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2011 | 16 | 1 | 54-72
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Ruch i zmiana jako wskazówki wyzwalające abstrakcyjne schematy pojęciowe we wczesnym okresie rozwoju poznawczego

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Movement and change as signs releasing abstract notional schemas at early stage of cognitive development
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EN
Contemporary research in cognitive development shows that even young infants conceptualize reality, rather than simply respond in the non-reflective manner to the stimulation from environment. During the first four years of the child’s life these conceptualizations take a form of theory-like schemata of certain categories of events and of objects involved in these events, e.g. physical bodies, intentionally acting agents, tools and other artifacts, and living kinds. These categories are framed within (1) “naive physics” – theory of bodies and physical causality, (2) intentional stance, (3) teleological and design stances, and (3) essentialist beliefs. One of the main issues to be solved at this early stage of development is demarcating the scopes of application of theses schemata. Perceived patterns of movement and change constitute a very early and rich source of information that the child uses to solve this task. In this paper I review available empirical evidence (including our own research) for early processing of dynamical information and its role in conceptual-cognitive development.
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16
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1
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54-72
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References
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bwmeta1.element.psjd-747c4826-1ab7-4620-94f1-1b948049dd02
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