Shapley value as a measurer of shareholders decision power

• Authors: Dariusz Karaś
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Making decisions in joint-stock company on stockholders meeting is an example of cooperative game. Cooperative game theory focuses on the coalition players may form. Voting at the general meeting of shareholders is a special kind of cooperative game. We assume each coalition may attain some payoffs, and then we try to predict which coalitions will form. To determine the solution and measure the ability of shareholders to create victorious coalitions we can use Shapley value. Among the shareholders it assigns a unique distribution of a total surplus generated by the coalition of all players.

Keywords

EN

Game theory; Shapley value; decision power; joint-stock company

• Publisher: Scientific Publishing House „DARWIN”
• Journal: World Scientific News
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 90
• Pages: 231-242

Contributors

author

Dariusz Karaś

• Department of Management, The Cardinal Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Poland

References

• [1] R. Axelrod, W. D. Hamilton, The evolution of cooperation. Science, vol. 212, 1981, pp. 1390-1396.
• [2] A. H. Copeland, Review: Theory of games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 51, 1945, pp. 498-504.
• [3] P. Dubey, On the uniqueness of the Shapley value. International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 4, 1975, pp. 131-139.
• [4] J. Enelow, M. Hinich, The spatial theory of voting: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1984.
• [5] R. Farquharson, Theory of voting. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969.
• [6] A. Gibbart, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica, vol. 41, 1973, pp. 587-602.
• [7] J. F. Nash, Two person cooperative games. Econometrica, vol. 27, 1953, pp. 128-140.
• [8] A. Roth, The Shapley value: essays in honor of LLoyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988.
• [9] L. S. Shapley, A value for n-person games, [in:] Kuhn H. W., Tucker A. W., Contributions to the Theory of games, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1953, pp. 307-317.
• [10] L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik, A Method of Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review 48(3), 1954, pp. 787-792.
• [11] Y. Shoham, K. Leyton-Brown, Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
• [12] P. Young, The evolution of conventions. Econometrica, vol. 61(1), 1993, pp. 57-84.

• Document Type: article