Press.
  • [6] Scientific method (2016). Oxford Dictionaries: British and World English, retrieved 28 May 2016.
  • [7] Paradigm Shift: How Expert Opinions Keep Changing on Life, the Universe and Everything, Imprint Academic 2015, p. 181.
  • [8] Stuart H. (1980). Cultural studies: two paradigms. Media, Culture and Society 2, p. 57-72.
  • [9] De Langhe, R. (2012). The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality, Philosophica 86.
  • [10] Firinci Orman, T. (2016). Science Model of Imre Lakatos. III. International Multi-Track Conference On History of Philosophy (PHILHIST'16).
  • [11] Kuhn, T. (1977). The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • [12] Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd Edition, The University of Chicago Press.
  • [13] Barber B. (1961). Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery, Science, CXXXIV, pp. 596-602.
  • [14] Shapere D. (1964). Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Durham, North California: Duke University Press, p. 391.
  • [15] Masterman M. (1970). The Nature of Paradigm, w: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Cambridge, pp. 61-65.
  • [16] Hoecke M. V., Warrington M. (1988). Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, Issue 3, pp. 495-536.
  • [17] Kuhn T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • [18] Hempel C. (1979a). Scientific Rationality: Normative vs. Descriptive Construals, in Berghel, Hubner, and Kohler, (eds.), Wittgenstein, The Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, p. 402.
  • [19] Hempel C. (1981). Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction, Synthese 46, pp. 389-404.
  • [20] Hempel C. (1983a). Kuhn and Salmon on Rationality and Theory Choice, The Journal of Philosophy, pp. 570-572.
  • [21] Hempel C. (1983b). Valuation and Objectivity in Science in Cohen and Lauden, (eds.), Philosophy and Psychoanalysis D. Reidel, Boston.
  • [22] Hempel C. (1988). Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of Scientific Theories, Ullmann-Margalit, (ed.), Science in Reflection, Kluwer Academic, Boston.
  • [23] Bird A. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its Significance, Essay Review of the Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. p. 63.
  • [24] Giere R., (1988). Explaining Science, University of Chicago Press. p. 37.
  • [25] Kuhn, S. T. (1990). The Road Since Structure, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1990, pp. 7-8.
  • [26] Niiniluoto I. (1984). Scientific Progress , Is Science Progressive?, Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Vol. 177, p. 75-110.
  • [27] Pérez D, G. Torregrosa J. M. (1983). A model for problem‐solving in accordance with scientific methodology, European Journal of Science Education, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 447-455.
  • [28] Lee A. S. (1989). A Scientific Methodology for MIS Case Studies, Management Information Systems Research Center, University of Minnesota, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 33-50.
  • [29] Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2008). Thomas Kuhn and the Chemical Revolution. Foundations of Chemistry 10, pp. 101–115.
  • [30] Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • [31] Popper K. (1991). The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
  • [32] Parvin, P. (2010). Karl Popper, New York: Continuum.
  • [33] Gonzales W. (2004). The Many Faces of Popper’s Methodical Approach to Prediction, in Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, edited by Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald. London: Routledge.
  • [34] Popper K. (1943). The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson and Co., p. 100 .
  • [35] Popper K. (1983). Realism and the Aim of Science. Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. i-260, p. 110.
  • [36] Popper K. (1962). The Open Society and its Enemies, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel. Marx and the Aftermath, Volume 2, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • [37] Gleick J. (2011). Chaos: Making a New Science. Open Road Media. New York.
Document Type
article
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.psjd-e387b432-fb66-4b1e-89cf-f6a1340213c7
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.