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2016 | 51 | 62-71
Article title

Falsification and falsificationism

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EN
Abstracts
EN
Falsification is not meant to refute the theory, but only allows you to specify the probability of the truth of posed too. This action can be described as a set of hypotheses that have a researcher to help explain and describe the world around us.
Year
Volume
51
Pages
62-71
Physical description
Contributors
  • Faculty of Economics and Management, Nicolaus Copernicus University, 13a Gagarina Str., 87-100 Toruń, Poland, karolkrainski@o2.pl
References
  • [1] Hines R. D. (1988). Popper's Methodology of Falsificationism and Accounting Research. The Accounting Review, 63(4), 657-662.
  • [2] Grünbaum A. (1976). Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsificationism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27(4), 329-362.
  • [3] Medawara P., Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought, Methuen, London 1969, p. 32.
  • [4] Popper K.R., Wiedza obiektywna, PWN, Warszawa 1992.
  • [5] Wallis, C. (2005). The Evolution Wars. Time Magazine, p. 32.
  • [6] Caldwell, Bruce J. (1984). Some Problems with Falsificationism in Economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 14, 489-495.
  • [7] Hausman, Daniel M. (1985). Is Falsificationism Unpractised or Unpractisable? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15, 313-319.
  • [8] Popper K.R., Logika odkrycia naukowego, PWN, Warszawa 1977.
  • [9] Chalmers A.F., Czym jest to, co zwiemy nauką? Wydawnictwo Siedmiogród, Wrocław 1997.
Document Type
article
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.psjd-1f3911c8-2d30-47ce-9157-228a86302fcd
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