Full-text resources of PSJD and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl


Preferences help
enabled [disable] Abstract
Number of results
2012 | 56 | 1 | 65-101

Article title

Considerations on General Methodological Assumptions of the Sciences of Sport



Title variants

Languages of publication



The considerations included in the article are the result of several years of teaching general methodology for doctoral studies at Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw.The presented text consists of two basic parts. The first includes reminiscences and associated methodological resentment. The second presents a wide panorama of standpoints concerning functions and kinds of hypotheses, their role and significance in contemporary research programs of formal, empirical (connected with natural sciences and biology), and humanities nature. Sketchy and encyclopaedic interpretations, presented in the context of commentaries by the author of this paper, thereby dominate.The aim of the first part is to draw attention to some methodological mistakes which often appear and which have become common in some academic milieus to such a degree that some intervention and postulatory correction, referring to Polish and Western methodological literature, is advisable. These shortcomings are connected, among other things, with the structure of the scientific work, with the formulation and application of hypotheses, with relations taking place between the general methodology and specialized methodologies, kinds and types of research work, with reliability of information on sources of creative information, as well with the category of verification in its relation, on the one hand, to confirmation and corroboration, and on the other hand, to testing, checking, falsification, and terms close in meaning to the last one.The abovementioned resentment results, first of all, from the fact that the authors discussed in the first part usually insist on erroneous solutions, negating a priori, without becoming acquainted with the literature on the subject or making attempts to explain or initiate a methodological argument referring to sources and studies.That resentment is significant, among other things, in the causal sense - that is, because of the fact that, firstly, it justifies and substantiates the need for a statement presenting controversial questions in a content-related and formal way. Secondly, because thanks to such (that is, cognitive-emotional) introduction, the whole argument - not only in the first, but also in the second part - is much more interesting. It is saturated with authenticity. Many readers know the figures mentioned and are familiar with their - sometimes too insouciant (sometimes not very reliable) - attitudes to important issues from the field of research methods. It is also interesting why the people cited make mistakes. Hence, it is also advisable to look at a wider methodological context of justification (included in the much longer second part) dedicated to perhaps the most thorough characteristics of the hypothesis in the literature on the subject, which is available to the author. Without presentation of the controversial issues in the first part, the second part, more important from the methodological viewpoint, might be omitted by a considerable proportion of readers. In that part attention is paid mainly to issues concerning working, initial, zero, primary, introductory, directing, gradual, auxiliary, ad hoc auxiliary, bridge, futile and true, dangerous and safe, quite natural and neutral, individual and general, complete and incomplete, deep, strong, probabilistic and non-probabilistic (that is, deterministic), related, falsifying, basic, psychological, metaphysical and materialist hypotheses, as well as those concluding ones - that is, those constituting the final effect of definite (concluded here and now) research; hence, those which have undergone verification, confirmation, corroboration or modification as those which predict and explain a given research problem in the best possible way.









Physical description


1 - 12 - 2012
29 - 12 - 2012


  • Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw, Poland


  • Ajdukiewicz, K. (1938). Logiczne podstawy nauczania /Logical Foundations of Teaching/. Warszawa-Wilno.
  • Ajdukiewicz, K. (1948). Metodologia i metanauka /Methodology and Metascience/. Życie Nauki, 31-32, 14-15.
  • Ajdukiewicz, K. (1985a). Metodologiczne typy nauk /Methodological Types of Science/. In K. Ajdukiewicz, Język I poznanie /Language and cognition/, vol. 1 (pp. 87-313). Warszawa: PWN.
  • Ajdukiewicz, K. (1985b). Metodologia i metanauka /Methodology and Metascience/. In K. Ajdukiewicz, Język I poznanie /Language and cognition/, vol. 2 (pp. 117-126). Warszawa: PWN.
  • Aristoteles (1983). Metafizyka /Metaphysics/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Aureliusz Augustyn (1977). O państwie Bożym /The City of God/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Braithwaite, R. (1953). Scientific Explanation. Cambridge.
  • Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods. New York.
  • Carnap, R. (1969). Sprawdzalność i znaczenie /Verifiability and Meaning/. In R. Carnap, Filozofia jako analiza języka nauki. Warszawa.
  • Carnap, R. (1935). Logical Syntax of Language. London.
  • Carnap, R. (1973) Neopozytywistyczna koncepcja weryfikacji w ujęciu Carnapa /Neopositivist Conception of Verification According to Carnap’s Interpretation/. In B. Mejbaum, W. Mejbaum (Eds.), Główne zagadnienia filozofii I socjologii marksistowskiej. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Akademia Medyczna w Łodzi.
  • Chmielewski, A. (2007). Popper. In Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii. Lublin.
  • Colodny, R.G. (Ed). (1969). The Nature and Function of Scientific Theory. Pittsburgh.
  • Dąmbska, I. (1975). O konwencjach i konwencjonalizmie /On Conventions and Conventionalism/. Wrocław.
  • Demel, M. (1968). O wychowaniu zdrowotnym /On Health-Related Education/. Warszawa.
  • Demel, M. (1980). Pedagogika zdrowia /Pedagogy of Health/. Warszawa.
  • Domański, J. (1996). Metamorfozy pojęcia filozofii /Metamorphoses of the Notion of Philosophy/. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
  • Duhem, P. (1904). Ewolucja mechaniki /Evolution of Mechanics/. Warszawa.
  • Duhem, P. (1906). La theorie physique, son objet et sa structure. Paris.
  • Feyerabend, P. (1970). Against the Method, Minnesota Studies for the Philosophy of Science, 4.
  • Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against the Method. Londyn.
  • Feyerabend, P. (1979). Jak być dobrym empirystą /How to Be a Good Empiricist/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Fleck, L. (1986). Geneza i rozwój faktu naukowego /Genesis and Development of Scientific Fact/. Lublin.
  • Gratton, C., Jones, I. (2005). Research Methods for Sport Studies. London and New York.
  • Hegel, G.W.F. (1963). Fenomenologia ducha /Phenomenology of Spirit/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Hempel, C.G. (1945). Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, Mind, 54.
  • Hempel, C.G. (1962). Deductive-Nomological versus Statistical Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3.
  • Hempel, C.G., Oppenheim, P. (1965). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. In Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York-London.
  • Hempel, C.G. (1968). Podstawy nauk przyrodniczych /Philosophy of Natural Sciences/. Warszawa
  • Herbut, J. (2003). Hipoteza /Hypothesis/. In Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii. vol. 4. Lublin.
  • Hume, D. (1947). Badania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego /An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding/. Kraków.
  • Hume, D. (1963). Traktat o naturze ludzkiej /Treatise of Human Nature/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Hume, D. (1974). Związek konieczny /On the Idea of Necessary Connexion/. In S. Jedynak, Hume. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Myśl i Ludzie”.
  • Jevons, W.S. (1960). Zasady nauki /Principles of Science/. Warszawa.
  • Kamiński, S. (1981). Metoda i nauka. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacji nauk /Method and Science. The Notion of Science and Classification of Sciences/. Lublin :Wydawnictwo KUL
  • Kant, I. (1971). Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności /Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Kant, I. (1984). Krytyka praktycznego rozumu /Critique of Practical Reason/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Kant, I. (1986). Krytyka czystego rozumu /Critique of Pure Reasoin/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Kawalec, P. (2003). Hipotetyzm /Hypothetism/. Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
  • Kmita, J. (1975). Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk /Lectures on Logic and Methodology of Science/. Warszawa.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (1988). Pierre de Coubertin - w kręgu Olimpii i Laokoona /Pierre de Coubertin - in the Circle of Olympia and Laocoon/. Sport Wyczynowy, 7-8.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (1996). Metodologia jako forma agnostycyzmu /Methodology as a Form of Agnosticism/. Edukacja Filozoficzna, 22.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (1999). Bóg i afirmacja, czyli o pewności istnienia Boga /God and Affirmation - on Certainty of God’s Existence/. In Bóg, cielesność i miłość /God, corporality, and love/ (pp. 13-37). Warszawa: Aletheia.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (2004a). Rozważania o pojęciu i metodologii nauk o kulturze fizycznej /Considerations on the Notion and Methodology of Physical Culture Sciences/. In J. Kosiewicz, Filozoficzne aspekty nauk o kulturze fizycznej i sporcie /Philosophical Aspects of Physical Culture and Sport/ (pp. 65-83). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo „BK”.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (2004b). Hegel - człowiek jako niezbędne i centralne ogniwo w procesie samorealizacji Absolutu /Hegel - Man as a Necessary and the Central Link in the Absolute’s Self-Realisation/. Roczniki Naukowe AWF, XLIII. Warszawa.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (2006). Boxing Fight as a Manifestation of Movement Towards Absolute Abstraction: An Analysis from the Viewpoint of Hegelian Phenomenology of Spirit. Moving Bodies. Ethical Expertise, Phronesis and Moral Education, 4. Oslo.
  • Kosiewicz, J. (2012). Free Time versus Occupied and Unoccupied Time in a Philosophical Context. Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research, LV, 77-94. DOI: 10.2478/v10141-012-0015-2.[Crossref]
  • Krajewski, W. (Ed). (1972). Pojęcie prawa nauki a konwencjonalizm XX wieku /The Notion of Science and 20th Century Conventionalism/. Wrocław.
  • Krajewski, W. (1998). Prawa nauki. Przegląd zagadnień metodologicznych i filozoficznych /Laws of Science. A Review of Methodological and Philosophical Issues/. Warszawa.
  • Krawczyk, Z. (2005). Selected Writings. In J. Kosiewicz (Ed). Sport, Culture and Society. Warsaw.
  • Krawczyk, Z. (2006). Pisma wybrane /Selected Writings/. In J. Kosiewicz (Ed), Sport, kultura, społeczeństwo. Warszawa.
  • Krąpiec, M. A. (2003). Hipoteza metafizyczna /Metaphysical Hypothesis/. In Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii. Lublin.
  • Kuhn, T. (1968). Struktura rewolucji naukowych /The Structure of Scientific Revolutions/. Warszawa.
  • Lakatos, I., Musgrave, A. (Eds). (1968). Problems of the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam.
  • Lakatos, I. (1990). Racjonalna rekonstrukcja odkryć naukowych /Rational Reconstruction of Scientific Notions/. Lublin.
  • Lakatos, I. (1995). Pisma z filozofii nauk empirycznych /Writings on Philosophy of Empirical Sciences/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Levi, I. (1967). Gambling with Truth. New York.
  • Lewis, C.I. (1934). Experience and Meaning, Philosophical Review, 43.
  • MacAloon, J.J. (1984). This Great Symbol. Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games. Chicago-London.
  • Podsiad, A., Więckowski, Z. (Eds). (1983). Mały słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych /Small Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Notions/. Warszawa.
  • Mazierski, S. (1993). Prawa przyrody. Studium metodologiczne /Laws of nature. A Methodological Study/. Lublin.
  • Mill, J.S. (1962). System logiki dedukcyjnej i indukcyjnej /A System of Logic/. Warszawa.
  • Mortimer, H. (1987). Indukcja /Induction/. In Filozofia a nauka. Zarys encyklopedyczny. Wrocław.
  • Nagel, E. (1934). Verifiability, Truth and Verification. Journal of Philosophy, 31.
  • Nagel, E. (1970). Struktura nauki /The Structure of Science/. Warszawa.
  • Poincarè, H. (1908) Nauka i hipoteza /Science and Hypothesis/. Warszawa.
  • Poincarè, H. (1911). Nauka i metoda /Science and Method/. Warszawa.
  • Popper, K. (1935). Logik der Forschung /The Logic of Scientific Discovery/. Vienna.
  • Popper, K. (1977). Logika odkrycia naukowego /The Logic of Scientific Discovery/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Popper, K. (1992). Wiedza obiektywna. Ewolucyjna teoria epistemologiczna /Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach/. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Pseudo-Platon. (1973). Alkibiades i i inne dialogi oraz definicje /Alkibiades and Other Dialogues and Definitions/.Warszawa.
  • Reinchenbach, H. (1936). Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of its Problems. Journal of philosophy, 33. Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych /Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Notions/. (2000). Warszawa.
  • Schlick, M. (1936). Meaning and Verification. Philosophical Review.
  • Szaniawski, K. (1987). Hipoteza /Hypothesis/, In Filozofia a nauka. Zarys encyklopedyczny. Wrocław.
  • Siemianowski, A. (1983). Fakty, prawa, decyzje /Facts, Laws, Decisions/. Wrocław.
  • Siemianowski, A. (1987). Konwencjonalizm /Conventionalism/. Wrocław.
  • Whewell, W. (1851). On the Transformation of Hypotheses of Science. Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, 9.
  • Whewell W. (1847). The Philosophy of Inductive Science. London.
  • Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York.
  • Wójcicki, R. (1982). Wykłady z metodologii nauk /Lectures on Methodology of Science/. Warszawa.

Document Type

Publication order reference


YADDA identifier

JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.