PL EN


Preferences help
enabled [disable] Abstract
Number of results
2019 | 134 | 2 | 270-280
Article title

Does Central Bank Independence have any effect on inflation in Sub-Saharan African Economies?

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This paper aims at assessing the potential effect of central bank independence on inflation in the Sub -Saharan countries. It suggests an extended empirical approach that distinguishes various measures of de jure and de facto independence. Results based on a panel data model of inflation clearly indicate that greater independence does indeed translate into decreased inflation. More specifically, de jure independence tends to matter more than de facto independence, and all of the political, legal and economic aspects of independence seem to be equally important. These results could further convince political authorities in the sub-continent about the necessity of less interference with the monetary authorities for the benefit of more stable dynamics of their economy.
Year
Volume
134
Issue
2
Pages
270-280
Physical description
Contributors
  • Faculty of Economic and Management, Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar, Senegal
References
  • [1] M. Arnone, B. Laurens, J. F. Segalotto, The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: survey of models, indicators, and empirical evidence, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 6 (2006) 4-85.
  • [2] Ajay Chhibber, Africa Rising Inflation, Causes, Consequences and Cures, Banks Policy, Research and External Affairs Complex, World Bank, working papers, 1 (1991) 577.
  • [3] A. Cukierman, S. Webb, B. Neyapti, Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcome, The World Bank Economic Review, 6 (1992) 353-398.
  • [4] V.Grilli, D. Masciandaro, G. Tabellini, Political Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, Economic Policy 6 (1991) 324-392.
  • [5] F. Bararuzunza, Performances des politiques économiques en Afrique Subsaharienne: Théories et évidences empiriques, Etudes Africaines 1 (2010) 203-235.
  • [6] J. S. Guillaumont, L'indépendance de la Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest: une réforme souhaitable? Revue d'économie du développement, 14 (2006) 45-77.
  • [7] F. Kydland, E. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977) 437-492.
  • [8] R.J Barro, D. B. Gordon, Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983) 101-122.
  • [9] B. Neyapti, Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development, Contemporary Economic Policy, 21 (2003) 458-475.
  • [10] G. Diana, M. Sidiropoulos, Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio, Journal of Economic Literature, 15 (2003) 385-402.
  • [11] I. Down, Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and the Sacrifice Ratio, Comparative Political Studies, 37 (2004) 399-434.
  • [12] R. J. Barro, Inflation and Growth, Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, 14 (1995) 121-144.
  • [13] M. Campillo, J.A. Miron, Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries? University of Chicago Press, working paper, (1997) 335-362.
  • [14] G. Mangano,Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences, Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (3) (1998) 468-492.
  • [15] J. De Haan, E. Sturn, Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter? Center of Economic Research 47 (2001) 390-403.
  • [16] L. Jacome, and F. Vazquez, Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008)788-801.
  • [17] J. H. Brum, The Effect of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries, Economics Letters 90 (2006) 189-193.
  • [18] J. De Haan and J. Klomp, Central Bank independence and Inflation revisited, Public Choice 44 (2010) 445 457.
  • [19] M. Presnak, Central Bank Independence in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis (1960 1989), Res Publica, Book 05, Presnak [1] (1996).
  • [20] S. M. Fouda, Independance de la Banque Centrale et Inflation dans les Pays Africains Sub-sahariens: Existe-t-il une Relation? Quarterly review 22 (1998) 455-479.
  • [21] G. M. Wessels, Are African Central Banks Sufficiently Independent for Monetary Convergence? South African Journal of Economics 74 (2006) 230-245.
  • [22] H. Kasseeah, J.M.F. Weng, K.P. Moheeput, Central Bank Independence: Evidence from Africa, Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences 2(4) (2012) 325-332.
Document Type
article
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.psjd-6f4c9a9c-c45d-4a9a-8576-b70bc20f854f
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.