Cooperation Model with Costly Punishment

• Authors: T. Gradowski , M. Mrowinski , R. Kosinski
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In recent years the issue of costly punishment in systems where free-riding occurs has been a subject of extensive research in the field of game theory. This issue is present in many areas of human activities like paying taxes, using public transport, wireless Internet or P2P networks. It is one of the most common dilemmas in modern societies. In this work we present a simple model of cooperation with three possible strategies (cooperate, defect or punish). In the model players explore the available strategies according to their interactions with other players. We introduce two groups of parameters. The first group is sociological-like and it describes the social acceptance for the free riding behavior. The other group of parameters describes the economical aspects of the system - the cost and efficiency of punishers. Using differential equations approach, as well as an agent based model, we look for equilibrium properties of the system.

Keywords

EN

87.23.Ge; 89.65.-s

Discipline

• 89.65.-s: Social and economic systems
• 87.23.Ge: Dynamics of social systems

• Publisher: Institute of Physics, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Acta Physica Polonica A
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 121
• Issue: 2B
• Pages: B-31-B-33

Dates

published

2012-02

Contributors

author

T. Gradowski

• Warsaw University of Technology, Faculty of Physics, Koszykowa 75, Warszawa 00-662, Poland

author

M. Mrowinski

• Warsaw University of Technology, Faculty of Physics, Koszykowa 75, Warszawa 00-662, Poland

author

R. Kosinski

• Warsaw University of Technology, Faculty of Physics, Koszykowa 75, Warszawa 00-662, Poland
• Central Institute of Labor Protection - National Research Institute, Czerniakowska 16, 00-701 Warszawa, Poland

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12693/APhysPolA.121.B-31